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In recent years, cooperation between the UN and the EU in the realm of international 
peacekeeping has gone through major changes, including the remarkable achievement of a 
‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’ through which both 
organisations promised their primary role and responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Although the EU has reiterated its commitment to play a 
decisive role as a reliable peacekeeping actor within the UN framework, the decision of the 
EU to not always engage in international peacekeeping operations alongside the UN is 
puzzling. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the major driving forces behind decision-
making which may determine the likelihood of EU cooperation with the UN in international 
peacekeeping, by asking: ‘under what condition do EU Member States lead UN-related 
peacekeeping operations?’ 
Using a revised two-level game approach, this thesis identifies the most important chief 
negotiators involved in negotiations, and analyses the dynamics of decision-making between 
the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping at two different levels: 
international UN level and domestic EU level. Variables and conditions under which chief 
negotiator(s) are more likely to provide active leadership to drive the EU to decide to engage 
in a peacekeeping operation are investigated with insights from two prominent IR theories; 
realist and social constructivist theories. Hypotheses drawn from each theory and the roles of 
chief negotiators are examined in each of three cases selected: Operation Artemis (2003), 
EUFOR RD Congo (2006), and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007). With the key research 
outcomes from a comparative analysis of the three case studies, the thesis aims to contribute 
to comprehensive debates on the role of the EU as a promising partner of the UN in 
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 “The UN and the EU are natural partners. We share the same values and 
objectives, […] and we are engaged across the international agenda, from 
peace and security to democratization [sic], from humanitarian assistance to 
environmental protection. While the partnership adds value at the policy level, 
our overarching intent is to translate these norms into practical realities.” 






Over the past half century, the issue of international peace and security has occupied a 
central position in the international political system. Unpredictable and unstable events in 
international relations (IR) have increasingly exposed the need to promote cooperation in 
international peacekeeping. In this respect, to deal with threats to international peace and 
security in both a consistent and effective manner, the United Nations (UN) has spent 
decades improving its capacity. The UN has conducted various peacekeeping missions in 
which the so-called ‘Blue helmets’ were, and are still currently deployed, in conflict areas. 
Such deployments are buttressed in the UN’s universal mandate and legitimacy at the legal, 
political and operational level. French President Jacques Chirac highlighted the role of the 
UN, inter alia the Security Council, which is to assume the right to utilise the use of military 
                                                 
1
 Forwarded by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the UN-EU Partnership Report, 
“Improving Lives: Result of the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 
2009”, Brussels: United Nations System in Brussels, 2009. 
Chapter  1 
Introduction 
The UN and the EU: Promising Partners in Peacekeeping? 
 2 
force, and stressed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security rests with the UN.
2
 The UN has thus been considered the uncontested central 
player in the realm of international peace and security in terms of its legitimacy. No other 
organisation was in a position to compete with the UN, and states barely considered the 
possibility of carrying out peacekeeping operations outside of the UN framework.
3
   
However, as peace operations became more multifunctional and multidimensional, the UN 
encountered many difficulties and challenges in its peacekeeping activities. Since the 1990s, 
a growing demand for blue helmets has led the UN to enter into a number of highly complex 
and expensive operations. Some 80,000 peacekeepers have been deployed in over 30 
different operations. Such deployments have brought the UN’s capacity near the point of 
overstretching. The UN began to lose its centrality when its peace operations encountered 
considerable losses and fatal implementation failures in volatile regions such as Somalia 
(1993), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and Rwanda (1994). These difficulties and challenges 




Given the significant challenges facing the UN and the growing global demand for peace 
operations, the UN Security Council decided to appeal to regional organisations to provide 
robust assistance in order to enhance UN capacities with well-trained, equipped, mission-
ready and rapidly deployable forces.
5
 Moreover, as international voices against American 
unilateralism were amplified following the aftermath of the war against Iraq in 2003, the 
question of effective multilateralism to deal with security threats has been increasingly posed 
in hot international political disputes. Greater international and regional collaboration was 
required to fulfil the demand for multilateral crisis management. As a result, the UN is no 
longer the only universal security actor conducting peace operations. The increasing number 
of peace operations mounted by regional organisations has doubled in the past decade.  
Efforts by regional actors to develop their own ability to manage and sustain peace 
operations alongside the UN have created new opportunities for the development of more 
                                                 
2
 Speech of President Chirac to the General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003. 
3
 For example, see E. Newman, A Crisis of Global Institutions?: Multilateralism and International 
Security, London: Routledge, 2007, pp.43-55. and T. Tardy, “UN Peace Operations in Light of the 
Events of 11 September 2001” in T. Tardy (ed.),  Peace Operations After 11 September 2001,  New 
York: Frank Class, 2004, p.14. 
4
 Thierry Tardy (2004), Ibid., p.14. 
5
 Government document of Canada, International Consultative Group, “Towards a Rapid Reaction 




flexible and enhanced cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in the field of 
international peace and security.  
Meanwhile, since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has staked out a growing role in 
peace and security by developing structures and capabilities for a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) sustained by European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
 6
 The 
EU has presented itself as a reliable regional security actor committed to strengthening UN 
peacekeeping capabilities. The EU and its member states have also emphasised the need for 
cooperation between the UN and the EU in carrying out effective global peace operations. 
By espousing these commitments and dedicating substantial efforts to their realisation, the 
EU has gradually come to be expected to play a decisive role in maintaining international 
peace and security. The UN welcomed the EU’s willingness to share its heavy peacekeeping 
burden, and finally called upon the EU to play an important role in a wide range of 
international peacekeeping operations in close cooperation with the UN.
7
 Not surprisingly, 
the question of whether the smaller and regional EU can ‘rescue’ the larger and multilateral 
UN became one of the salient issues in the realm of international peace and security.
8
 
Although the EU has reiterated its commitment to play a decisive role as a reliable 
peacekeeping actor within the UN framework, the decision of the EU to not always lead or 
engage in peacekeeping operations alongside the UN is mystifying. Besides, despite the fact 
that a consensus-based decision-making mechanism in the second pillar of the Union, i.e. 
CFSP, involves all EU member states, there exist considerable tensions between members 
and the levels of interests and active roles played by EU actors vary across different 
operations. Some EU member states exclusively tend to jostle or to be reluctant to influence 
on a peacekeeping agenda, which results in a different negotiation outcome over UN-EU 
peacekeeping initiatives. Empirical evidence suggests that UN-EU cooperation seems to not 
                                                 
6
 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) has been relabelled the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since December 
2010. However, as most part of this research project has gone through pre-CSDP period, this thesis 
refers to the European common security and defence policy as ESDP. 
7
 For example, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the 
UN mission (UNMIBH), was deployed in January 2003. UN Security Council Resolution 1396 
(2002) “welcomed” the EU’s willingness to provide EU police mission in the country. Operation 
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was authorised following UN Security 
Council Resolution 1484 (2003). The EU deployed its military forces to the north-east regions of the 
DRC on a temporal basis until the UN mission (MONUC) was reinforced. See also EU Presidency 
Statement, ‘Review of Peacekeeping Operations’, New York, 16 October 2003. 
8
 For example, see D. Hannay, “Making Multilateralism Work”, CER Bulletin, No. 40, London: 
Centre for European Reform, 2005; and K.V. Laatikainen and K.E. Smith, The European Union at 
the United Nations, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.3.  
 4 
always happen as favourably as predicted in accordance with formal commitments and 
agreements. Given this puzzling paradox, this thesis seeks to examine the important 
conditions that may drive the EU to decide to take a responsibility in a peacekeeping 
operation.  
1.1 Research Question 
In 2008, there were many illegal armed groups triggering violence and conflicts in the Kivu, 
east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A quarter of a million people were 
forced to flee their homes and hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded as a result of 
intense fighting between the rebel forces, and Congolese army soldiers and their allied 
militia.
9
 A question immediately arose regarding protecting civilians and handling 
peacekeeping in the region; should the EU send an additional force to back up the 
extraordinarily overstretched MONUC?
10
 The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged 
the EU to take immediate action to protect civilians who were at severe risk in eastern Congo. 
EU ambassadors met on 31 October in Brussels to consider the UN’s request for the 
deployment of an EU force. Although Belgium, the former colonial power in the DRC, 
expressed a particular willingness to support the operation, France did not have much 
interest.
11
 In addition, Germany also opposed the UN Secretary-General’s request for the 
deployment of a military operation in eastern DRC.
12
 As an excuse for rejecting the UN’s 
request, EU diplomats said that they preferred to see “MONUC use its existing troops more 
efficiently before deciding whether an EU force was needed.”
13
 In the end, the EU undertook 
no commitment or action.  
Despite the urgent request of the UN Security Council followed by intensive EU-level 
discussions for a possible deployment of troops, the EU Member States decided not to 
deploy their forces to the DRC. This was an unanticipated outcome, because it seemed 
obvious that the EU and its member states should have been willing to cooperate with the 
UN in maintaining peace and security in the DRC. The EU and its member states have 
reiterated on several occasions their determined readiness to fulfil the responsibility to 
                                                 
9
 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Civilians Under Attack Need Urgent 
Protection", 7 November 2008.  
10
 Interview with senior officer, EU Commission, Brussels, 28 April 2010. 
11
 Interview with national officer, Council of the European Union, 29 April 2010.  
12
 See Roy H. Ginsberg, “Measuring and Evaluating CSDP Impact: The Case of EU-NATO 
Relations”, paper submitted for the Twelfth Biennial International Conference of the European 
Union Studies Association, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2011, p7. 
13




contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the DRC for humanitarian and 
normative reasons.
14
 In fact, the UN and the EU had already gone through successful tests 
and developments of close cooperation in peacekeeping, particularly in the DRC, through a 
number of operations including Operation Artemis (2003), EUSEC RD Congo (2005), 
EUFOR RD Congo (2006), and EUPOL in Kinshasa (2007). Hence there was a credible 
belief within the international community that the EU would play a most robust role in 
enhancing the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, especially when requested to do so by the 
UN. It is also noteworthy that whereas France demonstrated its pivotal role in receiving the 
EU’s imprimatur for a military mission in the Ituri region of the DRC in 2003, France 
expressed loss of appetite to respond to the UN’s request for further peacekeeping support in 
2008. This empirical case allows us to critically address some theoretical puzzles; under 
what conditions is the EU, especially its major states, most likely to cooperate with the UN 
in peacekeeping? Who and/or what determines whether UN-EU peacekeeping occurs? 
The study initially aimed to investigate the most significant motivations of the UN and the 
EU to cooperate respectively, giving an equal weight to both organisations. However, given 
the inter-governmental nature of the EU’s decision-making in the specific area of foreign and 
security policy, it is the EU member states that are the most decisive and powerful actors 
insofar as the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. According to 
Ginsberg, a unique status of the EU that is “neither a military alliance nor a single sovereign 
state” becomes “challenges that the EU faces in the field of international security and crisis 
management”.
15
 Ginsberg notes that the role of the EU as an international actor in foreign 
and security affairs needs to be evaluated through a perspective that ranges in levels of 
national effect of member states “from nil to marginal political impact and from considerable 
to significant political impact”.
16
 As Ginsberg points out, within this policy structure, each 
member state holds a different influence or impact on decision-making, and the likelihood of 
EU’s agreement and collective action seems to be more possible when the initiative is taken 
by the great powers. 
                                                 
14
 For example, see Anglo-French summit (2003), Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in 
Africa, Le Touquet, 4 February 2003; and Council Conclusions on the Great Lakes Region, 2879
th
 
External Relations Council meeting, Luxembourg, 16-17 June 2008.  
15
 R.H. Ginsberg (2011), op. cit., p.3. 
16
 Ibid., p.5. For a detailed examination of the ranges of foreign policy impact, see also Roy H. 
Ginsberg, Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration, Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. 
 6 
Upon an empirical investigation, the study discovers that there is one type of important 
variation across all UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation: leadership. To be more specific, in 
each case of UN-EU peacekeeping, the level of leadership or active role of the major states 
varied, and EU’s approval for the UN’s request for peacekeeping cooperation came about 
when considerable leadership was provided by the bigger states. This research posits that the 
variation on the role of the European major states is one of the most important factors which 
may determine the likelihood of EU’s decision to engage with the UN in international 
peacekeeping operations.  
Hence, the primary research question is clear: under what conditions do EU Member States 
lead UN-related peacekeeping operations? In order to answer the primary research question, 
there are two key steps in the analytical process. First, we must identify the most important 
EU actors who provided leadership during the dynamic interactions between the UN and the 
EU. Second, we must investigate the key motivational factors that contribute to the 
leadership role of the EU actors in decision-making. Theoretical perspectives are employed 
to elaborate on the plausible explanations. Combining the two sets of conclusions derived 
from the analysis, the study offers the best explanations for the driving force behind the EU’s 
decision-making on a robust peacekeeping engagement with the UN.   
 
1.2 Peacekeeping Operations 
The Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, is the foundation document for 
all of the UN’s work. According to the UN Charter, the UN was established to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war and one of its main purposes is to maintain 
international peace and security.
17
 More specifically, the Charter gives the UN Security 
Council primary responsibility and power to take collective action for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, which led to the Security Council’s adoption of a range of 
measures for peace operations, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. 
However, the term ‘peacekeeping’ per se is not explicitly provided in the Charter, but has 
evolved into one of the main tools used by the UN to achieve this purpose.  
                                                 
17




Chapter VIII of the Charter stipulates that the UN shall work with regional organisations 
acting within their geographical area. Collaboration between the UN and the EU has 
developed steadily since the first UN-EU Troika meeting in 2000. Both the UN and the EU 
are gradually asserting their promising roles and partnership as global players in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Yet, even though UN-EU cooperation is 
founded on shared common values such as human rights, rule of law and democracy, the 
range of UN-EU cooperation activities or modalities in international peace and security has 
not been clearly defined or specified. In fact, UN-EU cooperation takes a range of forms and 
denotations depending on the tasks to be carried out. Moreover, cooperation between the UN 
and the EU often adopts different terms that have a favourable resonance, so that states or 
institutions are inclined to use them in their statements and rhetoric in circumstances where it 
will look appropriate. Examples include ‘UN-EU cooperation in peace operations’,
18
 ‘Joint 
declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management’,
19
 ‘EU-UN cooperation in conflict 
prevention and crisis management’,
20
 ‘EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management 
operations’,
21
 and ‘UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping operations’.
22
   
Given this situation, cooperation between the UN and the EU needs to be approached with a 
precise and specific definition and scope within the realm of international peace and security. 
This study does not focus on the utility of the concept of peace and security. While the 
research does not propose to engage with the various perspectives and debates on peace 
operations, it suggests using the term ‘peacekeeping’ to label issues which share a number of 
characteristics of civil-military operations and which, in recent years, have been at the centre 
of negotiations between the UN and the EU. As it is the focus of this study, it is important to 
define peacekeeping in order to understand how it relates to and differs from a range of other 
peace and security activities, as well as to limit the scope of the research. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to offer a short review of the various definitions of peace operations, which include 
peacekeeping.  
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24 September 2003.  
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“EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 
2006”, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Occasional Paper n° 72, 2008. 
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Constrained Environment”, in M. Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the United Nations: 
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What is Peacekeeping? 
Peace operations, broadly, are supposed to embrace the whole gamut of activities performed 
by states, international organisations and other actors when dealing collectively with a 
conflict. The spectrum of peace operations was carefully and precisely presented in the 
Brahimi Report.
23
 According to this report, UN peace operations entail the following 




Conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of prevention in order to build a solid 
foundation for peace and security. When those foundations crumble, conflict prevention 
generally involves the application of a diplomatic initiative or measure to reinforce them, 
thereby conflict prevention seeks to “keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes 
from escalating into violent conflict”.
25
 Ideally, it should build on structured measures 
including early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving 
the conflict. Such preventive action or confidence-building measures are, by definition, low 
profile activities; “when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether”.
26
  
Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress, attempting to 
bring them to a halt. In other words, peacemaking usually uses diplomatic action or 
mediation to facilitate the resolution of the conflict, which brings hostile parties to a 
negotiated agreement. For this reason, the role of peacemakers in diplomacy and mediation 
is deemed as particularly important. Peacemakers can be envoys of governments, groups of 
states, regional organisations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be 




                                                 
23
 The report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations is commonly called the Brahimi Report, 
named after the chairman of the committee which produced it, Lakhdal Brahimi. This report 
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Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the 
use of military force to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. It 
requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. However, peace enforcement 
operations are usually beyond the UN’s ability to command, control, and plan. Instead, they 
are often carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organisation such as NATO. 
Peace enforcement operations are likely to disregard state sovereignty, particularly if the 
mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the 
peace enforcers into their territory. For this reason, an international mandate is normally 
necessary for the operation to be considered legitimate. 
Peacekeeping, as defined by the UN, is “a way to help countries torn by conflict create the 
conditions for sustainable peace and security”.
28
 Peacekeeping is a 60-year-old enterprise 
that started off primarily as a military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of 
forces after inter-state wars. In the past decade it has rapidly evolved to incorporate a 
complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to build 
the foundations for sustainable peace.
29
 Peacekeeping is designed to preserve peace and to 
assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers. The nature of peacekeeping 
includes, but is not limited to, the monitoring of the withdrawal of combatants from a former 
conflict area, the supervision of elections, and the provision of reconstruction aid.  
Peace-building is a complex, comprehensive, and long-term process of creating the 
necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peace-building is a term of more recent origin 
that defines broad “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for “building on those foundations something that 
is more than just the absence of war”.
30
 Thus, peace-building involves broader measures 
aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national 
capacities at all levels to effectively, as well as legitimately, carry out state core functions for 
conflict management.
31
 Peace-building includes, but is not limited to, reintegrating former 
combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law,
32
 providing technical support 
                                                 
28
 See “60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping: Looking Back and Moving Forward”, published by 
the United Nations, 2008; and “What is peacekeeping?”, United Nations, 2008. 
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Principles and Guideline” (2008), op. cit., p. 18. 
30
 Brahimi Report (2000), Ibid., para. 13. 
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 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline” (2008), op. cit., p. 18. 
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 For instance, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform. 
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for democratic development, and improving respect for human rights through education.
33
 
By addressing such a comprehensive range of measures, peace-building seeks to strengthen 
the foundation for sustainable peace and development.  
Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity, but the boundaries between 
different peace operations – conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building, 
and peace enforcement – have become closely linked and even blurred, as seen in Figure 1.1. 
















Hence, while UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed for the primary 
purpose of supporting the implementation of a peace agreement or a ceasefire, they are also 
likely to be involved in peacemaking and early peace-building activities to play a robust role 
in peace operations. In this context, MacQueen perceives a peacekeeping operation as an 
“activity with extremely flexible boundaries”, for which defining a dimension of 
peacekeeping is difficult and still complicated.
34
 Although the line between peacekeeping 
and other peace operations may appear blurred at times, there are nevertheless important 
differences that distinguish peacekeeping from other peace operations. Peacekeeping 
operations usually involve a huge range of military and quasi-military activities with the 
authorisation of the Security Council. Particularly in situations where the states are unable to 
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provide security and maintain order, peacekeeping operations are allowed to use military 
forces at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties in 
the conflict. On the contrary, other peace activities are normally prohibited from involving 
the use of force unless they are authorised under Article 2 (4) of the Charter by the Security 
Council. 
 
UN’s role in Peacekeeping  
UN peacekeeping crystallised during the Cold War as a “technique to control violence by 
means other than enforcement or counter-violence”.
35
 The early years of the post-Cold War 
decade were ones of remarkable achievement for the Security Council, and strategic context 
for UN peacekeeping was dramatically changed. Massive expansions of the UN’s 
peacekeeping activities were underway, and were a shift away from the earlier classical 
peacekeeping operations to much more complex, multi-faceted, and multidimensional 
enterprises. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations fall into two main categories: observing 
ceasefire and peacekeeping. Observational tasks were generally performed by military 
personnel who monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements following the cessation 
of hostilities between two state parties in dispute. After the Cold War ended, there was a 
rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. With a new consensus and a 
common sense of purpose, the Security Council authorised a total of 20 new operations 
between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. The UN 
achieved significant successes among its peace operations, beginning with Namibia in the 
late 1980s, and including Mozambique, El Salvador, the Central African Republic, 




The general successes of earlier missions raised expectations for UN peacekeeping beyond 
its capacity to deliver. Between 1992 and 1995, three major disasters struck UN 
peacekeeping operations and severely undermined the authority and credibility of the 
Security Council. Increasing numbers of demands upon peacekeepers without a requisite 
                                                 
35
 M. Berdal, “United Nations Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report in Context”, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, pp.35-44 (p.38). 
36
 For more details on each operation, see the history of UN peacekeeping (DPKO), available at 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml (accessed on 08 March 2012). 
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rethinking of the nature, role and scale of the peace operations, the gap between the tasks 
given to peacekeepers and the means supplied to them resulted in a number of high-profile 
failures in peacekeeping operations. The first of these occurred in Somalia where local 
insurgents inflicted heavy casualties on the peacekeeping forces, leading to the withdrawal of 
the large UN contingent and eventually to the collapse of the whole operation. The second 
case was in former Yugoslavia where, despite very large UN deployments and some tactical 
successes, the UN proved unable to prevent a massacre of thousands of civilian refugees by 
the Bosnian Serbs at Srebrenica “right under the noses of a battalion of UN peacekeepers”.
37
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most shamefully of all, was the small and under-resourced UN 
peacekeeping force in Rwanda which became a “helpless spectator” to acts of genocide of 
massive proportions.
38
 The UN was particularly criticised because of its disintegrating force, 
as two out of the three main troop contributors withdrew and no member state volunteered to 
replace them.  
These three high-profile peacekeeping operations came under criticism and the reputation of 
UN Peacekeeping suffered. On such less-favourable circumstances and fatal failures, 
Hannay refers to UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s as a “roller-coaster of a 
decade”.
39
 There was a widespread sense among the international community that the UN 
had become irreparably damaged by a succession of catastrophic peacekeeping failures. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the very word ‘peacekeeping’, which was originally a neutral and 




At the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to 
peacekeeping in the 1990s and introduce a series of reforms to strengthen its capacity to 
manage and sustain filed operations. At the UN’s Millennium Summit in 2000, Kofi Annan 
called for a special panel of experts led by the former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar 
Brahimi to consider the future direction of UN peacekeeping operations. The panel was 
given the task of identifying the principal weaknesses and shortcomings in UN peace 
operations and making specific and practical recommendations to overcome those 
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weaknesses. As instructed, the Brahimi Report focused upon how the UN’s peace operations 
might better manage planning, mission support, decision-making and personnel in the field 
to produce more effective results. The panel contained insights into how peacekeeping 
operations might be conducted in the future, which reinvigorated the ongoing dialogue with 
member states and other partners such as the EU on how to better adjust UN peacekeeping to 




EU’s role in Peacekeeping 
From its creation, the European Union has engaged in crisis management and conflict 
prevention, and now continues to strive for peace, security, and prosperity across the 
European continent and often beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been developing a 
credible foreign and security policy designed to contribute to peacekeeping through 
international crisis management operations. During the past decade, as a part of the EU’s 
CFSP, ESDP has developed rapidly to become the Union’s first coherent strategy to identify 
and respond to EU-wide security concerns. ESDP enables the EU to develop the 
international crisis management capacities required to achieve five key objectives: 
safeguarding the EU’s common values and fundamental interests; strengthening the security 
of the EU; preserving peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter; 
promoting international cooperation; and advancing democracy and the rule of law, 
including human rights.
42
 ESDP affords the member states a broad range of options for 
managing crises as well as an enhanced ability to act rapidly and collectively in the face of 
security threats.  
Since 2003, the EU has carried out more than twenty ESDP operations, including military 
and policy missions, rule of law missions, border management operations, and civil-military 
support actions, in Europe, Africa, and Asia.
43
 The EU has significantly increased its 
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 See UN document, New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, 
Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, New York, July 2009.   
42
 Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) defines the five objectives of the CFSP. 
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 For instance, military operations aimed at ensuring stability and security include EUFOR Concordia 
in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003), EUFOR Artemis in Democratic Republic of 
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operational contribution to international crisis management. Through autonomous and UN 
Security Council-mandated ESDP operations, the EU helps lessen the burden on UN 
peacekeeping capacities that are stretched close to the limit.  
However, as mentioned earlier it is important to note that the EU itself is “neither a state nor 
a traditional international organisation”.
44
 Besides, EU foreign and security policy has 
remained largely intergovernmental in character, focusing on member states’ preferences in 
decision-making. In order to understand the role of the EU in line with the UN, a 
comprehensive approach needs to be adopted that elucidates the extent to which the EU is an 
important partner of the UN. The strength and impact of the EU before the UN is determined, 
first and foremost, by the mere presence of EU member states, especially in the Security 
Council.
45
 As things stand today, the EU is assured at least two most influential seats in the 
Security Council. These two permanent member seats are reserved for the United Kingdom 
(UK) and France, which are able to veto any Council decisions and resolutions. 
According to Johan Verbeke, the maximum number of seats which the EU could 
theoretically occupy in the Security Council is six
46
; i.e., out of the total 15 members of the 
UNSC, on average and in practice, the EU can count on four to six member states in the 
Council, which will amount from around 27% to 40%, respectively. In 2006 and 2007, for 
instance, no less than one-third of the seats were in EU Member States’ hands, while the 27 
EU Member States stand for only one-eighth of the total 192 UN Member States.
47
 This 
numerical strength might be sufficient to guarantee the EU’s decisive influence in the UNSC, 
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because EU Member States have an obligation to defend common EU positions at this venue 
(see Figure 1.2). Given this legal duty, EU states on the Security Council possess ‘EU-
loyalties’ and are obliged to respect, pursue, and maintain common positions as well as 




Beyond voting power there is a financial dimension to the EU’s potential power at the UN. 
This power derives from the EU’s major contributions to UN activities. As in Figure 1.3, EU 
Member States provided around 36.6% of the UN’s regular budget in 2006 and around 38.9% 
in 2007.  










Source: United Nations DPKO 
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 European Constitutional Law Review (2005), ‘Article 10 EC, Article 6 EU, Article I-5 Draft 
Convention’, 1:17-20.  
Figure 1. 2 Article 19, Treaty on European Union 
(1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations…. [and] 
uphold the common position in such forums.  
(2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), […] Member States which are 
permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, 
ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to 
their responsibilities under the provision of the United Nations Charter. 
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The EU member states are likewise the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, to 
the tune of 38.6% in 2006 and 40.6% in 2007 (see Figure 1.4). In addition, the EU member 
states also provide around half of the budget of UN funds and programmes. Hence, there is 
no doubt that the EU Member States’ current share of the overall budget for UN 
peacekeeping missions amounts around 40 percent, making the EU by far the largest 
financial contributor.   
 
 
Figure 1. 4 Main Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations 
2006 2007 
Source: United Nations DPKO  
 
The EU’s high level of commitment to the primary role of the UN in maintaining 
international peace and security and its core function of peacekeeping is also reflected in the 
number of troops, police and observers assigned to UN operations. In November 2006, a 
total of 11,140 men and women, or around 13.5% of UN peacekeeping personnel, came from 
the EU. This was a considerable increase compared to figures from previous years. In 2003, 
for instance, the EU’s contribution to UN operations totalled 3,295 personnel, which 
accounted for 9.0% of the total. When the contribution of the ten new acceding countries was 
added in 2004, the figure rose to 4,801 which accounted for 13.2% of total UN deployment. 
With the largest financial contribution as well as the provision of troops and police for UN 
peacekeeping operations, the EU and its member states are seen as playing a decisive role in 




UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping 
The issue of the EU as a global actor has attracted the attention of a rising number of IR 
studies. In recent years both the IR community and the European studies community have 
demonstrated an increased focus on European powers in the international system. Within this 
focus there has been a particular emphasis on the role of the EU at the UN in the context of 
foreign and security policy.
49
 Tardy suggests that ten years of UN-EU cooperation in the 
crisis management field has led to substantial changes and developments in international 
peacekeeping. Central to this change has been a fundamental evolution of the UN as the 
main peacekeeper and the emergence of a regional actor (the EU) offering considerable 
promise for cooperation at both military and civilian levels.
50
 Hannay explains that the EU 
and the UN have shared many common objectives and approaches to the solution of 
international problems, and this feeling of shared objectives has been strengthened over the 
past decades as a result of the ever larger contribution of the EU to the UN’s operations. 
According to Hannay, the EU and its member states became the UN Secretary-General’s 
strongest supporters in pushing for an ambitious programme of change, and thereby the EU 
and the UN are “natural allies”.
51
 He stresses that “without them [the EU and its members] 
nothing at all would have been achieved”.
52
 Gowan remarks that it is hard to imagine the EU 
having developed an important role as a security actor without the UN as a partner. Gowan 
compares the UN and the EU, in the field of peacekeeping operations, to ‘Obélix and Astérix’ 
respectively; one handling big and slow missions (the UN, Obélix), and the other 
concentrating on smaller and flexible operations (the EU, Astérix).
53
  
The initial idea that UN-EU cooperation should perhaps be institutionalised was voiced in 
2000, at a time when the UN was examining the reform of its operations through the ‘Report 
of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, commonly known as the Brahimi 
Report (2000). In the Brahimi Report, the UN acknowledged the need for cooperation with 
regional organisations, and called upon the EU to take on a share of the responsibility for 
international peacekeeping and to provide assets that are needed for complex and robust 
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 In response to the UN’s request for cooperation, the EU 
underlined the special and unique value of cooperation between the two bodies. The EU 
addressed that “efforts made will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively 
and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN”.
55
  
The expectations for UN-EU partnership were stoked by the adoption, in 2001, of EU-UN 
Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, which identified three areas of 
priority for cooperation: conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis 
management, and particular regional issues.
56
 The document also established modalities for 
meetings at different levels between these two organisations. Both organisations have made 
further remarkable achievements when the UN Secretary-General and the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU signed the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis 
Management on 24 September 2003.
57
 In this landmark agreement, the UN and the EU 
declared that they are united by the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The EU’s commitments were echoed in Javier Solana's 
report in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS), through which the EU reaffirmed its 
primary responsibility to support the UN in the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the core function of peacekeeping.
 58
   
Despite the two organisations sometimes holding contradictory and competing visions, both 
the UN and the EU have acknowledged that they are the most ideal partners for cooperation 
in crisis management.
59
 Some arguments are also made that in both the scholarly literature 
and official documents the special and unique value of UN-EU cooperation has gradually 
become an object of attention.
60
 Moreover, according to a European national official, as UN-
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EU cooperation became a source of greater legitimacy for both organisations, the UN and the 
EU have mutually benefited from such cooperation.
61
 From the UN’s side, the benefits 
derive from the credibility and operational resources provided by the EU in complex and 
multidimensional operations in difficult situations. The UN has tried to involve the EU as 
much as possible in peacekeeping activities. From the EU’s side, the benefits derive from the 
political legitimacy conferred by UN mandates. In addition, UN-EU cooperation allows the 
EU to fulfil the initial aims of the ESDP. The EU seeks to equip itself with capacities for 
autonomous action backed up by credible military forces and appropriate decision-making 
bodies and to strengthen stability and security both in Europe and beyond by conducting 
military and civilian peace operations.
62
 In short, given the benefits derived by both sides of 
this equation, UN-EU cooperation in the realm of peacekeeping operations seems to be a 
phenomenon that will continue to develop and deepen in future years.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Debates  
On the issue of relations between the UN and regional organisations, such as UN-EU 
cooperation or UN-NATO coordination, Jamie Shea offers an interesting analogy of a 
‘married couple’.
63
 The relationship between the UN and the EU in peace operations is more 
or less like a married couple who have children. One day the children leave and the married 
couple discover that they have nothing in common. They face a stark choice: either to 
develop some new and common interests, or to divorce as quickly and painlessly as possible. 
Likewise, where cooperation has been established and has evolved between the UN and the 
EU, some common interests that strongly unite the two organisations must exist. In order to 
elucidate important conditions under which UN-EU cooperation seems most likely to happen, 
the two key concepts of foreign policy analysis need to be focused: who makes decisions 
(actors) and why they behave and make such choices (motivations).      
The theoretical and empirical literature on EU foreign policy in general, and EU’s role as a 
global security actor in particular, is growing. However, little systematic and empirically-
based theoretical work has been conducted, for which theoretical approaches encompassing 
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both input and output of decision-making are essential. Ginsberg points out that no one 
theoretical perspective explains the complexity of phenomena surrounding the start-up of an 
EU operation.
64
 As the number, range and complexity of peace operations have grown, so 
too have the number of theories and concepts used by analysts and practitioners alike to 
explain and understand the regional arrangement and the UN.
65
 Christopher Hill asks, in this 
regard, that “what you see (theoretically) may well depend on where you sit, but what seats 
give you the best view in the house?”
66
 Ginberg’s logic of explanation suggests particularly 
three of the best seats that are occupied by political scientists: EU foreign policy, the starring 
actors, or the preferences of the actors.
67
  
This section explores different ways of defining cooperation in peacekeeping and contending 
theories. Since the origins of peace operation lie in attempts by the great powers to manage 
conflicts and impose their collective will in other powers,
 68
 theoretical debate must be able 
to draw together different threads of great-powers-centric approach and institutional 
approach by seeking to answer how collective actions become functional. According to 
Gibbs, it has been idealists and realists who have been dominant on the basic issues and 
discussion of peacekeeping.
69
 Having considered various theoretical assumptions 
surrounding cooperation in peace and security, the study narrows down possible 
interpretations into three systemic theories which entail the key ideas of actors, motivations 
and behaviour: realism, liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. In addition, as it 
has become prevalent that European cooperation is a product of its own internal dynamic, 
this thesis also takes Ginsberg’s self-styled logic into account to see if its explanation best 
fits into this research subject. In what follows, different theories of peace operations are 
examined to determine the best theoretical framework.  
 
 
                                                 
64
 See R. H. Ginsberg (2011), op. cit. 
65
 See Alex J. Bellamy (et al.), Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge: Polity, 2010, pp.13-42. 
66
 C. Hill, “A Theoretical Introduction”, in W. Wallace and W. Patterson (eds.), Foreign Policy 
Making in Western Europe, Harborough: Saxon House, 1978, p.8. 
67
 R. Ginsbgerg (2011), op. cit., p. 6. 
68
 For example, see S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 and M. Finnemore, The Purpose of 
Intervention, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.   
69
 D. N. Gibbs, “Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism?”, International Peacekeeping, vol.4, 





Realist scholars recognise the primary importance of states in pursuit of national interests on 
the world stage where they seek to advance gains and minimise losses. The realist 
perspective begins with the structure and distribution of power in world politics and its 
impact on the commercial, political, and other interests of the member states. For realists, 
power primarily functions as the determinant of states’ choices and behaviour.
70
 Realists 
argue that states are unitary rational actors in international relations, and multilateral 
cooperation is a result of inter-state or inter-governmental bargaining.
71
 Realists possess a 
notorious pessimism about the autonomy and impact of international organisations. In their 
view international organisations are often seen as merely effective means to protect national 
interests and to promote the economic and military power of the state. Where international 
organisations are acknowledged, they tend to be depicted as the tools of their members and 
thus are premised upon, and protective of, state sovereignty. Thus, states remain the key 
actors, states control decision-making, and the international organisation itself is merely a 
new stage on which the drama of power politics can be performed.  
Realists acknowledge that international cooperation is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain, 
and dependent on state power and interest.
72
 However, they insist that international 
cooperation is nevertheless possible when states make it happen and more likely to succeed 
when states’ interests and preferences are aligned. That is, EU foreign policy action is likely 
to occur only when it is the rational and national interests of member states to cooperate at 
the EU level. The realist perspective seems useful in explaining and anticipating the 
preference and choice of EU members’ behaviour as well as limits to EU foreign policy and 
ESDP operations.  
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Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
Since neo-liberalist institutionalism is the progeny of liberalism which is an intellectual 
sibling with realism, neo-liberal institutionalism has shared some ideas and assumptions with 
realism. However, in contrast with realism, whose core research question is how to survive 
and maximise a state’s interests in the international system, neo-liberal institutionalists focus 
on the idea of cooperation after hegemony, where there were no hegemonic superpowers, 
and the international environment consisted of many regimes and institutions.
73
 Advocates 
for neo-liberal institutionalism, such as Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie, are attracted to 
rational-egoist logic or what some might call rational choice institutionalism. This 
scholarship would argue that states pursue cooperation because it is usually in the best 
interest of all involved to do so. According to Keohane, “states adjust their behaviour to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”.
74
 In the 
case of the EU, member governments delegate authority to the union’s agents such as the 
Council and the Commission to implement their decisions. Institutionalists find that in 
collective action the transactional costs are lower and the potential for more efficient and 
effective action is greater than in a case where the individual member states had pursued 
their interests separately. Moreover, as EU bodies help shape and implement EU foreign 
policy and ESDP decisions, they increase the scope of their influence.  
From a neo-liberal institutionalist view, although cooperation is hard and can easily lead to 
situations of discord, regimes and institutions could benefit states by incorporating 
cooperative strategies. Ruggie defines regimes as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and 
regulations, plans, organizational [sic] energies and financial commitments, which have been 
accepted by a group of states”.
75
 Hence, cooperation is possible in areas where states have 
mutual interests, and within the institution states want to maximise total amount of gains for 
all parties involved. Neo-liberal institutionalists provide insightful ideas to explain why 
states cooperate and to what extent regimes and institutions are important in promoting 
cooperation. However, neo-liberal institutionalist views have less relevance in areas in which 
states have no mutual interests. Not every member of the EU shares mutual interests when it 
comes to the particular issue of a peacekeeping engagement. In addition, the level of 
interests and participation of, as well as benefits for, states significantly vary in this policy 
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area. Cooperation in military or national security areas, where someone’s gain is perceived 
as someone else’s loss, a zero-sum perspective, seems to be more difficult to achieve. It may 
be more ideal for cooperation in political economy, human rights and environmental issues 
where states seek mutual interests and common goods rather than in peacekeeping 
involvement.   
 
Self-styled logic of EU foreign policy 
Having a careful consideration of various theoretical and analytical frameworks which 
possibly explain how EU states make collective decisions and achieve cooperation, Smith 
suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the internal decision-making process within 
the EU foreign policy system. Given the limits of general explanations of cooperation, Smith 
argues that Ginsberg’s “self-styled” logic of EU foreign policy action has become more 
prevalent since the 1970s, which involved European Political Cooperation (EPC).
 76
 The self-
styled logic posits that EPC actions reflect a unique European brand of diplomacy and 
foreign policy moulded by an internal dynamic of cooperation among members and common 
institutions. According to Ginsberg, “EPC enables members to reach into all areas of 
international politics and has served to create an atmosphere conducive to fashioning a 
foreign policy style that reflects the members’ convergent interests in foreign affairs.”
 77
  EU 
foreign policy actions are thus the products of habits of working together, its own mission 
and initiatives in the world independent of the phenomena that trigger other actions, and a 
sense of what Europeans want in foreign policy questions.
 78
 In this respect, when the EU 
initiates policy actions based not on external stimuli but on its own internal dynamic, 
interests, and instincts, a European interest of “self-styled” logic is at work.
79
  
Ginsberg argues that the self-styled logic is neutral in the liberal-realist debate because “it 
represents a symbiosis between the EU and the member governments who together produce 
uniquely European action”.
80
 Ginsberg’s self-styled logic explains that cooperation is driven 
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by an internal decision-making dynamic and increasingly bound by institutionalisation. Yet 
with its general arguments Ginsberg’s self-styled logic has some limits. It fails to account for 
comprehensive conditions, such as external forces impinging on the EU or individual 
member states, which may also generate cooperation. Furthermore, it falls short of 
elucidating more fundamental questions; does the internal dynamic of the EPC always lead 
to successful agreements between members and institutions? but, what if it is not the case?; 
and how can different interests of each member state simply converge into a single European 
interest given the complex process of negotiations? The self-styled logic assumes that 
European identity and common interests are naturally produced as a result of the customs of 
working together within the EU. However, it underestimates the reality in which the level of 
states’ power, willingness or interests can significantly vary during the internal dynamic and 
decision-making process especially when it is concerned with ESDP. It fails to explain 
empirical outcomes in which states’ different interests prevent a European common foreign 
policy from being achieved. The self-styled logic seems, therefore, to have less explanatory 
power in explication of the different levels of leadership and interests between members 
during the internal decision-making process.   
  
Constructivist theories 
Mark Eyeskens, a former Belgian foreign minister, famously stated in 1991 that the EU was 
‘an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’. While the EU was represented 
as a ‘civilian power’ in the 1990s,
81
 the increasingly vital role of the EU as both a civilian 
and a military power in international relations has led a new generation of European studies 
scholars to revisit the EU as ‘normative power Europe’.
82
 Rosecrance and Manners argue 
that Europe’s attainment is more normative than empirical. Put differently, the EU’s power 
stems more from what it is than from what it does. It has the power to change conceptions of 
what is ‘normal’ in international politics and thus exerts an ideational impact.
83
 Smith echoes 
this argument, positing that the normative dimension is important because the debate on the 
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The concept of normative power Europe places a heavy focus on the role of ideational 
factors such as constitutional norms, ideas, principles and identity. It is thus associated with 
the social constructivist approach to IR, an approach that stresses the value of social, cultural 
and historical factors, and their ability to “shape or even determine political actors’ 
behaviour”.
85
 Peterson argues that constructivism is now the ‘increasingly popular’ theory of 
European foreign policy,
86
 which is perhaps unsurprising given that the EU remains ‘in [the] 
course of construction’ as a global actor.
87
 According to Giegerich, the EU is in the process 
of establishing its twin goals of autonomous capacity in crisis management and enhancing its 
profile as a security actor.
88
 This combination of a normative identity and the EU’s 
establishment as an actor managing global security has generated a demand for EU 
operations.
89
 The language used by Giegerich expresses explicit normative claims. Giegerich 
argues that the EU, as an established civil-military actor, has the potential to dominate 
integrated crisis management in the future with its neutrality.
90
 As a result, the EU becomes 
conceived and construed as a unit-state-like entity of which institutional arrangements and 
characteristics authorise its uncontroversial engagement in crisis management.
91
 To what extent 
the normative values and identity of the EU lead to the likelihood of member states’ decision to 
engage in peacekeeping seems worthy of attention.  
In sum, two theories are perceived as particularly useful to explain important conditions for UN-
EU cooperation: realist and constructivist theories. The two theoretical approaches are further 
examined in chapter 4 seeking to formulate plausible and testable hypotheses.  
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
The following chapter introduces the research design and methodological framework utilised 
in this thesis. In order to transform the research question into a testable and ascertainable 
form of statement, the chapter formulates a hypothetical relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables. The chapter then justifies the case selection and the use 
of the case study. It also discusses data collection and methods used to analyse and answer 
the research question.      
The third chapter provides analytical tools in order to 1) identify the most important EU 
actors involved and 2) delineate a dynamic interaction and decision-making process between 
the UN and the EU. Drawing upon Putnam’s two-level game metaphor, a new revised two-
level game model in which a complex web of actors interacts simultaneously at two different 
levels is discussed: International UN level (Level I) and domestic EU level (Level II). The 
analysis shows how UNSC resolutions are internationally achieved and how the EU member 
states domestically come to agree on a Council Joint Action. By investigating simultaneous 
negotiations and decision-making between the two levels, the chapter identifies the most 
influential EU actors in terms of chief negotiators. The role of the Big-four (UK, France, 
Germany and Italy) and the High Representative (HR) are examined at both levels.  
Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework. First, the important concept of leadership 
is elaborated in order to provide a conceptual framework. Then hypotheses are investigated 
with insights from two prominent IR theories: realist theories vs. constructivist theories. 
From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic interests 
increase, the likelihood of EU actors to actively provide leadership will also increase. In 
contrast, constructivist theories hypothesise that if there are normative pressures derived 
from norms and responsibilities, the likelihood of EU actors deciding to provide active 
leadership for a peacekeeping operation will increase. 
Chapters five, six, and seven analyse the case studies selected: Operation Artemis (2003); 
EUFOR RD Congo (2006); and EUFOR Tchad/CAR (2007). Each of the case studies begins 
with retrospection on the outbreak of conflict in the regions. The case studies examine 
decision-making dynamics between the UN and the EU by using a revised two-level game 




each of the case studies, hypotheses are tested to determine whether they are accepted or 
rejected.  
Using the scales, the eighth chapter provides a comparative explanatory analysis across the 
three cases. It identifies the most important chief negotiator insofar as the issue of UN-EU 
peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. The chapter revisits the overall outcomes of 
hypotheses testing and concludes with the best answers to the research question. The 
comparative explanatory analysis identifies that France is the most decisive chief negotiator 
among the EU actors in decision-making at both UNSC and EU levels. The study confirms 
that the political and strategic interests are the most important factors under which EU actors 
are most likely to provide an active leadership role in decision-making.  
The final chapter puts forward some thoughts on the effective role of the EU as a reliable 
global security actor. Taking a look at the EU framework from the inside and the outside, the 
chapter presents challenges which the EU is now confronting. The idea of how the EU will 
skilfully cope with upcoming challenges and uncover ways to reduce the gap between the 
credibility and capacity of ESDP are discussed. The chapter assesses the prospects for future 
research by considering the potential contributions of this thesis to the study of international 













The primary function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence emerging from the 
project answers the research question as unambiguously as possible.
92
 A research design 
provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data.
93
 Well-designed research 
enables the project to obtain relevant evidence that presents important data to accurately 
describe certain phenomena, evaluate hypotheses, test a theory, and identify which of the 
competing explanations is most compelling empirically and theoretically as a way to 
decisively answer the research question. De Vaus stresses that the way in which researchers 
develop research designs is fundamentally affected by whether the research question is 
descriptive or explanatory, which determines what information needs to be collected.
94
  
The primary research question of this thesis is ‘under what conditions do EU Member States 
lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?’ As it involves developing causal explanations, it 
employs the explanatory and deductive approach. In order to transform the research question 
into a testable and ascertainable form of statement, this chapter introduces variables and 
formulates a hypothetical relationship between dependent and independent variables. The 
chapter then justifies the case selection and the use of the case studies on the basis of the 
research question. It also discusses the data collection and research methods utilised to 
evaluate and analyse resources. 
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2.1 Explanatory and Deductive Approach 
Answering the question ‘under what conditions’ involves explanatory analysis and to some 
extent causal explanations. According to King, Keohane and Verba, if we posit that an 
explanatory variable causes a dependent variable, a causal mechanism approach would 
require us to identify a list of causal links between the two variables.
95
 Put simply, causal 
explanations seek to identify factors that may have a causal impact on a certain phenomenon; 
for instance, ‘Factor X causes (or affects) phenomenon Y’. However, it is difficult to 
recognise a clear causation in social science research. Defining causality often brings a 
critical confusion with correlation, which also misleads prediction with causation and 
prediction with explanation. Addressing this problem, De Vaus advises that simply because 
one event follows another, or two factors co-vary, does not mean that one causes the other.
96
 
The link between two events may be coincidental rather than causal. Instead, most causal 
relations in the social sciences are probabilistic.  
Probabilistic explanations can be achieved by specifying conditions under which X is less or 
more likely to affect Y. More specifically, probabilistic explanations can simply deduce 
cause and effect as follows: when/if a given factor increases (or decreases), the probability of 
a particular outcome is affected. Then, how can causal relations be accurately defined to 
meet the explanatory research question? According to Bryman, formulating a relationship 
between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables is the best way to account for causes and 
effects.
97
 The factor that has a causal impact is the independent variable (X) and the effect is 
the dependent variable (Y). Although one will never achieve complete or deterministic 
explanations in assessing an inference of how an independent variable is responsible for the 
variation that has been identified in the dependent variable, the research can minimise 
incorrect chances and avoid invalid inferences.
98
 
This thesis seeks to draw on theoretical grounds from which hypotheses are derived. A 
deductive approach is theory testing that begins with a theory to guide which observations to 
make. The deductive approach represents the commonest view of the nature of the 
relationship between theoretical considerations and empirical social phenomena. Deductive 
reasoning enables hypothetical concepts to be translated into researchable, predictable, and 
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 In contrast with a theory building approach, theory testing is a process 
that moves from the general to the particular.
100
 Therefore, by using a deductive reasoning 
approach to derive a set of propositions from the theory, hypotheses are tested to see whether 
these predictions are correct. If the theory has explanatory power, then certain things should 
be valid. But if they do not, then the hypotheses need to be either rejected or modified.
101
 In 
this thesis, the plausible hypotheses deduced from theoretical ideas come first and then drive 
the process of gathering data.  
Variables  
Variables refer to a logical set of attributes of the research subject, classified as independent 
and dependent variables. Defining variables which are conceptually precise, free from bias 
and well-substantiated on the basis of available evidence is a vital aspect of hypothesis-
testing, as variables reveal hypothetical relationships which accommodate the most likely 
explanations.  
An independent variable is typically the variable representing the value being manipulated 
or changed. The dependent variable (sometimes called the outcome variable, endogenous 
variable, or explanandum) is the observed result of the independent variable being 
manipulated.
102
 In research or an experiment, the values of independent variables can be 
controlled and selected by the researcher to determine their relationship to an observed 
phenomenon, i.e. the dependent variable. On the contrary, the dependent variable is the event 
that usually cannot be directly controlled, but is expected to change whenever the 
independent variable is altered.
103
 According to King et al., choosing variables, especially 
dependent variables, is a particularly important decision.
 104
 The authors offer the following 
three suggestions in selecting on the dependent variables. First, dependent variables should 
be dependent. In other words, explanatory variables are clearly exogenous and dependent 
variables are endogenous. Second, we should not select observations based on the dependent 
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variable so that the dependent variable is constant. Finally we should choose a dependent 
variable that represents the variation we wish to explain.  
In this thesis, the dependent variable is the ‘likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership’. 
It is important to note that the study does not aim to examine the likelihood of leadership of 
every member state. Rather, as it is the focus of this study to identify the most decisive and 
important states that may lead a EU’s decision, the study limits the scope of 27 EU Member 
States only to the four major powers, namely Big-4 (UK, France, Germany and Italy). The 
dependent variable of leadership will be measured on a scale that ranges from low, medium 
to high. Based on theoretical assumptions, the study examines possible variables that may 
significantly influence the level of EU member states’ active leadership. Two broad 
independent variables are accordingly identified: 
1. Political and strategic interests, including the political and economic interests of the 
EU member states in areas of operation; and  
2. Normative pressures that may be largely triggered by normative ideas, values and 
historical memories of the EU member states.  
As summarised in Figure 2.1, by examining these variables, the study proposes testable 
hypotheses that consider the relationship between the important factors and the decisional 
outcome. Each hypothetical relationship between dependent and independent variables is 
tested to see whether these conditions appropriately explain the likelihood of the EU member 
states’ leadership which may affect the EU’s decision to lead UN-related international 
peacekeeping operations. 
Figure 2. 1 Dependent and Independent Variables  
 Dependent Variable EU Member States’ leadership 
 Independent Variables 
1)  Political and Strategic Interests  
2)  Normative Pressures 
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Hypotheses 
Fearon argues that scholars in comparative politics and IR often use hypotheses, particularly 
in small-N research settings, in order to evaluate the causes of the phenomena they study.
105
 
By definition, a hypothesis refers to an untested assertion about the relationship between two 
or more variables.
106
 Hypothesis formation and testing are considered important in political 
and social research which should proceed by seeking to establish and test evidence of 
relationships between variables.
107
 Given the value of variables, this study tests deductively 
interrelated propositions using a ‘hypothetico-deductive model’.
108
 It is designed around the 
assumption of ‘multiple causation’, meaning that there will likely be more than one cause for 
one particular effect.
109
 The following hypotheses are derived according to the correlation 
between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables.  
The likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership to lead EU’s engagement in UN-related 
peacekeeping operations will increase if:
110
  
 Hypothesis 1: there are Political and Strategic Interests in the peacekeeping areas.  
 Hypothesis 2: there are Normative Pressures of the EU member states. 
 
Hypotheses 1 is derived from a realist assumption, while Hypotheses 2 is derived from a 
social constructivist assumption. The precise relationships between the dependent variable 
and each independent variable will be elaborated in Chapter 4.  
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2.2 Case Studies 
Employing case studies has been widely recognised as an essential research strategy, 
especially when contemporary sets of events are explored and in-depth explanations are 
sought.
111
 Zainal argues that the case study method enables a researcher to closely examine 
data within a specific context.
112
 Yin defines the case study ‘as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used’.
113
 The use of case studies will primarily depend on the types of research 
questions asked. If research questions focus mainly on ‘what’ or ‘who/where’, two 
possibilities arise; empirical/descriptive research or survey/archival research strategies.
114
 In 
contrast, ‘why’ and ‘under what conditions’ questions are more explanatory and likely to 
lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments as the preferred research strategies. 
This is because such questions deal with operational links that must be traced carefully over 
time, rather than over mere frequencies or incidents.
115
 Thus, the case study as a research 
strategy is often used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon or events over which the 
investigator has little or no control.
 116
 Also the case study provides a useful tool to identify 
specific factors that may expose a causal relationship and thereby serve to evaluate a 
fundamental driving force behind the phenomenon studied.
 
 
Stake suggests that case selection offers the opportunity to maximise what can be learned 
through the research process, given the limited time available for carrying out the study.
117
 In 
the same manner, Yin stresses that a well-developed theory can be tested by carefully 
selecting a series of cases in the same way as theories are tested experimentally. 
118
 Indeed, 
selecting cases is a difficult process, but Yin holds that the literature provides proper 
guidance for such selections.
119
 In this thesis, a multiple-case study on the basis of a 
comparative perspective is used. Using such an approach mandates that cases be selected 
carefully because they should either produce similar results or bring contrasting results.  
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Case Selection 
In this thesis, three cases of UN-EU peacekeeping operations were selected:  
1. Operation Artemis (2003) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 
2. EUFOR RD Congo (2006); and 
3. EUFOR Tchad/CAR (2007) in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).  
 
Having careful awareness of the possible problems and bias of case-selection, the research 
carried out case selection driven by the research question as well as the dependent variable. 
In the process of the case-population approach, the assessment revealed that there is one type 
of variations across every case in UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. It is always member 
states that provided the decisive leadership to drive the EU to cooperate with the UN in 
peacekeeping. The leadership usually came from one or more member states. However, the 
level of leadership among the members significantly varied across cases. Hence, identifying 
the most important actor who possesses influential leadership to determine the EU’s decision 
is considered crucial. The essential interest of this study lies in examining to what extent 
leadership of major powers is important in deciding the EU’s engagement in a peacekeeping 
operation and under what conditions the leadership is more likely to increase. From this 
standpoint, only cases in which UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation has successfully gone 
through on account of an effective leadership role played by the major powers are valid. 
There were four basic steps through which the study delineated important criteria for 
selecting cases.   
First, cases were selected from 46 peacekeeping operations which have been deployed either 
jointly or separately by the UN and the EU since 2003.
120
 Second, as this thesis seeks to 
examine the likelihood of leadership of the major powers in deciding EU’s engagement in 
the realm of international peacekeeping on a UN’s request, cases were selected among 
autonomous EU-led peacekeeping operations. By definition, peacekeeping operations are 
allowed to use military force in maintaining peace and security, while other peace operations 
are normally prohibited from involving the use of force. Thirdly, military operations were 
considered as appropriate cases to investigate, whereas civilian operations were excluded 
from the case selection. Fourth, the research focuses on peacekeeping operations deployed 
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beyond Europe reflecting the growing role of the EU as a ‘global’ peacekeeping actor 
alongside the UN. As Figure 2.2 displays, three cases were selected accordingly. 
Justification of case-selections should be linked to variations identified by the hypotheses to 
explain and predict the most important factors which led to EU member states’ leadership for 
UN-related peacekeeping operations. Further details about justification of case selection are 
expounded below.  
 
a. Time frame: Cooperation since 2003 
The EU launched its first ESDP operation in 2003. Since then an increasing number of 
peacekeeping operations have been conducted under the auspices of the UN and the EU 
either individually or jointly. The EU became labelled as a possible security actor equipped 
with both civilian and military capacities, and the UN has authorised the EU to undertake 
peacekeeping operations alongside it since 2003. Given the landmark year for the UN-EU 
cooperation at both a political and an operational level, only peacekeeping operations since 
2003 were considered as possible cases for this research.    
b. The nature of mandate: EU-led operation 
There are three variations in UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping according to the different 
leadership types: UN-led operations, EU-led operations, and UN-EU coordinated operations. 













30 May 2003 
Operation ARTEMIS 
Council Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP, 
of 5 June 2003 
Bridging model 
EU-led military 
operation before UN 
take over 
12 June 2003 – 
01 Sep. 2003 
MONUC 
S/RES/1671 
25 April 2006 
EUFOR RD Congo 
Council Joint Action 
2006/319/CFSP, 




operation in support 
of an existing UN 
operation 
30 July 2006 – 
30 Nov. 2006 
Chad and 
the CAR  
MINURCAT 
S/RES/1778 
25 Sep. 2007 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
Council Joint Action 
2007/677/CFSP, 
of 15 October 2007 
Bridging model 
EU-led military 
operation before UN 
take over 
28 Jan. 2008 – 
15 Mar. 2009 
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In general, when an operation is authorised, the type of cooperation is clearly identified in 
official mandate such as UNSC resolutions and EU Council Joint Actions. In the DRC case, 
for instance, the UN Security Council, by its resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999, decided 
to constitute MONUC and authorised the expansion of the UN-led military mission. 
However, this peacekeeping operation has been constantly extended by resolutions 
authorising the expansion of MONUC as the conflicts in this area continued and required 
more UN military forces. In 2003, the Secretary-General reported that the peace process had 
moved beyond the initial conflict area and opened a new chapter that would require the 
comprehensive engagement and assistance of the UN and the international community.
121
 
The main focus of MONUC has shifted to facilitating and assisting the transitional process, 
and by resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, the Security Council authorised the EU to take over 
that mission. Peacekeeping operations in the DRC, consequently, shifted from being UN-led 
in the first instance, to UN-EU coordinated in the second instance, and finally became an 
EU-led operation in the third instance. In this thesis, EU-led peacekeeping operations are 
perceived as suitable cases to investigate a dynamic leadership role of the EU actors 
concerning the EU’s responsibility to lead an operation.   
c. The modality of peacekeeping: Autonomous & Military operation 
On the civilian front, the EU has been actively involved in a number of crisis management 
operations since the 1990s. These have taken various forms, including police, rule of law, 
civil protection, and civilian administration missions.
122
 There has been little dispute over the 
role of the EU as a civilian actor, and it is more likely to meet EU openness towards 
engagement than military aspects. For military activities, however, there is reluctance on the 
part of the EU to be involved, particularly when the UN leads operations. Even though the 
EU has stressed the need to build its autonomous military capacities (EU-led) without 
recourse to NATO assets, in reality military intervention without NATO has often exposed a 
high-level cleavage within the EU. Besides, conducting an EU-led autonomous military 
operation involves high costs that would require personnel, financial and material resources. 
This research selects the most challenging cases – autonomous military operations without 
recourse to NATO assets - to investigate the most crucial motivation of EU member states to 
provide active leadership to encourage the EU to lead peacekeeping operations nonetheless.   
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d. Peacekeeping beyond Europe 
Since 2003, the EU has declared its operational capability and reaffirmed its strong 
willingness to play an important role in maintaining international peace and security 
alongside the UN. Accordingly, the pressure has been relatively high on the EU to live up to 
its promises, and it became an impetus for the UN to press the EU to play a more robust and 
effective role in crisis management beyond Europe.
123
 As the purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate the conditions under which the EU member states are likely to provide leadership 
concerning international peacekeeping, the cases are selected beyond European boundaries 
on the basis of a ‘global’ dimension, rather than limited to Europe or its neighbours, the 
Balkans. 
 




Documents are a rich source of data for social and political research. Documentary analysis 
covers a wide variety of sources, including official statistics, photographs, texts and visual 
data.
124
 The use of documents as a data source can corroborate information and evidence 
from other sources.
125
 In addition, documentary analysis can also be used differently in 
conjunction with either quantitative or qualitative methods.
126
 Although this research project 
did not depend entirely on documentary data, primary and secondary documents were largely 
collected and analysed in conjunction with other data sources.   
In order to scrutinise the research topic, primary data analysis was deemed the most 
appropriate. Often primary sources consist of direct evidence that emerged at the time when 
the events or conditions were occurring. Primary data sourced from official documents is 
important for the analysis of UN-EU cooperation, because it helps to reveal the dynamic 
interactions during the negotiation process. For the analysis of UN-level negotiations, 
Security Council resolutions, session documents, progress reports, decisions, letters from the 
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Secretary-General, and national statements presented by requesting countries and 
contributing countries were examined. Documents produced by the EU include, but are not 
limited to, common positions and common strategies announced by the European 
Commission, Council Joint Actions, declarations or conclusions from the Council, 
statements of the Presidency and Commissioners, and letters and reports from the High 
Representative. Documents and statements produced by various individual EU Member 
States were also examined.  
Despite a wide range of official and administrative documents, primary sources are of course 
subject to restricted access in many cases.
127
 In order to overcome the limited access to 
primary archives, this research project used secondary data to supplement the primary 
documents. The main source of the secondary documents was collected from a range of 
publications, including newspapers, released speeches, scholarly journal articles, and reports 




The interview was one of the main research methods employed to collect data for this 
research project. Conducting in-depth elite interviews provided an effective way of assessing 
the substantial information which has not been fully disclosed to the public. Official 
documents released to the public often only entail the final results without full details of the 
negotiations. The documents may indicate whether or not the participants or decision-makers 
agreed on certain issues, but they are limited and fail to reveal the whole story of what 
exactly happened both inside and outside the room. Particularly in the case of decision-
making processes at UNSC level, most essential negotiations and lobby activities often take 
place through informal discussion behind closed doors. Thus, acquiring the whole story from 
document data seems less likely unless the negotiation was directly observed and recorded.  
Semi-structured [in-depth] elite interviews were a valuable tool to obtain a more 
comprehensive account of the negotiations to corroborate the research question. Interviewing 
elites is appropriate when interviewees are considered to be experts or have direct and 
profound knowledge of the issues studied. Officials who took part in or witnessed the events 
being examined in the research are also considered to be an appropriate source of 
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preliminary data. This research project carried out thirty-five elite interviews in five different 
venues: New York (Feb-April 2009), Paris (March 2010), Brussels (April 2010), Edinburgh 
(November 2010) and Seoul (May 2012).
128
 All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, 
and assurances were given regarding confidentiality. Where the interviewees did not demand 
anonymity, this thesis cites their name. 
In order to collect qualitative data about decision-making at UN level, interviews were 
conducted at the UN Headquarters in New York. Officials and professionals from the UN 
secretariat, inter alia, Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) were interviewed. 
Interviews with delegates from various EU Member States’ Permanent Representation/ 
Mission to the UN were also carried out. National delegates from EU countries, particularly 
the Big-3 (UK, France and Germany), shared the most valuable information and diplomatic 
experience, including their domestic preferences and positions on the issue of peace 
operations. Furthermore, in-depth interviews were conducted with British and French high 
level diplomats who were in charge of the Security Council’s matters. Officers representing 
other EU member states, such as the Czech Republic that was holding the EU Presidency at 
the time of interviewing (March 2009), also agreed to be interviewed. Interview data and 
primary sources gathered from the United Nations were very fruitful and are used as 
important sources of evidence in this thesis.   
Elite interviews were also carried out in Brussels to collect primary data on the nature of EU-
level decision-making. Officials from the European Commission and the Council of the 
European Union who were specifically in charge of CFSP/ESDP were interviewed. Data 
collected in Brussels provided a wide range of useful information for this thesis and filled the 
gaps left by insufficient public documents. Moreover, considering the most decisive role of 
France in peacekeeping operations at both UN and EU levels, in-depth interviews were also 
carried out in France, with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defence. For the important role of Italy, diplomats who had been previously in charge of 
foreign and security affairs welcomed sharing their knowledge and experience in regard to 
this research subject. In-depth interviews at the Embassy of Italy in Seoul were an essential 
part of data collection. Several interviews with officials from other prominent security 
organisations, such as NATO, were also carried out to collect data important for examining 
inter-organisational cooperation in international peacekeeping. 
                                                 
128
 See Appendix I: Research Notes and Appendix II: Lists of Interviews.  
 40 
Despite the fact that interview data could provide crucial evidence, the author was well 
aware of the possible weakness of interviews as source material. Interviewees could be 
tempted to highlight their own institutional role or to not give the exact account of specific 
events. In order to avoid the potential biases generated by the interview data, interviewees 
were asked almost the same questions in general. The same semi-structured interview 
questions were asked to different people, for instance, interviewing French officials in NY, 
Brussels and Paris. Likewise, delegates from Britain and other member states were also 
cross-examined with the same interview questions both in NY and Brussels. This was 
believed as the best way to ensure reliability and validity of interview data on the specific 
issues and events which demanded special knowledge and experience. In cases where 
confidentiality was required, secondary questions were predominantly used. In this way, the 
research was able to corroborate statements provided by different interviewees, and thereby 
the risks were mitigated. 
The research was critical in assessment and acceptance of interview data. When there is need 
to support important claims with statements made by interviewees and other data source, the 
interview data was used as source material. The research tried to reduce the tendency to use 
statements by individuals uncritically and to balance conflicting information and opinions 
gained from diverse sources.  
 
Non-participant Observation   
 
In addition to elite interviewing, the research also relied on non-participant observation. 
Non-participant observation allows the researcher to have a first-hand experience with the 
informant, as information and details can be noticed at the time that the observation 
occurs.
129
 Observation without participation was particularly useful when identifying the 
most important actors and decision-makers involved in dynamic negotiations and group 
discussions at the United Nations. This data collection method does not require any 
particular skill or experience. This research carried out non-participant observation during 
the substantive session of the ‘UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its 
Working Group (C-34)’ at the UN Headquarters in New York from 23 February to 20 March 
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 The author attended almost all of the High-level plenary meetings as a delegate and 
special advisor on UN peacekeeping operations, being formally authorised by the Permanent 
Mission of the ROK to the UN.
131
  
Access to the conference, the High-level plenary sessions and daily working group meetings 
allowed for the careful observation of the role of the EU and its member states at the UN 
with regards to the issue of peacekeeping operations. In addition to observing the special 
committee on peacekeeping operations at the UN General Assembly, exclusive meetings at 
the Security Council concerning peacekeeping operations were also monitored. Conducting 
non-participant observation enabled this research to obtain robust and practical evidence 
about the role of the EU in general and the important position and leadership of some EU 
member states at the UN Security Council in particular.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research design utilised to answer the research question. It 
argued that, in order to answer the primary research question that entails a causal ‘under 
what conditions’ subject, an explanatory and deductive approach provides the best 
framework to identify the most important conditions. In explanatory and deductive research, 
developing plausible propositions that have been derived from theory is deemed essential. 
This chapter offered two testable hypotheses drawing on the most prominent IR theories, 
realist theory vs. social constructivist theory. Each hypothesis considered the relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent variable. This chapter hypothesised that the 
likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership in supporting UN-related peacekeeping 
operations will increase if there are political and strategic interests of the EU member states 
in peacekeeping areas and the normative pressures concerning peacekeeping operations. In 
each case chapter, the study will examine the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables and test the hypotheses. 
This chapter also introduced the research strategy and methods used to collect and analyse 
data. It suggested that a multiple case study is the preferred research strategy to investigate 
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the important conditions under which the EU states are more likely to provide their 
leadership to approve UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping operations. Three 
cases were carefully selected on the basis of the research question and analytical framework: 
Operation Artemis (2003); EUFOR DR Congo (2006); and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007). In 
the next chapter, some possible analytical frameworks will be discussed to investigate the 
dynamic negotiations and decision-making between the UN and the EU on the issue of 
international peacekeeping operations (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 will further examine the key 
theoretical debates to clarify the formulation of two hypotheses deduced from theoretical 
ideas. By using a new revised two-level game analysis, each case study (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) 
will examine the most important actors involved in decision-making and test the hypotheses 
to determine to what extent important conditions are likely to influence the decision of EU 
member states to play an active role in peacekeeping. Chapter 8 will revisit the findings of 
each of the case studies and provide a comparative explanatory analysis of the three cases. 












Chapter    3 
Two-level Game Analysis: 









This chapter proposes an analytical framework to examine the dynamic interactions between 
the UN and the EU in the realm of international peace and security. Building upon Putnam’s 
traditional ‘Two-Level Game’ metaphor, this chapter seeks to develop an analytical 
framework to answer the following two questions: (1) how the UNSC and the EU 
simultaneously interact in dealing with issues of international peacekeeping; and (2) who 
plays the most important role in decision-making insofar as the issue of UN-EU 
peacekeeping cooperation is concerned. The two-level game approach is deemed worthy of 
attention; it addresses a structural analysis for international negotiations, and it also accounts 
for actors’ behaviour driven by domestic preferences which may significantly influence 
international bargaining outcomes.  
This chapter begins by examining Putnam’s traditional two-level game metaphor to elucidate 
how international diplomacy enables domestic interests and preferences to be compatible 
with international politics in general (section 3.1). The chapter also investigates the 
suitability of a multi-level game approach to the study of UN-EU cooperation. Focusing on 
various important actors involved in a complex web of interactions, a multi-level game 
approach is examined by delving into three different levels (section 3.2). Finally, this chapter 
suggests a new revised two-level game model which best fits into this specific case (section 
3.3). In order to construct a new analytical framework, this study first defines two different 
levels: the ‘international UN level’ as level I and the ‘domestic EU level’ as level II. Then 
the two-level game analysis identifies the most important actors involved in negotiations and 
decision-making in terms of chief negotiator and facilitator (section 3.4). 
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3.1 Putnam’s Two-Level Games 
 
 
Several authors argue that in international contexts negotiations take place on different levels 
or in different fora, but a central feature of political diplomacy is the interaction between 
domestic level and international level.
132
 Amongst many attempts to theorise the correlation 
between domestic and international politics, Robert D. Putnam’s two-level game provides a 
useful analytical tool for assessing this interaction. Putnam’s metaphor helps to flesh out the 
dynamic interaction between the domestic level and international level, where every 
international negotiation goes through. In addition, it identifies the most important actors 
involved in negotiations in terms of chief negotiators. The two-level game analysis helps this 
study to explain how interactions between different levels can be formulated and to what 




Putnam developed what he calls ‘Two-Level Games’ as a metaphor for analysing the 
domestic-international interaction which happens as a part of international negotiations. By 
observing the complex negotiations on macroeconomic, trade and energy policies linked to 
the Bonn G7 summit of 1978, Putnam sought to make the argument that an economical 
bargaining mechanism became possible politically. He argues that key governments adopted 
policies “different from those that they would have pursued in the absence of international 
negotiation”, and that agreement would be possible only when “a powerful minority within 




In Putnam’s two-level games, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, international negotiations should be 
broken down into two different stages. The first stage consists of negotiations aiming to 
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• Domestic consultations 
• Ratification phase 
 
 
• International negotiations 
• Negotiation phase 
 
achieve a provisional agreement at the international level (Level I), while the second stage 
entails negotiations at the domestic level (Level II), within which each group discusses 
whether or not to accept and ratify the initial agreement of Level I.
135
 Putnam’s metaphor 
implies that the games are played simultaneously when two level processes are interactive in 
many negotiations. According to Putnam, there are likely to be prior consultations at Level II 
in order to impose a domestic initial position for the negotiations at international Level I. 
Putnam highlights the importance of a Level II ratification that would affect Level I 
negotiations directly or indirectly.  
 




    
                                      Negotiations 
                                                                 
                                                                       Reopening Negotiations 
                                                                                                                             (modification) 
                                                              Domestic 
                                                              pressure                           
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                         Rejection 
                          
                       Ratification 
 
Putman explains that Level II ratification usually entails a formal voting procedure, which 
leads to the endorsement or implementation of a Level I agreement, either formally or 
informally.
136
 Accordingly, the Level I agreement is considerably constrained, because it 
must bring a Level II ratification in the end. Furthermore, expectations of being rejected by 
constituents at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I. During Level I negotiations, 
therefore, there is a considerable amount of pressure exerted by the national government or 
constituents who seek to maximise their own preferences and interests on the international 
arena.  
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The logic of the two-level games is, therefore, that strategies and decisions taken at one level 
can have a direct effect on negotiations at the other level.
137
 In this context, attention must be 
paid to the concept of ‘win-set’ that defines a range of outcomes that each party will accept. 
Given the Level II constituency, Putnam’s win-set implies the set of all possible Level I 
agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when simply 
‘voted up or down’.
138
 From Putnam’s point of view, during international negotiations all 
negotiators - Putnam considers them national leaders - aim to maximise their own ability to 
satisfy domestic preferences and interests, so that they can bring around the domestic 
ratification without any amendment or rejection. Putnam argues that the contours delineating 
Level II win-sets are very important for understanding a Level I agreement for two reasons.  
First, larger win-sets make a Level I agreement more likely, ceteris paribus.
139
 By definition, 
any successful agreement at Level I must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of the 
parties to the accord. Thus, an agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap; and the 
larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-sets, 
the greater the risk that negotiations will break down. In other words, when it becomes clear 




Second, Putnam argues that the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the 
distribution of joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of 
a negotiator, the more the negotiator can be “pushed around” by the other Level I negotiators. 
Conversely, a smaller domestic win-set can somehow be a bargaining advantage; because it 
sometimes turns out to be a good excuse for a negotiator to politely refuse counterparts’ 
proposal by saying “I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at 
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 To sum up, the size of Level II win-sets directly and indirectly affects the 
outcomes of international negotiations and bargaining.   
In assessing the interactions between domestic and international politics, Putnam presents 
each side as represented by a negotiator who acts as the only formal link between Levels I 
and II. He views national leaders as negotiating players in a two-level game.
142
 In Putnam’s 
traditional two-level games, the negotiator is often introduced as a ‘Chief Negotiator’ or 
‘Chief of Government (COG)’.
143
 In Putnam’s two-level games, the chief negotiator is an 
individual single actor rather than a group or multiple actors, who have no independent 
policy view, but act merely as an ‘honest broker’ or rather as an ‘agent’ on behalf of his 
government or constituents.
144
 Given the role of the COG, it appears that the credibility of 
the COG is especially essential at both level negotiations, and neither of two games can be 
neglected by the central decision-maker, the COG.
145
  
In sum, the two-level game approach depicts international diplomacy as a “process of 
strategic interactions”.
146
 Although Putnam’s metaphor basically implies a state-to-state 
interaction, it can also incorporate a state-centred approach within an institutional structure. 
This may provide a good reason why many scholars gradually shift their attention to 
Putnam’s metaphor for the analysis of EU’s external relations, which entails complex 
interactions among multiple actors across interdisciplinary policy areas. Putnam himself 
suggests that further efforts have to be made to extend and develop upon the two-level game. 
Indeed, various authors fascinated by the value of Putnam’s two-level game metaphor seek 
to extend and identify more possible levels in the analysis of EU diplomacy.
147
 Drawing on 
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this traditional two-level game metaphor, the following section examines a multi-level game 
approach to determine whether the analysis offers the appropriate explanations on UN-EU 
peacekeeping cooperation. 
 
3.2 Multi-Level Game 
 
Recently, an increasing number of scholars have applied a multi-level game approach to the 
study of the EU’s external relations; more specifically, to the study of the EU as a global 
actor.
148
 Authors who advocate a multi-level game analysis seek to take every possible unit 
into account as a separate level, so that they can define different levels whereby various EU 
actors interact simultaneously. Hence, this chapter also seeks to investigate a multi-level 
game analysis to determine to what extent multi-levels of analysis can explain the dynamic 
interactions between the two organisations both in a precise and simple way.  
The argument is best laid out by Andrew Moravcsik, in his book ‘Choice for Europe’ (1998). 
According to Moravcsik, decisions are ultimately made through a series of 
intergovernmental bargains at European-level, which therefore enables us to consider the 
value of multi-level negotiations based on the number of levels established. Collinson notes 
that the use of multi-level frameworks in the analysis of the EU’s external policy provides a 
“basis for tackling some of the broader questions concerning the nature and significance of 
the EU as an international actor in the world’s economic and political arena”.
149
 In the course 
of analysing international negotiations where the EU is a party,
150
 Young argues that there 
must be an extension of the two-level game model by emphasising the important role of the 
European Community (EC) that plays in two parallel games; “in one game the EU is the 
international level at which the member governments representing their domestic interests 
seek to find a common position, while in the second game the EU is the domestic level and 
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the Commission (or the Council presidency) negotiates at the international level”.
151
 
Consequently, three levels - domestic government level, EU level, and International level - 
are defined to examine the EU’s external negotiations.  
The interpretation as well as application of a multi-level game approach may significantly 
vary according to the different actors and institutions involved in negotiations. Most often, 
however, when Putnam’s metaphor has been used for the study of the EU in international 
negotiations, the two-level game metaphor was converted into a three-level game 
metaphor.
152
 In adaptations of Putnam’s two-level game framework, for instance, Patterson 
and Moyer insist that it is useful to envisage three rather than two levels in the EU’s 
negotiation and decision making processes.
153
 Glaser also emphasises the need for the 
extension of the two-level game, by proposing a three-level model for his case on EU trade 
policy; Level I is a level in which the Commission negotiates based on a mandate at the 
international level; while Level II refers to the Community level, where the common position 
is forged by the EU institutions; and Level III involves decision-making in the domestic 
politics of member states.
154
 Moreover, Meunier argues that, in the case of the EU, the 
complex web of rules through which diverse preferences are aggregated into a common 
position is amplified by the existence of three levels that interact in international bargaining: 
‘domestic, supranational (European), and international’.
155
 Considering the value of a three-
level game analysis, the next section examines the applicability of a three-level analogy to 
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Three-level Game  
Level I, as in Putnam’s two-level framework, would depict the international UN level, at 
which the key actors involved negotiate simultaneously to reach an agreement on 
international peacekeeping operations. Level II, on the other hand, becomes the European 
Union level, in which the negotiations take place among the member states. The Commission 
plays an important role in steering the policy process within the framework of the CFSP and 
ESDP. Level III remains the national or domestic level, at which individual member states’ 
preferences are particularly considered. In sum, according to a three-level analysis, the 
negotiations between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping are 
simultaneously carried out in three different venues: the UN (Level I), the EU (Level II), and 
domestic sectors of individual EU member states (Level III).
 
 
In Putnam’s two-level game, the same individual negotiators simultaneously interact 
encompassing direct concerns and responsibilities at both Level I and II. However, 
particularly in Collinson’s three-level formulation, negotiators in the various levels may 
differ. Collinson argues that the key EU negotiators linking Level I and Level II are not 
always the same individuals who are playing at Level II and Level III. In addition, Level I 
may involve more than one key actor and each may represent different interests and ‘issue-
systems’.
156
 In this three-level model, as Figure 3.2 displays, UNSC member states are 
present at Level I negotiations; while the Commission representatives and other key EU 
actors within the EU system such as COREPER
157
 and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each 
member state are entangled within the EU level negotiations; and domestic constituencies 
constitute Level III negotiations. The role of the Commission is rather highlighted in 
accessing the negotiations between Level I and Level II as well as Level II and Level III, 
because it is deemed to be negotiating on behalf of all member states as well as the Union at 
international level. Ministers and officials representing each domestic member state, on the 
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The multi-level game analysis seems to be useful to formulate a byzantine network of 
interactions between different levels and investigate the range of possible analyses of the role 
of EU actors in international relations. Despite the value of a multi-level game approach, 
however, it appears that a multi-level or three-level game analysis is less appropriate to 
examine negotiations between the UN and the EU. 
First, the direction of interactions between different levels needs to be redefined. As 
Collinson acknowledges, Putnam’s framework is concerned principally with the ‘vertical 
interaction’ between different levels within a whole system.
158
 To put it differently, as far as 
the direction of the negotiations and decision-making process goes either vertically top-down 
or bottom-up, the role of the EU (Level II) which is placed in the middle position comes to 
be the most highlighted, as it represents the only formal link between Level I and Level III 
(see Figure 3.2).  However, in fact, the role of the EU is limited at both levels, especially 
insofar as the peacekeeping resolutions are concerned.
159
  
                                                 
158
 S. Collinson, op. cit., p.220. 
159
 Although the Treaty of Lisbon has intended to achieve the EU legal personality by creating a 'High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' for the consistency of the 
Union in external relations, the ratification process is still undergoing. And even if the Treaty would 
be ratified by all Member States, it will take more time to come into force. Therefore, the issue of 




 Level I 
   Level II 
   
 
Level III 
    
UN Security Council 
 
European Union 








UNSC member states 
 52 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the external agreement can be somehow reached by the 
efforts of the Commission and the Commission is often directly engaged in the policy 
process, the negotiation outcomes nevertheless can only be determined by the Council of 
Ministers in which individual member states have the right to vote and ratify in the end. 
Considering the nature of foreign and security policy by which the decision-making process 
remains fundamentally inter-governmental, domestic Level III is the level that should 
directly interact with international Level I. Therefore, the set of vertical arrangements of a 
three-level model where the EU is placed in the middle as the formal link between different 
levels would less fit into this specific case of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.  
Second, in terms of the chief negotiator, the key actors who are formally involved in the 
negotiations across the three levels are not explicitly identified. According to Collinson’s 
three-level game analysis, individual EU member states at domestic Level III are more likely 
to facilitate the European level (Level II) to play an effective role as an agent or negotiator 
that aims to achieve the Community’s common interest and position in international 
negotiations. However, on the specific case of international peacekeeping, only a few EU 
members in the Security Council can participate and act in the negotiations on behalf of the 
EU (Level II) as well as their own nation (Level III) at the UNSC negotiations (Level I). 
Therefore, international bargaining outcomes are largely determined by a few powerful 
member states which can directly reflect their preferences and interests on UNSC resolutions, 
rather than be driven by the EU as an institution. The three-level game analysis lacks an 
explicit identification of who would simultaneously act across different levels as a chief 
negotiator. As a result, a complex web of interactions among different actors at different 
levels only brings more intricate analysis.  
Third, in terms of the ratification phase, a three-level game analysis still remains a critical 
question regarding at which level the final agreement is to be accepted and ratified by voters. 
According to Putnam’s metaphor, the agreement taken at an international level must be 
ratified at a domestic/national level in the end. However, in a three-level game analysis, the 
external agreements on peacekeeping operations shall only be concluded by the Council of 
Ministers at the European Level II. In this regard, Collinson notes that the Council’s 
conclusion of agreements may be equated with Putnam’s notion of ‘ratification’.
160
 Yet, in 
principle, the form of ratification usually comes to encounter national/domestic approval at 
                                                                                                                                          
the EU’s legal personality still remains at negotiation level, and thus this study does not consider the 
EU as a legal personality so far.     
160




last. If Level III is not significantly considered in the context of the ratification phase, it 
seems unlikely to constitute a separate third level.  
 
Three-level Game and Its Deficit 
 
Given the critical weaknesses of a three-level game analysis, this study attempts to evaluate 
an alternative three-level game approach. This alternative three-level game analysis differs 
by and large from the one discussed above in two aspects. First, the concept of ‘vertical 
reverberation’ is redefined by the potential for horizontal interaction between different 
levels.
161
 To be more specific, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, instead of adopting a vertical 
interaction, the alternative three-level model accounts for a triangular interaction by 
combining horizontal and vertical interactions, within which every actor or negotiator can 
play simultaneously across different levels.  
 
Figure 3. 3 Alternative Three-level Game Model 
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Second, for the analysis of domestic Level III, it narrows down the scope of possible EU 
member states involved. Alternatively, as Collision notes, since Level III should encompass 
the domestic politics of every member states and those areas of interest-group politics across 
national boundaries, the picture of the dynamics would potentially become very 
complicated.
162
 So in order not to overload the analysis, it must identify the most important 
member states and focus only on those states’ positions in a way that may demonstrate a 
significant impact on the negotiations at both EU and UN levels. Gross argues that the 
positions of Britain, France and Germany, namely the ‘Big-three’, are of particular relevance 
in explaining policy outcomes in European crisis management due to “their substantial 
political and military involvement, their size and influence in the EU setting, and their 
contrasting preferences and approaches towards the EU foreign and security institutional 
framework”.
163
 Apart from those traditional ‘Big-three’, Italy in particular has increased its 
involvement in peacekeeping and provided important role in ESDP missions over the last 
decade, trying to ensure its prominent position at both the UNSC and the EU. Italy notably 
insists on a ‘Big-four’ rather than three, especially when it comes to the issues of EU-related 
peace operations.
164
 In this perspective, among all 27 EU members that potentially constitute 
the domestic Level III, the positions and preferences of the UK, France, Germany, and Italy 
are viewed as considerably important. The Big-four countries are deemed to possess a super 
power to promote European consistency in security and defence policy at the community EU 
level (Level II) and international UN level (Level I).
165
 
Nevertheless, despite further efforts to make up for these deficiencies in a three-level game 
analysis, there remain crucial questions about chief negotiators and the ratification phase. 
First, in light of a separate domestic level for the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, this study 
raises a critical question about the chief negotiator who has to act as a formal link between 
different levels. It seems unfeasible to formulate the Big-four countries as a separate level 
(Level III), because they rather act as the most important negotiators interacting between the 
Security Council (Level I) and the EU (Level II) simultaneously. According to the logic of 
the multi-level game analysis, there must be different chief negotiators who interface and 
negotiate across three different game boards; between the Security Council (Level I) and the 
European Union (Level II); between the European Union (Level II) and domestic UK, 
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France, Germany and Italy (Level III); and between domestic UK/FR/DE/IT (Level III) and 
the Security Council (Level I) respectively.  
As in Figure 3.3, negotiations between Level II and Level III would be led by British, French, 
German and Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers or officials who would play a role as chief 
negotiators representing their domestic constituents. Meanwhile, the permanent 
representatives of the UK and France and to a lesser extent Germany and Italy to the UNSC 
would become the chief negotiators between Level I and Level III respectively. However, 
the chief negotiator who directly interacts between the UNSC (Level I) and the EU (Level II) 
is not clear here. If the UK, France, Germany and Italy are defined as a separate domestic 
national level (Level III), there must be another chief negotiator who would simultaneously 
connect the UNSC level and the EU level, other than those Big-four countries. However, 
besides the UK, France, Germany and Italy, there are countries that are unlikely to be 
involved in decision-making at either Level I or Level II. In sum, even in this alternative 
three-level game model, chief negotiators who must formally link negotiations between the 
UNSC (Level I) and the EU (Level II) are still absent.  
The second reason that the UK, France, Germany and Italy are less likely to be considered as 
a separate third level is primarily associated with the negotiation outcomes on peacekeeping 
mandates. Given the increasing credibility of multilateral cooperation among regional and 
international organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
UNSC is more likely to mandate the EU to collaborate alongside the UN, rather than to call 
upon individual countries, such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy, to provide 
peacekeeping support separately. Therefore, it is the EU not individual member states that 
the UN Security Council resolution authorises to carry out EU-related peacekeeping 
operations.  
Hence, it is unlikely that a UNSC resolution would directly mandate the UK, France, 
Germany or Italy to perform peacekeeping operations by being entitled ‘UK mission’, 
‘French mission’, ‘German mission’, or ‘Italian mission’ for instance. In light of the EU 
mission, decision-making on peacekeeping operations at the EU level implies the unanimous 
agreement of all EU member states. Negotiation outcomes are thus expected to be ratified 
and implemented within the framework of the ESDP, not by the individual French, British, 
German or Italian domestic structures. As a result of the intensive negotiations between the 
UN and the EU, the final agreement is normally achieved and officially announced in two 
 56 
different forms: UNSC Resolution at the international UN level and Council of Joint Action 
at the European level. After all, neither individual nor separate domestic peacekeeping 
mandates are precisely authorised during the process of UN-EU decision-making. The 
argument for a third level therefore seems less likely to be plausible. 
Finally, if the European Big-four countries are to be placed as a separate level, the third level 
should bring the analysis to examining the British, French, German and Italian domestic 
politics respectively, including each national decision-making procedure and ratification 
phase. Because, theoretically, a domestic national level represents a stage where negotiation 
outcomes should be either ratified or rejected by constituents. However, this study does not 
aim to explore individual domestic politics in which each distinctive national culture of 
decision-making, as well as the win-sets, is intricately linked. Rather, this study seeks to 
examine the institutional interactions between the UN and the EU. By doing so, it aims to 
identify the most important actors involved in the process of the simultaneous negotiations 
and decision-making. 
The advocate for a multi-level or three-level game approach would argue that establishing a 
separate third level for the Big-four countries is essential in the analysis of UN-EU relations 
because of their vital role and decisive position which may largely affect negotiation 
outcomes. It is true that the role of the UK, France, Germany and Italy is undeniably 
important in relations between the UN and the EU. Nevertheless, this study confirms that it 
is only possible to consider the Big-four as a separate level if evidence suggests that they 
negotiate and make a decision as independent actors representing their own domestic 
interests at international level. Furthermore, considering legal obligations and responsibilities 
of the EU member states stipulated in Article 19 of the EU Treaty, the European Big-four are 
strongly expected to act on behalf of all EU member states in international negotiations. 
Therefore, the UK, France, Germany and Italy are neither separate actors nor independent 
units in UN-EU relations. On the contrary, they are part of a core between two levels by 
being engaged in the negotiations between these levels.   
Overall, this study confirms that a three-level game framework which considers France, the 
UK, Germany and Italy as a separate third level would not fully depict a comprehensive 
contour of the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU. In what follows, 
consequently, this thesis suggests a new analytical framework. By drawing on, but revising, 




account for the simultaneous interactions between different actors and levels involved on the 
issue of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping. 
 
 
3.3 Revised Two-Level Game 
  
The most noticeable difference between a two-level and a three-level game analysis lies in 
the existence of Level III. The question of whether or not the UK, France, Germany and Italy 
constitute a separate level is a key concern in determining to what extent different levels can 
most simply, but explicitly, account for the UN-EU decision-making on peacekeeping 
cooperation. This thesis argues that negotiations between the UN and the EU on the issue of 
international peacekeeping are simultaneously carried out at two different levels: 
International UNSC level (Level I) and domestic EU level (Level II). This study determines 
that the Big-four states are chief negotiators, rather than a separate level. It posits that during 
the dynamic interactions between the UNSC and the EU on the issues of international 
peacekeeping cooperation, the UK, France, Germany and Italy would play a decisive role as 
chief negotiators by leading and being engaged in bargaining, negotiations, and decision-
making at both levels simultaneously. 
Putnam argues that international relations are entangled with domestic politics where the 
“domestic causes and international effects” or the “international causes and domestic 
effects”.
166
 Similarly, one UK national delegate to the UN highlighted that European 
common preferences and interests can affect the negotiation outcomes of the United Nations, 
either directly or indirectly, and vice versa, through the activeness of the EU major 
powers.
167
 The UK, France, Germany and Italy play an important role across two levels, 
leading to the achievement of peacekeeping mandates and eventually an operational action in 
the field.  
Although this study adopts a two-level game approach as an analytical tool, it will not 
duplicate or simply repeat what Putnam has already done with his traditional two-level game. 
This study instead proposes a new revised model based on Putnam’s traditional metaphor, 
which may best fit into the analytical and theoretical perspectives as well as empirical cases. 
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This chapter further discusses the most notable features of a new revised model vis-à-vis 
Putnam’s traditional metaphor. It also clarifies why the two-level game needs to be revised 
for the analysis of this specific research subject. Table 3.1 summarises some key elements of 
a revised two-level game differing from Putnam’s traditional metaphor.  
 
Table 3. 1 Comparison of Two-level Game: Putnam's Metaphor vs. Revised Model 
 
 Putnam’s model Revised model 
Level I International Level  International UN level (NY) 
Interrelation State-to-State (Inter-governmental) UN-EU (Inter-organisational) 
Policy area Economic / Trade diplomacy Foreign and Security Policy 
Outcomes Agreement UNSC Resolution 
Level II Domestic Level Domestic EU level (Brussels) 
Parties Government / Constituents 27 EU member states 
Ratification Vote Council Joint Action 
Negotiator(s) 
Chief of Government (COG) 
(national leader / individual actor) 
Chief Negotiators (FR / UK / DE / IT ) 
+ Facilitator (HR) 
  
First of all, the analysis of this thesis argues that the UN-EU interaction is clearly divided 
into two levels: ‘international UN level’ as Level I and ‘domestic EU level’ as Level II. 
Whilst Putnam addresses that international negotiations are shaped by individual 
governments that seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures,
168
 a 
revised two-level game delineates international negotiations as a process of inter-
organisational interactions, inter alia between the UN and the EU. That is, a revised two-
level game posits that the interactions between levels are not inter-governmental or state-
centric interactions as Putnam’s metaphor suggests.
169
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Second, in light of the negotiator, the revised model identifies the UK, France, Germany and 
Italy as four possible chief negotiators. According to Putnam, each national leader or head of 
government appears at both game boards as the so-called chief of government (COG), and 
neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, COG.
170
 In the new 
revised model, however, the Big-four countries are viewed as important chief negotiators 
representing their domestic EU level position at the international negotiations. The UK and 
France are particularly seen as important chief negotiators, because they are not only 
powerful EU member states at domestic level, but they are also permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, which allows them to possess a prerogative legal status and power to 
influence the decision-making outcome. Germany and Italy, on the other hand, are also 
considered as important actors alongside the UK and France at the domestic EU level, albeit 
less influentially, particularly at the international UNSC level, due to their limited non-
permanent position at the Security Council. The revised two-level game analysis examines to 
what extent the UK, France, Germany and Italy play an important role as chief negotiators 
dealing with the issue of international peacekeeping operations. 
Third, besides those four chief negotiators, the new revised model identifies a facilitator. As 
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009, the EU’s representation in the 
international arena became the centre of attention. The EU has increasingly endeavoured to 
demonstrate the ambitious role of EU representatives by strengthening the role of the High 
Representative (HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy or the President of the 
European Council. Nevertheless, in practice, there remains a critical restriction on the role of 
EU representatives to act as decisive chief negotiators, because neither the HR nor the 
President of the European Council have a legal status at the UNSC where only sovereign 
states are allowed to sit. The position of the EU representative is, therefore, inevitably more 
limited than that of chief negotiators. The study examines the role of the HR in peacekeeping 
cooperation between the UN and the EU. Yet, this study considers the HR an important 
facilitator who has no direct impact on decision per se, but prompts and facilitates the UN-
EU negotiations on peacekeeping.  
Finally, in the context of negotiation outcomes and ratification, a revised two-level game 
analysis investigates a UNSC Resolution as a negotiation outcome at international level, 
while a European Council Joint Action is perceived as a negotiation outcome at domestic 
level. According to Woolcock, negotiators seek to find an outcome that will satisfy both their 
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international partners at Level I and their domestic principals at Level II.
171
 In a new revised 
two-level game analysis, negotiation outcomes at international level and domestic level 
should differ respectively. An international peacekeeping mandate and resolution can be 
adopted by the fifteen Council members’ vote at the UN Security Council, while 27 EU 
member states have to reach a unanimous consent on peacekeeping mandate by adopting 
Council of Joint Action.  
In sum, as Figure 3.4 illustrates, in a revised two-level game framework, the dynamic 
interactions between the UN and the EU on the issue of international peacekeeping are 
simultaneously carried out across two levels in which the European Big-four countries play 
an important role as chief negotiators. When decisions are achieved at each level, i.e. UNSC 
resolution at the international level and Council Joint Action at the domestic level, UN-EU 
cooperation in international peacekeeping finally takes place on the ground.   
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International UNSC level 
International peacekeeping operations have been universally perceived as being controlled 
and authorised by the UN Security Council. In the aftermath of the First World War, the first 
formal statement of what would become known as ‘collective security’ was introduced, in 
parallel with the establishment of a new international organisation, the League of Nations, 
which was replaced later by the United Nations after the Second World War.
172
 Collective 
security was a concept closely related to ‘peacekeeping’, albeit not necessarily synonymous 
with it.
173
 The important fact to be underlined here is that both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations were intended to be the institutional vehicle for international peacekeeping 
through the collective security.
174
 To be more specific, the purposes and principles of the UN 




To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace.  
 
The primary responsibility of the UN was reaffirmed by the Brahimi Report in 2000 which 
spells out that the UN should maintain international peace and security by facilitating 
collective cooperation among nations in a wide range of peace operations, such as peace-
making, peacekeeping and peace-building.
176
 As the very first and original legitimate 
international organisation for international peace and security, the UN has authorised and 
deployed a total of 63 peacekeeping operations around the world as of December 2009 since 
its foundation in 1945.
177
 According to the speech given by the former President of France 
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Jacques Chirac on the issue of the war against Iraq in 2003, no one had been entitled 
universally to assume the right to utilise force to prevent and intervene in any occasions of 
threat to international peace and security except the United Nations.
178
 Issues related to 
international peacekeeping operations have thus been the sheer weight of the UN. 
Among the plethora of specialised bodies, programmes and funds within the UN system, 
none has carried out greater peacekeeping work than the Security Council.
179
 As Article 24(1) 
spells out, in order to ensure that prompt and effective peacekeeping action is taken by the 
UN, its “members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”.
180
 Accordingly, the UN’s 193 
sovereign member states are obliged under its Charter to agree to accept and respect the 
decisions of the Council’s fifteen members, in particular on the issue of international military 
peacekeeping mandates.
181
 Furthermore, unlike decisions made in the General Assembly, 
decisions of the Security Council are to be binding.  
Luck also notes that the Security Council is a special and unique place where the 
enforcement authority for international peace operations comes to be decided and formed.
182
 
For more than sixty years of its existence, UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly to 
meet the “demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape” as a tool of 
international crisis response.
183
 The Security Council has been confronted and grappled with 
its major task of effectively managing international peacekeeping operations both at the 
political and operational level. At the political level, the Security Council appears to bring 
substantial issues to the negotiation table and decides legitimately and legally on whether 
civil-military peace operations ought to be deployed to conflict areas. When the Council 
deals with peacekeeping issues at political level, it elicits substantial and sustainable 
commitments from member states to support its decisions. Then moving on to the 
operational level, the Council carries out its operational activities and missions competently 
by organising collective actions to enforce institutional decisions.   
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The UN Security Council is a supreme commander as well as being “central to the life of 
international diplomacy”.
184
 Despite the fact that most peacekeeping operations are deemed 
to be approved and implemented by Security Council Resolutions, the Security Council itself 
can neither mandate peacekeeping operations nor provide any peacekeeping support without 
agreement or consensus of the fifteen member states of the Council. In light of the legal basis 
of decision-making and its procedures within the Security Council, resolutions whereby the 
Security Council organises peacekeeping operations must be adopted under Article 27 of the 
UN Charter. According to Article 27, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters 
require the ‘affirmative votes of nine members’ including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members. Even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes (9), a 
negative vote, or veto, also known as the rule of ‘great power unanimity’ by a permanent 
member prevents adoption of a proposal.
185
   
Meanwhile, procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid 
discussion of an issue. For example, abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording 
of the Charter.
186
 Therefore, the fact that one or several permanent members of the Council 
do not participate in or abstain from voting on any particular resolution does not mean an 
objection to the approval of what is being proposed. In order to prevent the adoption of a 
resolution requiring unanimity of the permanent members, a permanent member has only to 
cast a negative vote. If the dissenting member has a permanent seat in the Security Council, 
its negative vote would certainly prevent the adoption of the resolution concerned, and the 
same result may equally be achieved by the collective opposition of ten non-permanent 
members of the Council. The Charter does not expressly provide any legal means or 
procedure for the settlement of this kind of constitutional dispute.
187
 One could conclude that, 
in light of the legal possibility, there seems more likelihood of defeating resolutions on 
peacekeeping operations by individual permanent members than by strongly objected 
collective action of non-permanent members.  
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The dispute over the Iraq war in 2002-03 is a good example to illustrate how the Security 
Council can be easily and critically exposed to the fragile and intricate political environment. 
The Council appeared to be caught in a state of limbo by being split between divergent 
voices, inter alia the permanent members of the UNSC, particularly between Britain and 
France. The event critically demonstrated that compliance, cooperation, and participation in 
international peacekeeping are not always ‘automatic’,
188
 as individual permanent members 
of the Security Council retain the power to vote on any resolutions in compliance with their 
national position or interests. Hill argues, in this regard, that the ‘power’ of a permanent seat 
remains as a vital factor that may account for a considerable variation in the degree of 
adaptation and consensus of national diplomacy toward the international agreement on 
peacekeeping mandates at the Security Council.
189
  
In sum, the question regarding negotiation outcomes and decision-making at international 
UN level seems unlikely to be a merely procedural matter within the Security Council. 
Rather, it is essential to recognise a significant influence of veto-power and prestigious 
position of permanent members of the Security Council, particularly when issues concern 
peacekeeping mandates. The principle of unanimity of permanent members in such matters 
can be a critical hurdle that the Security Council has to surmount in order to undertake 
international responsibilities and provide the necessary resources for peacekeeping in a 




Domestic EU level  
 
 
The EU’s foreign and security policy is a purely intergovernmental matter involving all 27 
Member States. However, Smith argues that EU foreign policy must be supplemented with, 
and fully explained by, insights from institutional functioning and coordination between the 
institution and the member states.
191
 From Smith’s point of view, the EU’s 
intergovernmental decision-making structure became increasingly institutionalised and 
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linked to ‘Community’ procedures.
192
 Hence, CFSP/ESDP is considered a policy-making 
competence which is shared by member states and supranational institutions.
193
 Björkdahl 
and Strömvik argue that the process of agenda-shaping, decision-making and implementation 
for an EU-led operation is carried out by the simultaneous interactions between the three 
main institutional structures of the EU: the intergovernmental Council structure, the support 
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The Commission makes two broad contributions to CFSP and ESDP. First, the EU Treaty 
invites the Commission to be ‘fully associated’ with CFSP work including matters relating to 
ESDP.
196
 The Treaty allows the Commission to enjoy a right of policy initiative along with 
the member states. The Commission also manages the CFSP budget line, which gives it 
certain influence on the establishment, duration and mandate of civilian peace support 
operations.
197
 The Commission’s role in military dimensions of the ESDP, however, is 
limited. Second, the Commission plays a role as external representative in all the European 
Community areas, which includes policy formation in Brussels and representing of European 
common interests throughout the world.  
Despite the various efforts of EU actors that seek to fulfil their respective responsibilities in 
pursuing foreign and security policy, CFSP/ESDP issues are conducted jointly by the 
member states within the Council of Ministers. The European Council (or the Council of 
Ministers) comprises the Heads of state and government and the Commission President, and 
it is formally the highest decision-making institution within the EU structure. The primary 
task of the Council is to define the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as 
common strategies to be implemented in areas where the member states have important 
interests in common. Every peacekeeping-related issue and decision on ESDP civil-military 
operations is taken by the Council. To be more specific, the issue of peacekeeping operations 
normally comes to the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) where 27 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs are from each member state gather to deal with CFSP/ESDP 
matters together.  
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, the Council had been one 
single body irrespective of the ministers meeting, and other configurations of the Council 
could go ahead with decisions on CFSP/ESDP if time was of essence and a swift decision-
making procedure was required.
198
 For instance, the Joint Action on the operation Artemis 
was adopted by the ministers for justice and home affairs, and the operation was formally 
launched by the ministers for agriculture. However, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force 
on the 1st
 
December 2009, a new specified configuration of the Council, named the Foreign 
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Affairs Council (FAC), was created and replaced the GAERC format.
199
 Moreover, the FAC 
is no longer chaired by the representative of the member state holding the Presidency, but by 
the person holding the newly created post of High Representative.
200
 
In contrast to other EU policy areas where member states are likely to accept and even 
somehow empower a prominent role for the European Commission, ESDP operations are 
heavily dependent on the inter-governmental decision-making process which involves all 
member states at all times and allows them to veto at any time.
201
 Every formal decision is 
taken in bodies where all members are represented, and every decision is taken unanimously. 
The supranational institutions are far less involved in the process, and the Council - and its 
support structures - is the main ‘locus of power’ in this specific policy area.
202
 In addition, as 
Reynolds cites the British government’s blunt assertion that “when we don’t agree, there is 
no common policy”,
 203
 the degree of consensus among the members on a particular policy 
issue remains the key question for the possible launch of an EU peacekeeping operation.  
In order to get an ESDP operation on the agenda, not only member states but also the 
Commission can formally propose any new policy initiative. Those who initiate or wish to 
see the EU carry out an EU-led operation have far more influence over agenda-setting and 
sometimes spend laborious efforts and time lobbying in the Council.
204
 Björkdahl et al. point 
out that some states become more active than others when it comes to proposing new 
operations “with France and the UK being among the more active and enthusiastic ones”.
205
 
The initiative can also come from the HR and the Council Secretariat. On some occasions, 
the initiatives originate from external demands outside of the EU framework; from a UN 
request, for instance.
206
 The external demand for an ESDP operation seems often far greater 
than the EU’s actual present capacity to undertake the operation. Such ambitious initiatives 
are at least likely to be successful when any members ‘who wish to affect the ESDP agenda’ 
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have relatively influential power to bring other members to agree on the proposed 
operation.
207
 The precise decision-making process on the launch of an ESDP operation is 
displayed in Figure 3.6. 
 
                                                 
207
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Proposal 
PSC: Presidency (or other MS) introduces 
proposal on a possible ESDP operation 
PSC gives relevant Council Secretariat 
body (often EUMS or DG E) the task of 
formulating options in relation to the 
possible operation 
The proposal (or certain details) is 
either sent back for further 
negotiation or taken off the agenda 
EUMC and/or CIVCOM, respectively, 
discuss and negotiate the proposal 
Relex-committee scrutinises 
the proposal 
PSC discusses and negotiates the proposal 
for Joint Action 
Council agrees on Joint Action, 
specifying the objective, 
mandate, scope, and duration 
of the ESDP mission 
The proposal is placed on the 
Council Agenda 
Proposal taken off the agenda 
Relevant Council Secretariat 
body presents briefings, options 
and proposals to VIVCOM 
EUMS presents briefings, 
options and proposals to 
EUMC 
Council decision on the launch 
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Proposal passes COREPER II 
NO YES 
No agreement Agree 






Once an initiative or idea for a new operation starts to circulate at EU level, a number of 
considerations and intensive negotiations take place among the member states. In 
coordination with the Council Secretariat and the Commission, the member states 
deliberately seek to measure the political feasibility and tune the gaps between the real 
capacities and political willingness. In order to examine the conditions in more detail, the 
Political Security Committee (PSC) and other relevant bodies in the Council Secretariat 
undertake some initial contacts with the UN and gather information.
209
 Meanwhile, the 
member states discuss operational and strategic feasibility. Given the absence of a 
supranational authority during negotiations, any members who have strong interests and 
willingness to support the operation seem likely to lead the Union’s strategic and operational 
choice. Concerning operational feasibility, the member states seek to figure out whether they 
have the capacity and willingness to provide adequately-sized and equipped contributions. If 
it turns out that an operation would not be feasible enough for the EU to deploy such an 
operation, then a proposed initiative will not be carried out further this stage.  
When the member states reach an agreement within the PSC to go ahead with further 
discussions on an operation, the issue takes on the planning and preparatory phase. The first 
formal document being discussed is the crisis management concept (CMC). This document 
describes the general political assessment of “the situation, the overall objectives of the 
operation, and one or more proposed courses of action”.
210
 In the process of elaborating the 
CMC, the document establishes several strategic options, such as the line of command and 
the roles and responsibilities of the PSC and the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC) if the operation includes military components.
211
 To be more specific, the PSC is 
appointed to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation and explicitly 
given powers to change the operational plan (OPLAN), the chain of command and the rules 
of engagement.
212
 The EUMC provides military direction of all military activities within the 
EU framework and is responsible for offering the PSC military advice and recommendations 
on all military matters.
213
 The potential operation headquarters (OHQ) that may grant advice 
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and support is identified at this stage.
214
 Following the recommendation given by the EUMC, 
the military crisis management concept is negotiated in the PSC. Once an agreement has 
been reached in the PSC, the Council approves the CMC, which leads to the formal decision 
on the launching of an EU military operation.   
Finally, the dynamics of negotiations at EU level come to an end by formally adopting the 
EU decision, so-called Council Joint Action, which is the legal decision-making format 
available to the Council. The Joint Action requires the approval, or at least consent, of all 
member states and must be adopted unanimously by the Council.
215
 The Joint Action 
generally contains an outline of the political and legal context and the reasons for 
undertaking the operation. It also indicates operational details, such as the role and chain of 
command of a number of actors, including the SG/HR, as well as financing details. 
Furthermore, the Joint Action specifies a date for the launch of the operation in which an end 
date for the operation is normally presented. Under a mandate provided by the UN Security 
Council, the Council Joint Action is officially announced at the Security Council as a formal 
decision on the EU operation.  
 
3.4 Chief Negotiators 
 
When it comes to the analysis of UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping, a place 
to start is the ubiquitously pivotal chief negotiator. The so-called ‘Big-four’ refers to France, 
Germany, the UK and Italy which are the four biggest and most powerful European countries. 
Given the important role of the European Big-four countries, this thesis seeks to investigate 
the role of the UK, France, Germany and Italy respectively to determine to what extent each 
plays a decisive role in decision-making on the launch of an EU operation in cooperation 
with the UN.  
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France 
France is unquestionably one of the major driving forces behind UN-EU peacekeeping 
cooperation. France is a major contributor to EU operations both politically and 
operationally. Overall, at least four out of six EU operations have been conducted by French 
command and leadership. Apart from EUFOR Althea and EU NAVFOR Somalia, France 
has been the framework nation for all other missions. It provided the force commanders on 
the ground each time.
216
 In 2010, France ranked first in total number of military personnel in 
EU operations. As of February 2011, in the field of UN peacekeeping operations, France has 
been participating in seven of fourteen UN peacekeeping operations, with 1,473 total 
personnel deployed under UN mandates.
217
 France ranks so far as the nineteenth contributor 
of UN peacekeeping personnel,
218
 while being the first European contributor and the second 
largest contributor among the permanent members of the Security Council after China. In 
European military expenditure, France has been the second largest contributor to UN 
missions since 2002 to 2008, by being the biggest military power besides the UK and 
Germany.  
At the political level, France also appears to be the strongest supporter for ESDP missions as 
well as UN peacekeeping operations. In the eyes of France, according to a French national 
official, cooperation between the UN and the EU is “a vital instrument through which France 
expresses its leadership role, responsibility and its ambitious priority.”
219
 France has 
presented itself as embodying responsibilities for international peace and security and 
viewed its role as “an issue of humanitarian duty and great power status.”
220
 France has 
reaffirmed its duty as a permanent member of the UN Security Council “to be at the 
forefront of it [international peacekeeping]” and “[to] bear a special responsibility for 
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maintaining peace and international security”.
221
 France also reiterated that “making the 
European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the 
central tenets of our [French] security policy.”
222
  
France has actively promoted the ESDP “as a cooperative framework that would enable 
France to fulfil her national ambitions”.
223
 Those ambitions are primarily reflected in, but not 
limited to, military engagement with both the UN and the EU in peacekeeping operations. 
Regarding African peacekeeping operations, for instance, France alone contributed 
approximately 52 percent of all EU military personnel deployed to Africa ESDP 
operations.
224
 Overall, France is an important actor which may influence the likelihood of 




In the course of identifying the nature of the interaction between the UN and the EU, Hill 
focuses especially on the role of the two permanent European members of the UNSC, i.e. 
France and the UK.
225
 As a founding member of the UNSC in 1945, Britain alongside France 
has carried the ‘greatest weight’ in the UNSC over the past decades.
226
 Britain has sought to 
pursue its vital role and assumed responsibilities in shaping a new ‘international order’ as 
one of the most powerful and influential countries of the European Union.
227
 As a permanent 
member of the UNSC, Britain is obliged to uphold the UN Charter. At the same time, the 
UK aims to protect its own national interests while promoting the interests it holds in 
common within the EU framework. Hence, on the issues of UN-EU cooperation in 
international peacekeeping, the role of Britain in close coordination with France is essential 
in order to ensure politically consistent positions and the common interests of the EU in the 
Security Council.
 
In military terms, the UK has been a major contributor to UN 
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 Financially, as displayed in Figure 3.7, Britain is the third largest 
contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping budget, providing 8.16 percent, following the USA 
(27.17%) and Japan (12.53%).   
 
Figure 3. 7 Top 20 Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Budget (2010) 
 
 
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping 
 
The decisive role and position of the UK alongside France is closely linked to the nature of a 
chief negotiator delineated in Putnam’s two-level game. At the international UN level, the 
UK and France are expected to maximise their capabilities in order to uphold the European 
common positions and interests deliberately. However, at the domestic EU level, these two 
major powers would strive to achieve unanimous consent of other members with respect to 
the peacekeeping initiative discussed at the UNSC. In so doing, France and the UK make 
moves on a UNSC game board designed to achieve certain objectives - not only to uphold 
the principles of the UN Charter, but to also protect European interests and common 
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positions - when they are bargaining with their foreign counterparts.
 229
 Simultaneously, in 
response to UNSC decisions, they manoeuvre on an EU board to obtain domestic agreements 
on the provisional decisions made at the UNSC and to establish a Joint Action throughout 




Hampton explains that Germany has replaced its long-standing reluctance to participate in 
any military activities that might appear threatening with a willingness to project power or 
‘power lite’ capabilities.
230
 Following a favourable and drastic shift in German attitudes and 
willingness to eschew past reticence, Germany is beginning to assume a “role of nuanced 
leadership in the EU’s security governance approach to conflict prevention and 
resolution”.
231
 The German role in international peacekeeping has continuously grown as it 
has sought a permanent seat at the Security Council as part of the recent UN Security 
Council reform agenda.
232
 Germany has contributed a considerable amount of financial 
resources as well as personnel support to UN peacekeeping missions. With a share of 8.6% 
of the total amount of the regular UN budget, which accounts approximately USD 417 
million net for the years 2007-΄08, Germany is the third largest contributor worldwide 
followed by other EU partners, e.g. the UK (6.6%) and France (6.3%) (see Figure 3.8). In 
addition, Germany has increased its participation and support to the objectives and values of 
UN peacekeeping operations. German troops have participated in various PKOs, including in 
Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan among other countries, which reflects the 
current German tendency to pursue leadership in peacekeeping operations. Germany is also 
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Figure 3. 8 Ten Largest Regular Budget Contributors to the UN mission in 2008  
 
 
Source: Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN 
 
Germany is indeed an important partner of Britain and France for ESDP operations within 
the EU system. Despite the fact that Germany has a limited status in the Security Council 
due to its non-permanent membership, Germany is nevertheless relevant because 
“concerning any salient EU matters, France and Britain always involve Germany and have 
consultations with Germany.”
234
 In addition, under the Elisée Treaty, France and Germany 
are obliged to concert on every topic before taking any actions or decisions. France 
acknowledges that Germany often seems to be more important than Britain in specific areas 
of ESDP operations.
235
 Given the empirical evidence and claims on the important role of 
Germany, this thesis seeks to explore the German role as a possible chief negotiator on the 
issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. 
 
Italy 
Over the decades Italy has gone through significant development in crisis management by 
assuming increasing responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Since 
                                                 
234
 Interview with French official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 05 March 2010. 
235















the 1960s, it has deployed to numerous UN peacekeeping missions throughout the world, 
which has long been ‘part of the country’s foreign policy’.
236
 Examples include Italy’s 
engagement in 1963 in Congo where it made a significant contribution in terms of human 
life. Italian involvement in the international scene increased with the Libyan mission in the 
1980s, and continued to grow through the 1990s with participation in many multinational 
missions authorised by the United Nations, especially in the Balkans regions whose 
stabilisation and development was a great concern to Italy for geopolitical reasons. Italy’s 
participation in humanitarian missions has also been considerable especially in countries like 
Somalia and Mozambique, where it had also been necessary to evacuate Italian citizens in 
peril. Most recently, Italy has carried out various counter-terrorism operations, such as that 
in Afghanistan.
237
 Currently Italy participates in international peacekeeping operations in 
various ways with more than 9,000 Italian troops deployed in multilateral peacekeeping to 
make an important contribution to reconstruction, stability and peacekeeping. 
Consequently, from Africa to the Balkans and from the Middle East to Asia, Italy is actively 
engaged in making significant political, military and financial contributions through the 
various peacekeeping operations being conducted or authorised either collectively or 
individually by the United Nations and the European Union in all the principal crisis areas 
across the world.
238
 Italy gave strong impetus during its 2003 EU Presidency to the fruitful 
collaboration existing between the UN and the EU in the sector of crisis management. The 
signing of the joint UN-EU declaration on crisis management on 24 September 2003 in New 
York by Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Secretary-General became an important step 
forward, which gave Italy “the chance to participate in strategic decisions regarding the 
world’s main crisis regions”.
 239
 It was also “one of the most significant manifestations of 
overall Italian involvement in the UN”.
240 
In addition to a highly visible role in political and 
operational context, Italy ranks sixth among UN peacekeeping budget contributors (with 
approximately 5% of total expenditures) as shown in Figure 3.7.   
Given the important role of Italy in peacekeeping operations organised by the international 
institution, Under-Secretary De Mistura addresses that “Italy’s participation in peacekeeping 
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operations remains fundamental. The alternative would be highly serious.”
241
 The Under-
Secretary recalled changes over past decades in strategy and approach involving the roles of 
the UN and NATO, elaborating that “the Italian military has made a truly excellent 
contribution, and whose professional skill has improved enormously along with an ability to 
communicate linguistically that equals or surpasses that of many other nations. They are 
amply equipped for today’s multifaceted and asymmetrical wars and to maintain contact 
with the local populations”.
242
 As De Mistura pointed out, Italy has been consistent for 
decades to manage international peacekeeping operations. In this regard, Italian leadership 
and its important role as a chief negotiator is worthy of attention to investigate across cases 
selected.  
 
Facilitator (High Representative) 
The HR is formally titled the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and the Secretary-General (SG) of the EU.
243
 The post was introduced under 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.
244
 The HR’s role was articulated and expanded upon further at the 
Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999. According to the European 
Constitution, the HR is the main coordinator and representative of the CFSP. As the first 
Council Secretary-General and High Representative (SG/HR), Javier Solana was appointed 
in July 1999 and had occupied the position for ten years.
245
 Following the Lisbon Treaty on 1 
December 2009, the HR position is currently held by Catherine Ashton.
246
  
HR Solana has demonstrated his important role in numerous negotiations on issues related to 
international peace and security.
247
 The HR position allowed Solana to continue to be an 
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active promoter of Europe’s role in global security.
248
 For example, at the European Council 
in Thessaloniki on June 2003, the heads of state and government of the Union endorsed a 
paper presented by Javier Solana that was to serve as the basis for a new European Security 
Strategy (ESS).
249
 The ESS, also entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, was adopted 
by the European Council in December 2003. This strategy paper calls for directly countering 
new threats and strengthening multilateral cooperation in maintaining international peace 
and security. To meet these objectives, Solana urged the member states to be ‘more active, 
more coherent, more capable and working with partners’.
250
  
According to Solana, Europe loses influence ‘when it does not speak with one voice’.
251
 
Solana advised all permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to be aware that 
they are not just representing their own country but should be representing ‘the spirit of the 
EU’.
252
 The HR particularly urged the permanent members of the EU to cooperate coherently 
by pointing out that if they do not reach an internal common position, there would be no 
external EU position at international level. Solana sought to increase the bargaining power of 
the EU in the UNSC by achieving uniform EU representation. Biscop, in this respect, notes 
that the role of Solana is illustrative of the ongoing debate about how to increase the EU’s 
presence and power at international level.
253
  
The role of the HR is essential at both the UN and EU levels. Solana played an important 
role in getting any EU-related UNSC resolutions approved and ratified within the EU 
framework. Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to NATO, expressed the view that Solana 
is an “extraordinary consensus-builder who works behind the scenes on both sides”.
254
 Also, 
Solana’s leadership and diplomatic experience in political negotiations was expected to have 
influence on international relations.
255
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This study argues that, despite the important role of the HR, Javier Solana was a facilitator 
rather than a chief negotiator for the following reasons. First, he had no legal status as a 
sovereign state. According to Putnam’s assumption, the chief negotiator is not only a 
domestic representative to international negotiations, but also a part of domestic constituents 
who have the right to vote or make a decision. Javier Solana, however, did not have any right 
to vote or authority to act as a decision-maker. Farrell stresses that the EU is not a legal 
member of the UN Security Council and there is no single standing for the EU to vote on 
UNSC decisions or even to represent its common position at the UNSC.
256
 For the same 
reason, the HR cannot be a member of the UN Security Council, which only allowed Javier 
Solana to participate in formal meetings as an observer not as a negotiator. Second, Solana 
contributed to neither the EU budget nor the UN budget. Moreover, the HR does not have 
any authority to make his own decisions on the UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping as he 
does not contribute to peacekeeping troops. The role of the HR is limited to budgetary, 
military and institutional terms. Consequently, the HR is rather a facilitator who has no 
“legal competence or authority” to make decisions on ESDP missions or UN peacekeeping 







This chapter explored the dynamic decision-making process between the UN and the EU in 
the realm of international peacekeeping. In order to provide an analytical tool to identify the 
most important actors involved in decision-making, this chapter examined both two-level 
game and multi-level game analyses drawing on Putnam’s metaphor.  
In the process of investigating analytical frameworks, this study revealed some critical 
shortcomings of traditional two-level as well as multi-level game approaches to apply to this 
specific research subject. Consequently, the study proposed a new revised two-level game 
model, in which complex webs of interactions between the UN and the EU are decomposed 
into two different levels: International UN level (Level I) and domestic EU level (Level II). 
Regarding decision-making on UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation, the analysis of a revised 
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two-level game showed how UNSC resolutions are internationally achieved and how the EU 
member states domestically come to agree on a Council Joint Action. Moreover, the 
analytical framework identifies the most important actors who may influence the likelihood 
of a decision on UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. The European Big-four countries, i.e. 
France, the UK, Germany and Italy, appeared as chief negotiators, while the HR was 
presented as a facilitator.  
Despite the value of a two-level game analysis that describes a useful analytical tool for 
assessing the simultaneous interactions between different levels, the two-level game attracts 
one main criticism: it is not a fully developed explanatory theory. In order to determine the 
best answer to the primary research question, ‘under what conditions do EU Member States 
lead UN-related peacekeeping operations?’, the next chapter unfolds the theoretical debates 
to clarify the key motivational factors that may influence chief negotiator(s)’s decisions to 
provide active leadership, which is likely to increase the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in 
peacekeeping operations. The role of the chief negotiators and the HR is further examined in 









Chapter   4 
Theoretical Debates: 




[A] theory of international politics… can describe the range of likely 
outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system 
and show how the range of expectations varies as system changes.… [but 
in general] a theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies 










A military peacekeeping intervention is a high politics decision among foreign and security 
policies. Due to the complexity of intergovernmental decision-making, member states’ active 
roles and preferences fundamentally determine the outcome of UN-EU cooperation. It is 
therefore essential to investigate the key motivational factors under which states are more 
likely to trigger EU’s engagement in peacekeeping cooperation. In order to identify the 
important components, this chapter aims to examine the hypothetical variables derived from 
the insights of two prominent IR theories: realist theories vs. social constructivist theories. 
Realists would argue that states cooperate and engage in crisis management in order to exert 
their power and influence in the international arena. Bellamy et al., in this context, argue that 
the idea of cooperation in peace operations is based on the notion that “the great powers have 
a vested interest in preserving the international order in which they occupy a privileged 
position”.
259
 From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic 
interests increase, the likelihood of the EU member states’ leadership in a peacekeeping 
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operation will also increase. A social constructivist theory of EU foreign policy, on the other 
hand, emphasises the effect of pre-existing EU norms which are normally constructed by 
ideological factors including ideas, values, identities and traditions. Social constructivists 
would argue that a state’s behaviour is largely determined by normative pressures which 
gradually consist of normative conditions. From a constructivist perspective, this thesis 
hypothesises that normative pressures would increase the likelihood of EU member states’ 
leadership in determining whether to engage in a peacekeeping operation alongside the UN. 
This chapter expounds on explicit hypotheses for each theory, which integrate empirical and 
theoretical aspects.   
 
 
4.1. Realism and Foreign Policy 
After the Second World War, realism became the dominant theory of international relations 
in which primary concerns are issues of survival and the structure of the international 
system.
260
 The core assumption of realism is that the structure of the international anarchy 
system and humankind’s lust for power determine states’ choice of behaviour, which 
appeared particularly persuasive as an explanation for international relations.
261
 In the 1970s, 
however, classical realism was challenged by liberalists who emphasised interdependence 
between states, transnational relations and non-state actors.
262
 Critical questions were raised 
against the key concepts of realism such as egoism, self-interest and balance of power, which 
had been considered as the important factors determining states’ behaviour within the 
international anarchy system.  
Critics suggested the need to enrich analyses with other variables.
263
 Are the interests of 
nations served only through competition with one another and never through cooperation? 
Or how do we explain the growth of collaborative multinational institutions such as the EU 
and states’ willingness to abide by institutional rules and principles? Realism failed to 
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respond to such empirical questions. A growing number of critics pointed out that the “new” 
realism should be able to account for the ‘international-political system as a whole’ and to 
show “how the structure of the international system and variations in it affect the interacting 
units and the outcomes they produce”.
264
 
Such a challenge to classical realism was replaced by Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics (1979), in which Waltz advanced a radically revised realist theory, 
subsequently labelled ‘neo-realism’ or ‘structural realism’.
265
 Waltz emphasises the 
importance of the structure of the international system and its role as the primary 
determinant of states’ behaviour. According to a neo-realist assumption, states’ behaviour 
and all foreign policy choices are shaped by the international system and its structure, where 
the anarchic and competitive international system provokes states to interact and cooperate 
with one another for their self-interest as well as survival.
266
  
Waltz’s neo-realism is distinct from traditional or classical realism in a number of ways. As 
in classical realism, anarchy and the absence of central power in the international system’s 
structure remain a key element in neo-realism. Classical realism primarily adopts an 
inductive explanation.
267
 Looking at states’ behaviour and interaction in the system, classical 
realists explain international politics by arguing that states’ behaviour is a product of the 
international structure, in which there is no higher authority to prevent threats and counter 
the use of force, and accordingly states can only ensure their security by self-help.
268
 In this 
regard, classical realists highlight the constraints on international cooperation imposed by the 




On the contrary, Waltz and neo-realists employ a deductive approach to explain international 
politics. Neo-realists argue that such international structure emerges from “the interaction of 
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states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward 
others”.
270
 Furthermore, in contrast to classical realism, neo-realist analysis suggests that 
states would decide to follow norms and cooperation because they calculate that it is to their 
advantage, or because norms and cooperation become ‘internalised’.
271
 This neo-realist view 
helps to explain why the prospects for international cooperation often appear possible in 
anarchy international system. 
Neo-realists posit that international cooperation is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain, and 
dependent on states’ power. Nevertheless, neo-realists recognise that international 
cooperation is possible when states make it happen and more likely to succeed in relations 
with powerful states. Whilst classical realists argue that states respond to the conditions of 
the international system according to their size, location, domestic politics and leadership 
qualities, neo-realists further develop the argument that all states are functionally similar 
units as they all experience the same constraints presented by anarchy.
272
 Rather, in a neo-
realist world, states do not differ in the tasks they face, but only in their capabilities or power. 
The relative capabilities and power of states are particularly important, because the 
capabilities distributed either “define the structures of the system” or “stimulate changes in 
the structure of the system”.
273
 Neo-realists suggest that the effectiveness of international 
institutions or cooperation depends on the “leadership and support of a major power”.
274
  
The difference between classical realism and neo-realism can also be found in their different 
view of power. Hans Morgenthau, the most renowned US realist scholar of the mid-twentieth 
century, describes a realist view where “[…] international politics is the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power. [...] We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interests 
defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”
275
 For classical 
realists, military power is considered the most essential element of a state’s power among 
different elements of power.
276
 Power also remains a central concept in neo-realism. 
However, the quest for power is no longer considered as an end in itself as in classical 
realism. Instead, neo-realists see power as the combined capabilities of a state. That is, from 
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a neo-realist point of view, states pursue power as an ‘instrument of survival’ and states seek 
to use this power to ‘coerce and control’ other states in the system.
277
  
Kegley and Wittkopf suggest two categories of how states can use the power as a means to 
achieve survival: ‘internal efforts’ and ‘external efforts’.
278
 States internally seek to increase 
economic capability, to strengthen military capability and to develop robust strategies; while 
they invest efforts externally to strengthen and enlarge their own alliance or to weaken and 
shrink an opposing one.
279
 Neo-realists would lead us to believe that power gives a state a 
place or position in the international system and shapes that state’s behaviour. The 
emergence of a balance of power accounts for a comprehensive relation between power and 
a state’s behaviour in international structure. Neo-realists argue that states consciously aim to 
establish and maintain a balance, because the distribution of power and any dramatic 
changes in that distribution of power can bring a change to the structure of the international 
system.
280
 The neo-realist view on power and the balance of power is important to 
understand the ultimate desire of states, not only to maximise their military and physical 
capabilities, but also to strengthen their economic predominance and secure energy resources, 
which become more crucial for contemporary survival and security in the international 
system.  
Neo-realist assumptions draw the attention of this study to some essential points. First, neo-
realists tend to dominate issues of international security or what was once called high politics 
issues. Neo-realists account for the condition of anarchy and the behaviour of states that seek 
to enhance their security and power. Second, neo-realists emphasise the capabilities (power) 
of states over the intentions and interests of states. According to a neo-realist assumption, 
capabilities are essential for security. And uncertainty about the intentions of other states 
forces states to focus on the capabilities that they are able to accumulate in various ways, and 
which include political and economic power. Third, neo-realists accept the existence of 
institutions or regimes whose roles are deemed as “tools or instruments of statecraft”.
281
 
From a neo-realist point of view, states remain the core and determinant unit that establishes 
and controls these regimes and institutions if they serve states’ own interests. Therefore, 
states tend to continue to support these institutions or regimes if the cooperation activities 
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promoted by the institution would advance their gains and interests. Finally, neo-realists 
agree that institutions can shape the content and direction of foreign policy of states in 
certain issue areas. All things considered, the study determines that neo-realism is 
particularly useful to examine the most important conditions that may influence the 
likelihood of an EU member state’s leadership in dealing with issues of UN-related 
international peacekeeping operations.  
   
Variants of Realisms  
Kenneth Waltz’s theory of structural realism is only one version of (neo-) realism. The end 
of the Cold War raised an important question about the future of realist theories that were 
developed during what could be regarded as an “exceptional period of modern international 
history”.
282
 The advent of neo-realism and its critics provided an impetus for realist scholars 
to think further about the underlying forces that drive international cooperation. As a result, 
realists discovered that neo-realism could lead to various predictions, depending on “how 
they thought about the core assumptions” and “what they view as the most reasonable 
expectations about real-world conditions”.
283
 Recently, in the area of security studies, some 
scholars, including John Mearsheimer, Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, suggest new versions 
of neo-realism using the terms offensive and defensive realism. Also, Wohlforth revisits the 
diversity of theoretical sub-schools of neo-realism which are more foreign policy relevant 
realist theories than Waltz and Grieco’s version of neo-realism, namely offensive realism, 
defensive realism, and neoclassical realism.
284
 On the question of what causes states to adopt 
certain kinds of foreign policy on the issue of cooperation in international peace and security, 
the following section examines four distinct theories of realism, including innenpolitik 
theory in addition to those three types of neo-realist theories, to gauge which theory has most 
explanatory power to apply to the research subject.
285
   
G. Rose argues that the first and most common school of realism is composed of Innenpolitik 
theories. The main assumption of Innenpolitik theory is that foreign policy is best understood 
                                                 
282
 R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, International Relations: Theories and approaches, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p.89. 
283
 W. C. Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy” in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds.), 
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.34. 
284
 Ibid., pp.31-48.  
285
 Rose defines four distinct neo-realist debates related to European foreign policy. See G. Rose, 
“Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, vol. 51, no.1, 1998, pp.144-
172.  
 88 
as the “product of a country’s internal dynamics”.
286
 More specifically, Innenpolitik theorists 
would argue that internal domestic factors such as political and economic preference and 
national character determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their borders. 
Therefore, according to Innenpolitik theorists, one should peer inside the ‘black box’ where 
the preferences and configuration of key states are formed in order to understand why a 
particular country is behaving in a certain way in international relations.
287
 However, these 
theories present difficulties in accounting for why states with similar domestic conditions 
often yield different outcomes in the foreign policy sphere; and why dissimilar states in 
similar systems often act alike. In order to avoid this problem, scholars grounded in realist 
theories have generated theories of foreign policy, namely offensive and defensive realism, 
which both highlight the influence of the international system on state behaviour.
 288
 
Although both offensive and defensive realisms start from the common assumption that the 
international system is unitary and anarchy in which rational states are forced to choose 
security strategy options to survive and prosper in the system, each has a different take on 
the nature of the international anarchic system.  
Offensive realists assume that as the nature of international anarchy is generally Hobbesian, 
security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximising their relative power and 
advantage.
289
 In the offensive realists’ world, states develop military power and the 
capability to influence international affairs by balancing the power of other states regardless 
of whether or not they pose a threat.
 290 Offensive realists argue that states begin with a 
defensive motive, but are forced to think and sometimes act offensively because of the 
structure of the international system.
291
 Therefore, as Mearsheimer points out, leaders of 
states would seek to pursue security policies that weaken their potential enemies and increase 
their power relative to all others.
292
 In this view, states should ensure their security by 
expanding their power and influence whenever they can.
293
 In order to understand a state’s 
behaviour in a particular way, offensive realism suggests that one should examine a state’s 
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relative capabilities, power and external environment; because those factors will lead to 
foreign policy of a particular state and shape how the state chooses to advance its interests.
294
 
Offensive realism does offer a useful insight to examine the desire of EU actors to develop 
their security power to influence international events, in particular in the civil-military sphere. 
Nevertheless, this study suggests that offensive realism cannot comprehend the current 
European efforts to work collectively alongside the UN in global peacekeeping operations 
beyond European borders.  
Defensive realists take a softer line, arguing that in international anarchy security is often 
plentiful rather than scarce, because most leaders of rational states understand that the costs 
of war clearly ‘outweigh’ the benefits.
295
 According to a defensive realist assumption, states 
only respond to external threats.
296
 In other words, states only engage in expensive military 
operations to counter specific threats, and states often formulate cooperation or ally with 
neighbouring states in order to ensure their collective security in addition to reducing their 
military expenses. When states perceive or detect a threat to their security, they seek to 
expand their capability to influence events, but only ‘when necessary’ rather than whenever 
they can. According to defensive realism, states would seek to respond to any threats in a 
timely manner by balancing against them to obviate the need for actual conflict. However, 
the defensive realist argument underestimates the fact that states’ responses to threats can 
vary according to their perceptions of threats, which are generally shaped by their relative 
material power. 
Neoclassical realism challenges key elements of all three realist perspectives. For 
neoclassical realists, as Wohlforth argues, theoretical structures like offensive and defensive 
realism are “not always and everywhere true or false”.
297
 Rather, neoclassical realists seek to 
rectify this imbalance between the general and the particular. Instead of assuming that states 
seek security per se, neoclassical realists believe that states seek to control and shape the 
external environment and respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy. In this 
respect, Rose points out that neoclassical realism occupies a “middle ground between pure 
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structural theories and constructivism”.
298
 Neoclassical realists view the relative power of 
states as a key independent variable, stressing that power refers to the “capabilities or 
resources” with which states can influence each other in international relations.
299
 According 
to a neoclassical realist argument, the relative power shapes a country’s particular interests, 
goals or foreign policy preferences, which in turn primarily guide the country’s external 
choices and behaviour. In this regard, Wohlforth suggests that the neoclassical realist 
approach is most likely to exploit the benefits of realism for the analysis of foreign policy 
while avoiding the potential pitfalls.
300
  
Zakaria suggests that a good theory of foreign policy should account for to what extent the 
international system has an effect on national behaviour, because “the most powerful 
generalisable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the 
international system”.
301
 On the specific research subject of this study, neoclassical realism is 
deemed the best form of realist theories to evaluate the foreign policy of EU member states. 
Among various different sub-theoretical schools of realism, this thesis adopts neoclassical 
realism as a main theory to test whether it provides the best explanation for important 
conditions that may influence the likelihood of EU member states’ leadership which would 




Realist Propositions  
What would realists say about the key reasons of the European major powers leading and 
actively engaging in decision-making on an EU-led peacekeeping operation? Realists argue 
that states’ foreign policy and behaviour is considerably driven by rational calculations of 
gain or loss of national power and interests. On the basis of this realist assumption, Gegout 
attempts to explain the primary reasons why European powers are likely to engage in 
conflict resolution and international peacekeeping operations. According to Gegout’s 
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argument, the primary motives of European intervention, particularly in the military sphere, 
are related to political interests in power projection on the international stage, such as the 
defence of zones of influence, the promotion of national prestige, and enhancing their 
reputation as a major world power.
303
 One of the best examples to support this realist claim 
can be found in the US-led UN peacekeeping operation deployed in South Korea during the 
Korean War in 1950. The US utilised the UN to legitimise its intervention in Korea, which 
brought a significant triumph of US political and strategic interests afterwards.
304
 The 
political, economic and foreign policy directions of South Korean government were 
considerably influenced and guided by the US foreign policy, and the American power and 
influence over Korean peninsula along with north-east Asia, which are all geo-strategically 
important, became dominant. 
This realist view is particularly enhanced by Wohlforth’s argument. Wohlforth reflects the 
importance of the promotion of the relative power of states, arguing that declining power can 
unquestionably be a major driving force to trigger states to legitimately use military force to 
rescue their power and position if they are at stake.
305
 Put differently, when a state which had 
previously occupied an influential power in certain areas went through a decline in its power 
and position, the state would be likely to view a crisis management operation as an important 
opportunity to recover its place and further extend its power in the areas. This argument 
seems to be persuasive when it comes to the case in which there exists any colonial legacy 
between a host country and a troop contributing country. Bellamy and Williams posit that 
peace operation is intimately connected to the status quo, arguing that “international 
organization [sic] depends on each of the world’s most powerful states having vested interest 
in preserving the status quo”.
306
 Europe’s peace operations accordingly can be “ultimately 
concerned with managing and protecting the colonial status quo”.
307
  
In addition to the internal and state-centric political interests of individual states, European 
engagement in international peacekeeping can also be explained by the external motivations 
of EU member states, in terms of the balance of power. As discussed earlier, power is 
deemed by realists as the most essential element of a state’s survival and security, and it 
therefore remains a central concept in realist theories. States continuously seek to promote 
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their power and position in the international system, while they also consciously aim to 
maintain a balance of power. International systems have considerably changed since the end 
of the Cold War in the late 1980s from a bilateral to a multilateral international system. 
Furthermore, as China has recently emerged as a great power in the international system, the 
European super powers have relatively lost their uncontested prestigious power and position. 
For realists, new emerging powers such as China are seen as a threat. Realists would argue 
that due to a fear of dramatic changes in the distribution of power in the international system, 
which may cause a change to the structure of this system, the European major powers would 
tend to provide their active leadership to support institutional activities and promote 
cooperation conducive to maintaining their power within the international structure.  
Along with ensuring political power, enhancing economic power becomes an increasingly 
salient concern to the major states. When the world summit on sustainable development was 
held in Johannesburg in 2002, experts and scholars emphasised the importance of natural 
resources, particularly oil and gas, as a key catalyst for the various forms of engagement of 
super powers in Africa.
308
 One UN official remarks that permanent members of the Security 
Council seem most likely to get involved in crisis management in Africa if the region 
involved is particularly rich in various natural resources.
309
 Interestingly, according to 
interview evidence from a UN official for African peacekeeping missions, “some permanent 
members of the UNSC have launched investments and taken advantage of the engagement in 
most conflict areas in Africa where UN peacekeeping missions were authorised, such as in 
the Congo, Sudan, Chad and Somalia”.
310
 In light of the new security challenge facing the 
EU’s increasing dependency for energy imports, particularly fossil fuels (natural gas, solid 
fuels and oil) from non-EU countries, the EU has stated that a new energy strategy gives 
African countries an important geo-strategic position as well as a vital role in assuring the 
EU’s secure and reliable energy security.
311
  
From a realist perspective, oil and natural resources would play an important role in 
managing the dynamics of international relations and generate a new economic imperialism. 
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In effect, states often hold the perception that “economic power can be far more promising 
than military power when it comes to influencing the international agenda.”
312
 According to 
Drezner, the global distribution of power is rapidly shifting to oil producers.
313
 Drezner 
argues that energy exporters will thus have been in front and centre in the minds of national 
security and foreign policy strategies.
314
 In the same respect, Vialls also suggests that oil and 
natural resources have always been the major reason for many internal conflicts that in many 
cases have turned into civil wars such as in the Gulf (1991), Angola, Algeria and Congo.
315
 
More importantly, Vialls argues that superpowers seek ‘global dominance through control of 
the world’s oil resources’ for their own survival and protection of their national security.
316
  
As it has emerged that securing energy resources in a both effective and safe way became an 
important aspect of national and regional security, “the [EU] states are more willing to 
support the stability of countries of which abundant natural recourses are produced”.
317
 For a 
realist view, states tend to behave and pursue foreign policies in order to maximise their self-
interests for survival’s sake. This argument may overlap with what Putnam presents as ‘win-
sets’. The chief negotiators - the UK, France, Germany and Italy in this study- may seek to 
augment their own ability in negotiations at the international level in order to satisfy 
domestic preferences - securing reliable natural resources and strengthen their own economic 
power - and to clinch an international agreement in their favour. Hence, in a realist context, 
Elman argues that due to the geo-strategically important conditions of a particular region, the 
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4.2 Realist Hypothesis 
Drawing on what neoclassical realists primarily assume, this thesis establishes a realist 
hypothesis. The single hypothesis encompasses the most important conditions of neoclassical 
realism that may constrain the behaviour and decisions of the member states (independent 
variable). By examining the independent variable, it seeks to answer under what conditions 
the EU member states, inter alia the European Big-four major powers, are likely to provide 
their decisive leadership roles in dealing with issues of peacekeeping cooperation with the 
UN (dependent variable). As discussed earlier, the core assumptions of neoclassical realism 
are as follows: 1) states are the most important actors who determine and control the 
direction of institutions and cooperation in the international system; 2) due to the relative 
power and capabilities of states, powerful states primarily lead and stimulate cooperation 
when they consider it necessary; and 3) to states, institutions and cooperation are viewed as 
an effective means to reflect and maximise states’ interests and power in international 
relations.  
Such neoclassical realist assumptions are transformed into one single hypothesis that is 
linked to the dependent variable of this research study. As Figure 4.1 summarises, this thesis 
proposes a hypothetical relationship that if political and strategic interests in a peacekeeping 
operation increase, the likelihood of chief negotiator(s)’ leadership will also increase.  
 







The political and strategic interests are generally informed and measured by, including but 
are not limited to, the following three important conditions: extension of political power, 
existence of colonial legacy, and enhancement of economic power. First, states are interested 
in building their political power in the international system; and when there is a political 
interest on the part of chief negotiator in a peacekeeping operation, the likelihood of its 
leadership to influence the EU decision to  engage with the UN in peacekeeping will increase. 




Second, states that have previously enjoyed colonial powers would not want to abandon their 
exclusive influence over former colonies; and when there exists a colonial legacy of a chief 
negotiator particularly in a peacekeeping area, the likelihood of its leadership will increase. 
Third, states perceive that reinforcing economic power and securing energy resources are 
becoming more important for states’ power and security; so if the chief negotiator has an 
economic interest in a peacekeeping operation, the likelihood of its leadership in dealing 
with issues of engagement with the UN in peacekeeping will also increase. Yet, it must not 
be overlooked that this realist proposition could fall into a logical fallacy, i.e. the post hoc 
ergo propter hoc error. Put differently, it would be difficult to assert that since peacekeeping 
engagements are followed by economic benefits, peacekeeping must have been caused by 
economic interests. The study thus seeks evidence to show clear correlations, rather than 
causality, between economic interests of the chief negotiator and economic benefits 
following the operation. Overall, the aim of theory testing is to clarify whether political and 
strategic interests appropriately explain and predict the likelihood of the EU member states’ 
leadership in deciding to engage in a peacekeeping operation.  
 
 
4.3 Constructivism and Foreign Policy 
 
Beginning in the 1980s following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, criticisms emerged that realist theories were not clear about the future development 
of the balance of the power in a multi-polar system. A new IR debate and theoretical 
discussion thus began to emerge among IR scholars to help rectify current weakness in IR 
theories. Realism was particularly challenged by idealist scholarship, so called social 
constructivists. The term of Social Constructivism (in shorthand, constructivism) in IR was 
first elaborated by Nicholas Onuf in his book World of Our Making in 1989.
319
 
Constructivist theory is often called social constructivism, as its core assumption was 
inspired by theoretical developments in other social science disciplines, particularly 
philosophy and sociology. According to social constructivist assumptions, the world is 
constituted socially through “inter-subjective interaction” where actors and structures are 
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 Unlike realism which focuses on the distribution of power as an 
important reason for states’ behaviour and foreign policy in the international system, 
constructivists reject such a one-side materialistic account. Instead, constructivists give 
greater weight to the social, as opposed to the material, in world politics, which leads to a 
less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structures and agents 
(individuals, states, non-state actors). Giddens argues that structures and actors are not two 
separate concepts or constructs.
321
 Rather, in the process of interactions between states, the 
identities and interests of states are created, and states know who they are and what they 
want in the structure. Hence, “structure has no existence or causal powers” apart from these 
processes of interactions.
322
 Instead of just assuming that a particular foreign policy is 
determined by certain pre-existing interests of a state, constructivists explore how those 
interests are constructed through a process of interaction with the broader environment.
323
 
Constructivist theory has been applied to a range of IR subjects, including ‘political 
economy’,
324
 ‘international organization [sic]’,
325
 and ‘security studies.’
326
 Realists would 
argue that constructivism has generally eschewed the focus on the power politics of security 
studies and developed instead ‘benign norms’ for managing inter-states interactions and 
institutionalising broader forms of ‘political community.’
327
 Constructivists rather insist that 
their approach actually enables more sophisticated issues to be elucidated, including issues 
traditionally associated with realist approaches to security studies, from the ‘nature of 
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 in general to the ‘security dilemma and the balance of power’
329
 in particular. 
Constructivists believe that one can rarely understand the security dilemma or a state’s 
perception of threat without some attention to the role of standards of legitimacy or the 
politics of identity which are both the core concepts of constructivist theories. For 
constructivists, interests are interpreted as socially constructed rather than pre-given, which 
means that regularities or constraints of structures of the international system are the 
consequence of collective or inter-subjective interactions of states.
330
 
The logic of constructivism is particularly useful when it aims to account for the four 
decades covering Europe’s desire to maintain its peace and security by promoting effective 
multilateral cooperation within the EU framework.
331
 For constructivists, the most important 
dimension of European foreign and security policy is the role of the European norms and 
identity, which constrain and influence states’ behaviour. In the constructivists’ vocabularies, 
norms are interpreted as “shared expectations about appropriate or legitimate behaviour by 
actors with a particular identity”.
332
 Similarly, Katzenstein depicts the definition of norms as 
“collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.
333
 
Constructivists suggest that identity is especially constructed through the use of language, 
the deployment of ideas, and the establishment of norms. Through the internationalisation of 
norms, states usually acquire their identities and establish what their interests are, which is 
what constructivists mean when they talk about the ‘constructive effects of norms’.
334
 In 
order to address the value of constructivism and determine to what extent constructivist 
theory is applicable to the specific research project of this thesis, the next section investigates 
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Variants of Constructivism 
Most commonly, constructivists explore how international norms evolve and provide limits 
to acceptable state behaviour in general.
335
 Checkel suggests that constructivism comes in 
two main varieties: North American and European constructivism. The North American 
variant of constructivism, which is heavily dominated by US scholars, is often referred to as 
‘conventional constructivism’. It examines the role of ‘social norms’ and to a lesser extent 
‘identity’ in shaping international and foreign policy outcomes.
336
 These scholars adopt a 
top-down or deductive approach to account for causal relationships between variables such 
as actors, norms, interests, and identity. Conventional constructivism is especially useful to 
access the role of international organisations, because the theory is particularly interested in 
their ability to promote certain understandings of norms or identities, determining whether 




The European variant of constructivism, on the other hand, is often labelled ‘interpretative 
constructivism’ as its main focus relies on the role of language in mediating and constructing 
states’ identity and behaviour. The interpretative constructivists choose an inductive or 
bottom up research strategy that seeks to examine a fundamental change or a new construct 
of state identity which has emerged from a range of linguistic conditions, such as textual, 
narrative and normative discourses.
338
 Instead of examining what factors cause aspects of a 
state’s identity to change, interpretative constructivists have a different approach to explore 
the ‘background conditions’ which link to social discourse that may change a state’s foreign 
policy or position in international relations.
339
 A wide range of linguistic forms including 
public documents, statements, declarations and reports are viewed as important factors to 
determine states’ choices and behaviour.  
Another school of IR theories which is also broadly inspired by the work of social 
constructivism is ‘normative institutionalism’,
 340
 which is often referred to as ‘constructivist 
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 Normative institutionalism particularly focuses on the ‘central 
role assigned to norms and values within institutions’ in explaining states’ behaviour and 
choices of foreign policy.
342
 For normative institutionalists, an institution is not necessarily a 
formal or physical structure, but rather understood as a “collection of norms, rules, and 
understandings”.
343
 Peters notes that an institution would cover a comprehensive range of 
meanings from formal structural elements to amorphous normative entities, and has been 
conceptualised to explain the behaviour of individual member states.
344
 A collection of 
values and identities of institutions is largely normative rather than cognitive, which provides 
a means of linking individual states’ behaviour and institutions.
345
 In this respect, March and 
Olsen suggest that institutions possess an ‘inherent legitimacy’ that guides their members to 
behave in accordance with a sense of the collective, as opposed to their own self-interests.
346
   
According to Duke, decision outcomes on the issue of UN-EU relations can be shaped by 
institutions that are “collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate 
action in terms of relations between roles and situations”.
347
 For example, when the EU is 
undergoing international bargaining at the UN, institutional values such as European norms 
and identity encourage individual negotiators “to remember some identities and common ties, 
and to forget individual national identities that tend to create cleavages and conflicts”.
348
 
Thomas argues that a collection of institutional norms and values significantly constrains 
policy-makers to consult each other before publicising their preferences and to seek 
consensus, now deeply embedded in member states’ practice and expectations.
349
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In sum, constructivist theories share the key assumptions that norms and collective ideas are 
constructed in the process of social interactions between actors and structures, which leads to 
states’ normative behaviour and foreign policy in international relations. The thesis suggests 
that normative institutionalism is worth incorporating into social constructivism to examine 
to what extent normative factors are decisive to determine UN-EU cooperation in 
international peacekeeping operations.  
Constructivist Propositions 
To the extent that structures can be said to shape the behaviour of states, constructivists hold 
that normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures.
350
 
Constructivists believe that institutionalised norms and ideas “define the meaning and 
identity of the individual actor and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and 
cultural activity engaged in by those individuals”,
 351
 and they “condition what actors 
consider necessary and possible in both practical and ethical terms”.
352
 Therefore, normative 
ideas such as “how states think they should act, what the perceived limitations on their 
actions are and what strategies they can imagine to achieve their objectives” can be 




From a constructivist point of view, the propensity of states to lead a cooperation to achieve 
joint gains is more likely to be found within an institutionalised and normative framework 
than outside of one. Smith seeks to explain cooperation in related areas of security and 
defence through mechanisms or processes by which institutional norms occurs and affects 
EU foreign policymaking. According to Smith, a state’s behaviour is institutionalised 
through the various processes by which “an informal, extra-legal, ad hoc, improvised system 
gradually fostered the achievement of cooperative outcomes and progressively enhanced its 
own procedures to improve the prospects for those outcomes”.
354
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Reus-Smit defines the normative and institutional process as three mechanisms: imagination, 
communication and constraint.
355
 With regard to the first aspect, it is argued that normative 
and ideational structures affect an actor’s behaviour by framing its imagination. For example, 
a democratic state will only imagine and seriously entertain certain strategies within the 
liberal democratic polity, and such norms will condition its expectations and behaviour. 
Second, normative structures also work their influence through communication. When a state 
seeks to justify its behaviour, it usually provides a linguistic or moral court of appeal. In the 
case of intervention in the affairs of another state, a state may justify its behaviour with 
reference to international human rights norms. Finally, constructivists argue that 
“institutionalised norms and ideas work as rationalisations only because they already have a 
moral force in a given social context”.’
356
 In sum, besides appealing to norms and ideas to 
justify behaviour by using the very language and imagination, normative structure itself can 
place significant contestants on the actor’s conduct.   
The idea of the institutionalised normative process has been further developed by some 
constructivist scholars, including Daniel Thomas, Frank Schimmelfennig, Richard Youngs, 
Jeffrey Lewis, and Simon Duke. They have collaborated on a theory of EU decision-making 
on foreign and external relations, aimed at illuminating ‘why and when member states 
succeed or fail in negotiating common policies on the international stage’.
357
 By examining 
the bargaining dynamics and policy-making process of the EU’s CFSP, the authors conclude 
that EU decision-making is certainly determined by normative values, which are normally 
presented by three main normative pressures: normative commitment, normative entrapment, 
and normative suasion.  
As Figure 4.2 displays, once member states have committed themselves to a particular set of 
norms or policy course, they are likely to find themselves entrapped to take further actions 
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that do not reflect their original intentions or current preferences (normative commitment).
358
 
The states are expected to fulfil their commitment; otherwise their reputation will be 
somehow damaged in the international community (normative entrapment). In parallel, 
others may seek to behave in accordance with the normative ideas and policy commitments 
in order not to find themselves isolated from the collective actions of the Union in support of 
EU common policies. The concept of ‘normative suasion’
359
 remains the last, but the most 
important and difficult, step to strengthen the normative arguments. Normative suasion is 
pursued through communication among actors involved in negotiations. They discuss 
normative reasons why particular common policies are more desirable or more appropriate 
than what particular member states preconceive their identities and fundamental interests to 
be. Successful normative suasion produces a convergence of member states’ preferences that 
facilitates consensus on EU common policies. For constructivists, normative pressures are 
presented as important variables that may significantly influence the likelihood of 
cooperation. 
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Historical memory also plays a considerable role in affecting actors’ identities and behaviour 
in a normative way. Belgium’s fatal failures in the decolonisation process in the DR Congo, 
for instance, remain a significant reason for Belgium to baulk at the initiative of military 
deployment. The collective international failure to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 also resulted in a bone of contention between troop contributing countries. On the 
contrary, successful historical memory can become catalysts for active leadership just as in 
Kosovo case in 1999 which helped the growing emergence of the EU doctrine of a 
responsibility to protect and maintain peace even without UN endorsement. In light of 
European history, colonial legacy is inextricably entangled with the foreign policy of the 
major powers. Although colonial legacy is often seen as entailing ruthless neo-colonialism, 
the empirical study posits that colonial legacy also seems to be linked to the historical 
memory which helps to generate normative identity and responsibility of EU member states 
to intervene in peacekeeping.  
According to the document on ‘The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa’, the EU 
emphasised the importance of peacekeeping support in Africa, stressing the importance of 
“historical, cultural and economic ties between the states of Africa and many European 
nations”.
 360
 The EU urged its member states to consider that ‘the institutions responsible for 
the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) should have a subsidiary role in coordinating bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives to support African military crisis-management capabilities (iv)’.
361
 In 
fact, a wide range of EU-led peacekeeping operations in Africa is closely linked to the 
former colonial ties of some EU member states. As Table 4.1 shows, the EU has taken over a 
number of African peacekeeping missions that were initially mandated as UN missions. 
Interestingly, most of the African countries to which the EU deployed ESDP operations in 
cooperation with the UN were former colonies of Europe. Both the Central African Republic 
and Chad, for instance, where the strong EU-led military troops have been deployed 
alongside UN operations, were colonies of France. Sudan, where the EU has coordinated 
UN-AU mission by supporting military and civilian capabilities, was a colony of Britain. 
The DR Congo, in which a number of recent peacekeeping operations have been deployed, 
was colonised by Belgium in the nineteenth century. The EU has a robust military presence 
in the country.  
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Table 4. 1 Peacekeeping Operations in Africa (2003-2010) 
 
Country UN Mission EU Operation Colonial History 
CAR and Chad 
MINURCAT 
Resolution 1778 
25 September 2007 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
Council Joint Action 
2007/677/CFSP,  







11 June 2004 
EU Support to AMIS 
(Sudan/Darfur) 
Council Joint Action 










27 Feb 2004 
French mission 












30 May 2003 
and 
S/ RES/1671 
25 April 2006 
was renamed  
MONUSCO 
S/RES/1925 
28 May 2010 
DRC/ARTEMIS 
Council Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP, 




Council Joint Action 
2004/847/CFSP 
of 9 December 2004 
EUFOR RD Congo 
Council Joint Action 
2006/319/CFSP, 
of 27 April 2006 
EUSEC RD Congo 
Council Joint Action 
2005/355/CFSP, 




15 May 2008 
EU NAVFOR Somalia 
Council Joint Action 
2008/749/CFSP 







06 April 1999 
EU SSR 
Guinea-Bissau 
Council Joint Action 
2008/112/CFSP, 








In the case of the Liberia War Crisis, however, which displaced scores of people, both 
internally and beyond the borders resulting in some 850,000 refugees in the neighbouring 
countries and led to a complete breakdown of law and order,
362
 none of the EU countries 
deployed peacekeeping support. Liberia, a nation on the west coast of Africa, was colonised 
by freed American slaves with the help of the American Colonization Society and is the only 
country without roots in the “European Scramble for Africa”. Such empirical evidence 
provides an important basis for the constructivist proposition that states tend to behave, 
interact and cooperate in accordance with socially constructed normative identity and 
responsibility based upon their historical memory. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it 
would be also possible that the existence of historical memory will decrease the likelihood of 
active leadership of EU member states on the issue of peacekeeping engagement. If they 
have not established a peaceful relationship with countries requesting a peacekeeping 
support, there might be reluctance by host countries to invite their former colonial powers 
back into their territories.  
 
4.4 Constructivist Hypothesis 
The constructivist hypothesis seeks to evaluate to what extent normative values are 
important when EU actors provide their leadership in negotiating and making decisions on 
the possibility of an EU-led peacekeeping deployment. It is hypothesised that if there are 
normative pressures of chief negotiator(s), the likelihood of their leadership to lead 
peacekeeping cooperation with the UN will increase. Within this constructivist hypothesis, it 
is perceived that historical memory and normative institutional processes are particularly 
important conditions.  
First, in the context of historical memory, constructivists would argue that European 
countries that have ever experienced special historical ties or relationship with a country 
requesting peacekeeping may have a normative feeling of responsibility, and such a 
normative responsibility and identity would give an important impetus for, or at least spill 
over into, European collective action through social interactions. In this regard, if a country 
which was previously constrained by the colonial legacy of a certain European country 
requests a peace operation, the likelihood of the leadership of the EU states will increase. 
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Second, once states commit themselves to a particular set of norms and/or policy course, 
they are likely to find themselves obliged to act coherently. In this respect, it would be 
argued by constructivists that when there is a normative commitment of EU countries, the 
likelihood of EU engagement in a peacekeeping operation with the UN will also increase.  
Hence, as Figure 4.3 shows, this thesis hypothesises that if normative pressures of EU actors 
on a peacekeeping issue are presented, the likelihood of chief negotiator(s)’ leadership will 
also increase. The hypothesis is examined to determine whether the constructivist approach 
explicitly explains the real motives of EU actors’ leadership in deciding a peacekeeping 
engagement alongside the UN. 
 










This chapter discussed theoretical debates. In order to identify the important variables and 
conditions under which chief negotiators are likely to maximise their leadership in the 
determination of an EU-led peacekeeping deployment in support of a UN mission, this 
chapter suggested two hypotheses derived from each of the two theories: realism vs. social 
constructivism. The realist hypothesis is deduced from neoclassical realism and generally 
labelled realist hypothesis. The constructivist hypothesis is broadly inspired by social 
constructivist theories incorporating normative institutionalism. This thesis refers to it as the 
constructivist hypothesis.   
From a realist perspective, this thesis hypothesises that as political and strategic interests 
increase, so does the likelihood of leadership of EU major powers that may lead to an EU 




decision on peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the social constructivist theory 
hypothesises that the presence of normative pressures would increase the likelihood of 
leadership of the major powers to lead the EU to decide a EU-led peacekeeping engagement 
alongside the UN.  
In the following case study chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7), each of the hypotheses is tested 
across three cases to determine to what extent theories are likely to provide the best answer 














Chapter  5 
UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping I :  








On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to launch a fully 
autonomous military operation, codenamed Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).
 363
 It took place in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003 and the Council Joint Action of 2003/423/CFSP 
adopted on 5 June 2003. Operation Artemis became an important test case for the credibility 
of the EU as a global civil-military actor because it was the first EU attempt to cooperate 
with the UN with a full range of military instruments outside Europe. The aim of the 
operation was to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia, the north-eastern Ituri province of the DRC.
364
 The 
operation was deployed on a strictly temporary basis and officially ended on 1 September 
2003.  
Artemis is considered a special EU military intervention for the following reasons. First, it 
was the first autonomous EU-led military mission. Without recourse to the “Berlin Plus” 
arrangements and hence to NATO assets, Operation Artemis was the first to be implemented 
entirely autonomously. Second, it was the first ESDP military operation where UN-EU 
cooperation was applied. Operation Artemis was initiated by the EU and conducted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was carried out at the request and mandate of the UN 
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Security Council to work in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Third, it was the first EU military operation 
which took place outside Europe. The EU certainly expected to acquire greater credibility on 
the international stage and affirm its role as a promising security actor in the settlement of 
international crisis and conflicts.  
Despite such high expectations and largely being considered a success, Operation Artemis 
still suffers from lingering criticism that it had very limited aims in time and geographical 
location; the EU intervention was limited to the town of Bunia and only lasted three months. 
The EU was not willing to engage in crises and conflicts outside of this zone. In addition, 
there have been tangible debates on the nature of the EU military operation in the DRC. 
Initially, the military operation in the DRC was given to France by the request of the 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. However, France seemed to transform the French national 
military mission into a European operation by getting other member states involved. It is 
thus important to investigate the negotiating process and elucidate key conditions under 
which the EU achieved a consensus.  
In order to examine the causes and consequences of the first EU military cooperation in 
Africa, this chapter sheds light on both the negotiating context through which the operation 
became implemented, and important factors that may have influenced the leadership role of 
the chief negotiators to formulate the operation. The first section offers a brief background 
on the emergence of conflicts in the DRC, including an overview of the MONUC operation, 
which may facilitate a general understanding of why the UN came to request support from 
the EU (5.1). Then the chapter explores the dynamic negotiations between the UN and the 
EU in order to identify the most important actor(s) involved in decision-making at both the 
UN and the EU, namely the chief negotiator(s) (5.2). In the remaining two sections, various 
motives that may have influenced the decision of chief negotiator(s) regarding the military 
intervention in the DRC are analysed by testing theoretical propositions drawn from neo-
realism (5.3) and social constructivism (5.4). The aim of this chapter is to explicate the most 
important conditions under which the European major powers are more likely to provide 








The Democratic Republic of Congo is the third largest country in Africa by area after Sudan 
and Algeria, and is as large as Western Europe.
365
 The country is situated at the heart of the 
west-central portion of sub-Saharan Africa and is bounded by nine neighbours: the Central 
African Republic and Sudan in the north; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania in the east; 
Zambia and Angola to the South; and the South Atlantic Ocean and the Republic of Congo 
to the west (see figure 5.1). In spite of a slight increase in its Human Development Index 
(HDI) between 2000 and 2007 (it rose by 1.41% annually from 0.353 to 0.389) the DRC 
remains one of the least developed countries, ranking 167th out of 182 countries in 2007.
366
 
Nevertheless, the DRC seems to possess great economic potential.
367
 It owns more than 50 
percent of the forests in Africa.
368
 The Congo River is the second longest river in Africa after 
the Nile, and is also the second most concentrated in the world after the Amazon in terms of 
hydro-electric potential.
369
 More importantly, the country is rich in natural resources, 
particularly various and abundant minerals such as diamonds, cobalt, copper, gold, silver, 
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The richness and variety of Congolese natural resources could have certainly been a Central-
African blessing. However, it turned into a Congolese bane. Besides its politically unstable 
and insecure situation, the vast amount of mining resources of the DRC has drawn the 
attention of its neighbours, particularly Angola, Rwanda and Burundi, who are very much 
interested in Congolese natural resources. As a result, its geographically important position 
has augmented tensions not only between inter-ethnic groups, which are estimated to be over 
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 Map No. 4007 Rev.8, United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, 2004. 
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250, but also in conflicts with numerous armed militia rebel groups supported by the DRC’s 
neighbouring states. The main conflict factions involved Congolese government and rebel 
forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Having their own interests in sharing trade 
benefits and reaping from diamond mining, Rwanda and Uganda occupied and controlled the 
North-Eastern regions of the DRC, namely the Kivus and Ituri, where Operation Artemis 
aimed to deploy forces. Also, Rwandan ethnic rebel groups, Hutus and Tutsis which had 
been historical rivals, were fighting on Congolese territory in the Kivus.
371
 Tensions 
remained high in the DRC, particularly in the north-eastern area where numerous armed 
militia groups were in control of the country and inter-ethnic massacres had been taking 
place.   
Political instability and crisis in the DRC spiralled rapidly, and the second DRC civil war 
broke out in 1998, coinciding with international and internal wars where a number of 
countries became involved and fought simultaneously.
372
 Ulrisken et al. described this 
Congolese civil war as a ‘central web of wars’ in Africa.
373
 In July 1999, there was an 
attempt to end the war through a ceasefire, and inter-Congolese dialogues were established 
under the auspices of the United Nations. The heads of state gathered together in Lusaka 
(Zambia) and signed the Lusaka Agreements.
374
 After the first peacekeeping operation of the 
UN in the DRC during the Congolese wars of the 1960s,
375
 the UN started its largest and 
most expensive peace operation in 1999. Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement between the DRC and five regional states, the MONUC was established in 
November 1999 to monitor the implementation of the Agreement and observe the ceasefire 
and disengagement of forces.
376
 Under the UNSC mandate, 90 peacekeepers were deployed. 
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In spite of its previous crisis management experience in the 1960s, the constraints and 
deficits of the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC were evident. Morsut points out that 
due to the weak commitment of states and particularly the reluctance of Europeans to get 
involved in the operation, the deployment of blue helmets was delayed.
377
 Moreover, the lack 
of financial and human resources to cover a territory as big as Western Europe made the gap 
between the expectations and the capabilities of the UN even wider. It was impossible for the 
UN to fulfil its mission under limited resources and conditions. The situation of the DRC 
seemed not to improve greatly up to the year 2000, despite constantly renewed resolutions 
calling for respect of the ceasefire agreement.
378
 Accordingly, as the violence continued, the 
UN Security Council mandated to expand the mission with the addition of approximately 
6,000 military personnel and observers on 24 February 2000. 
The ‘fundamental turning point’ of the conflict came in January 2001 when Joseph Kabila 
assumed the presidency after his father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was assassinated during a 
conflict on the sixteenth of that month. On 2 February 2001, Joseph Kabila attended a UN 
Security Council meeting and spoke in a far more peaceful language than that of his 
bellicose father.
379
 Kabila appealed to the international community, expressing his strong 
willingness to cooperate with the UN, so that the UN could discharge its mandate effectively 
and help restore the Congolese peace. In his statement, Kabila called on the Council to 
support disengagement, deployment of UN troops, the unconditional withdrawal of the 
uninvited forces, and finally a full withdrawal of all foreign forces within a precise time 
frame.
380
 As a result, a vital breakthrough was reached in the Congolese peace process at 
both the national and regional level.
381
 Kabila’s commitment to the ceasefire allowed the UN 
to take control of the territory and begin the operations of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration in October. Moreover, an agreement was signed between the government of 
Uganda and the DRC in Luanda (Angola) on 6 September 2002. Under the Luanda 
Agreement, the withdrawal of the Ugandan army from the Ituri province in the northeast of 
the country was scheduled to occur.  
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In April 2003, under the guidance of the MONUC, the Ituri Pacific Commission (IPC) was 
created to supervise a separate peace process in Ituri. In contrast to the remarkable 
expectation of the peace and stabilisation progress in the Congolese area, however, the crisis 
in Ituri, especially around the capital Bunia, escalated following the withdrawal of the 
Ugandan troops. This was provoked by a security vacuum left after Ugandan troops pulled 
out in the beginning of 2003 in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. The militia fought 
for control of the town, committing large-scare atrocities against the civilian population. The 
absence of a deterrent force led to renewed clashes between the militias of rival ethnic 
groups, especially the Lendu and the Hema, and the fighting between different armed 
factions in Bunia resulted in a great humanitarian disaster. The two weeks of total chaos that 
unfolded in Bunia led to an international outcry over the UN’s incapacity to deal with the 
catastrophe promptly.
382
 According to some authoritative reports, more than 3.5 million 
people were estimated to have died as a result of the factional fighting between 1998 and 






5.2 Decision-making in Practice 
 
 
Level I: International UN level 
Following the withdrawal of the Ugandan army in May 2003, the humanitarian insecurity 
and political instability in Ituri continued to deteriorate. The MONUC’s headquarters in 
Bunia got attacked and blue helmets also became victims of aggression.
384
 The UN quickly 
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mandated the MONUC to deploy 700 UN peacekeepers, mostly from the Uruguayan blue 
helmets, in Bunia.
385
 Yet, the small contingent of the MONUC troops had neither the 
resources nor the military skills necessary to stabilise the situation and was overwhelmed by 
the increase in violence due to the Uruguayan troops only possessing observer capabilities.
386
 
The MONUC had a mere 2,800 troops, and in face of the humanitarian massacre, a 700-
strong force in Bunia was too ridiculously small to even maintain its own safety, against 
28,000 rebels.  
These events eventually prompted a UN Security Council decision to mandate an additional 
deployment in the DRC. With the catastrophic situation in Bunia, the Under-Secretary 
General for Peacekeeping Operation, Jean-Marie Guehenno, raised the first call for 
international intervention on 9 May 2003.
387
 The UN Secretary-General (SG), Kofi Annan, 
reflected this appeal and expressed his grave concern over the situation. The Secretary-
General called upon the Security Council and its member states to consider sending a 
peacekeeping force to eastern Congo, where inter-tribal fighting in and around the town of 
Bunia had left many dead and caused most of its 300,000 people to flee.  
More specifically, on 15 May 2003, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, the Secretary-General called for the rapid deployment to Bunia of “a highly trained 
and well-equipped multinational force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security 
to the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian 
population”.
388
 The SG also wrote letters to all 15 Security Council members asking them to 
form a ‘coalition of the willing’ to end the humanitarian disaster in Ituri. In addition, in his 
special report on the MONUC (S/2003/566), the UN Secretary-General highlighted a need to 
immediately extend MONUC’s troops to a brigade-size formation, namely ‘Ituri Brigade 
Force’.
389
 Annan also called for the deployment of an additional multinational rapid reaction 
force on a temporary basis until the possible deployment of MONUC was reinforced.
390
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The negotiation efforts of the Secretary-General became more successful when the SG 
developed a bilateral dialogue with France. During the weekend of 10 and 11 May 2003, 
Kofi Annan spoke with French President Jacques Chirac and requested help.
391
 France had 
indicated its readiness to accept a call for assistance very quickly. On 13 May, only a few 
days after Annan’s call, France officially acceded to the Secretary-General’s request by 
declaring that France was ready to send peacekeeping troops to the DRC.
392
 Foreign ministry 
spokesman, Francois Rivasseau, announced that “we [France] are willing to contribute to the 




France agreed to intervene, but subject to three conditions. Firstly, France should be granted 
a UN chapter VII mandate. Secondly, countries involved in the conflict, particularly DRC, 
Uganda and Rwanda, would have to officially support the French intervention. Finally, the 
operation would have to be limited in time and scope.
394
 When all these conditions had been 
met, France would officially announce its intention to act as the lead country in such an 
operation, labelled ‘Mamba’, which later became operation ‘Artemis’ when France brought 
the idea of an EU-operation into discussions at the EU level. France confirmed it would 
contribute not only troops but also essential equipment, such as a headquarters in Paris with 
personnel and facilities. Also, as a framework nation, France affirmed that it would acquire 
“support from a number of EU states”.
395
   
On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1484 authorising the deployment 
of a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia in close 
cooperation with the MONUC.
396
 Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which 
authorises the use of force when necessary to fulfil the mandate, the main objectives of the 
IEMF were as follows:
397
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- to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and the improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia, 
- to ensure the protection of the airport, internally displaced persons in the camps in 
Bunia, and if the situation requires it,  
- to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and 
the humanitarian presence in the town. 
The first UN-EU ‘bridging’ military operation was considered successful, as both 
organisations were able to manage to set up the operation in Bunia rapidly. When the 
Council of the EU, particularly the Political and Security Committee (PSC), requested HR 
Solana to study the feasibility of an EU military operation in the DRC, Solana anticipated 
that the decision would take “months, not days”.
398
 Yet, in practice, the decision-making 
process, from initiation to the launch of the operation, took less than a month. Nevertheless, 
critics claimed that the decision was possible because Operation Artemis aimed to 
demilitarise Bunia only by driving the militia elsewhere and not by disarming them or 
disbanding their units.
 399
 It was also criticised that the operation was too limited in time and 
space. The IEMF was authorised to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis, until 1 
September 2003, so as to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce the MONUC’s presence in 
Bunia by mid-August. In terms of the area the operation was to cover, the IEMF was to 
contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian 
situation in Bunia, the capital of the north-eastern Ituri province of the DRC, only.      
Although the UN Secretary-General made the first public call for a peacekeeping force in 
Bunia, France was the first country that agreed on the mission and spurred a military action 
in the DR Congo. Shaping a prompt response to the Security Council’s request, none was 
more important than France in the Security Council in determining the nature and scope of 
the operation. At the operational level, France also played a central role. Prior to the passage 
of Resolution 1484, France deployed its troops on 20 May to Bunia to assess conditions on 
the ground. In sum, France played a central role as a chief negotiator in decision-making on 
Operation Artemis, especially through its permanent position in the UN Security Council.   
                                                 
398
 A. Lobjakas, “EU: Official Declares Rapid Reaction Force Operational, It Not Rapid”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Library, 20 May 2003. 
399
 See J. Ladzik, “EU military and civilian crisis management operations: the first six years”, 
European Policy Brief, April 2009, p.7. 
 118 
Previously, Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair had described the current state of Africa as 
“a scar on our conscience of the world”, speaking of a moral duty to provide international 
military and humanitarian action in countries anywhere.
400
 More specifically, on the issue of 
conflict in the DRC, Blair highlighted that “If the world continues to ignore the sufferings of 
African nations, like in the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo, it would breed 
anger and frustration which would threaten global stability.”
401
 When the Secretary-
General’s letter which called upon the UK to contribute to the French-led EU operation 
arrived, Blair expressed the view that "It is going to be very important to make sure that 
force is properly led and properly supported, because otherwise we will revisit the terrors of 
the Congo of a decade or so ago. We are doing everything we can to avoid that situation."
402
 
Moreover, Blair stated that “there is a UN force being put together now. I understand France 
is going to make a considerable contribution to that. We are seeing, given all our other 
engagements, what support we can give."
403
 Baroness Amos, the former Secretary of State 
for Overseas Aid and International Development, said that “The UK has made its priorities 
absolutely clear, which is to work on conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo […].”
404
  
However, in practice, it seemed less likely that Britain would fulfil such a commitment in 
line with the French-led proactive role in peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the DRC. 
Tony Blair wanted to be careful to avoid committing British troops to the DRC. Despite his 
public announcement that Britain was willing to contribute to the operation and the 
deployment of soldiers had not been ruled out, Britain was in fact more likely to offer 
logistic or medical support rather than military troops. In addition, during the political 
negotiations in the Security Council, the UK rarely demonstrated its willingness to formulate 
a European military action in the DRC. Instead, the UK rather focused on the intervention in 
Iraq. In April and May 2003 when the war in Iraq dominated international headlines, 
concerns related exclusively to Iraq were on the radar screen of British political and military 
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affairs in the Security Council.
405
 The UK made few or no references in the Security Council 
to providing forces to contribute to African security either on its behalf or on behalf of the 
EU. Although the UK did not play an important role in decision-making at the Security 
Council, Britain did endorse the French initiatives in the end.   
In terms of the role of Germany, Duke notes that Germany’s contribution remained 
limited.
406
 Whilst France initiated and Britain endorsed the EU’s military intervention in the 
DRC, Germany had been reluctant to give the EU responsibility for the operation. The 
German foreign minister, Joshka Fischer, frankly admitted that Germany would have 
preferred to support a ‘coalition of the willing’ rather than provide substantial military force 
to the DRC.
 407
 Although Franco-British pressure secured German approval in the end, 
Germany had constantly stayed reserved, hardly making any official statement, by the UN’s 
request, during the decision-making process at the UN level. 
The Italian government had no say on Artemis at the international level. Although the Italian 
government agreed to Operation Artemis and took part in the operation by sending one 
military observer at the Operation Headquarters placed in Paris, it did not put the issues on 
its national agenda for discussion.
408
 According to an Italian diplomat, “Italy was not 
involved in the UN level decision-making, because our contribution to the operation was 
only one person. Hence, the Italian participation has been merely symbolic.”
409
 The results of 
the investigation into the Italian leadership demonstrate that the Italian roles and 
performance in the operation were not significant.    
The role of the High Representative came after France had committed itself to lead the 
operation.
410
 Kofi Annan appealed to Solana to build more specific support among the EU 
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defence ministers. Moreover, once the operation was launched, Solana communicated with 
the leaders of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, and travelled to the Great Lakes Region for 
meetings with the presidents in their capitals during mid-July.
411
 The HR also went to Bunia 
where the EU-led Artemis operation was deployed, which was followed by a trip to the UN 
Security Council in New York for a briefing on the mission on 18 July 2003. A series of 
Solana’s activities in New York, Brussels and the region of the Great Lakes, implied that the 
HR constituted the primary point of contact with the UN, the authorities of the DRC and 
neighbouring countries. Although most contacts were less visible and unreported, Solana 
certainly played an important facilitating role in coaxing cooperation among the actors 
involved.
412
 Nevertheless, as Ryan et al. argue, Solana’s diplomatic role and his influence at 
the political level per se appear to have been marginalised.
413
 Moreover, contrary to a 
number of assessments of his previous function, particularly in the Balkans, in the case of 
Artemis the role of Solana received little credit from media pundits. There have been 
attempts to analyse the role of the HR on the EU-led operation Artemis, but they are mostly 
descriptive and none of them presented the role of the HR as being a central negotiator. 
 
Level II: Domestic EU level 
When the Secretary-General urged a reinforcement of the military presence in the DRC, 
Annan’s request was also directly presented to the EU, via the High Representative. In 
parallel, the EU expressed its great concern with the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement and the peace process in the DRC. By adopting a Common Position on 8 May, 
the Council of the EU reaffirmed its willingness to fully support the action taken by the UN  
and underlined the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate.
414
 Yet, such a 
statement by no means guaranteed that the EU would unconditionally commit itself to a 
military crisis management operation in response to the UNSC’s appeal. In fact, as Jones 
criticises, there was a clear division within the EU on the issue of possible deployment of a 
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European autonomous military force without NATO assets; France and Germany 
emphasised the development of an independent military capability, whereas Britain and 
others stressed the importance of closer cooperation with NATO. 
415
  
The EU’s lukewarm and divergent positions had to change when Kofi Annan confirmed that 
France had agreed to participate in a force to stabilise the situation. France stated that it 
would act as the framework nation, yet emphasising the condition that it would not intervene 
alone without “a clear and robust mandate as well as the support from the EU”.
416
 France 
started to persuade European colleagues, particularly in the PSC, to formulate an EU military 
operation. Consequently, in line with the French proposal, the PSC requested Solana to study 
the feasibility of an EU military operation in the DRC on 19 May. Meanwhile, France 
carried on several bilateral dialogues with the UK and Germany respectively in order to 
receive a clear endorsement of the operation from the two most powerful EU states. 
The first French call went to Britain. As mentioned earlier, the UK appeared reluctant to 
intervene with a military contribution in the DRC. Besides, it seemed less likely that Britain 
would support such a demonstration of a European capability to conduct an autonomous 
military operation without recourse to NATO assets. Nonetheless, France convinced Britain 
that the EU would accomplish its first autonomous military mission without NATO assets, 
which is vital for the development of the ESDP both symbolically and practically. In the 
same context, President Jacques Chirac suggested to Tony Blair that France and the UK 
ought to carry out Anglo-French commitments to fulfil the responsibility to “contribute to 
conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, in close cooperation with the United 
Nations”.
417
 France also underlined that Operation Artemis would improve the otherwise 
shameful image of the EU engraved during the Security Council debates on the Iraq crisis.
418
 
The UK finally agreed to approve the first European autonomous military intervention in the 
DRC, albeit sending engineers rather than troops. Gegout argues, in this regard, that the 
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UK’s intervention was merely tokenistic or symbolic; because “in case the EU mission was 
successful, it would have been a shame not to have taken part in it”.
419
      
The French lobby then moved on to Germany which had originally questioned the EU 
endorsement of Artemis. Like the UK, Germany had been extremely reluctant to participate 
in the military intervention in the DRC. In addition, Germany had been less conscious of the 
DRC. Whereas French interests in the region could easily be identified, Germany had 
none.
420
 However, the Congo intervention came to be one of the main topics of German 
foreign and defence policy discussions when President Chirac visited Berlin in mid-June.
421
 
Jacques Chirac stressed that the operation was entrusted to the EU by the UN’s mandate and 
hence the operation was “European solidarity in an UN-instigated international mission”. 
422
 
President Chirac also emphasised that the operation was “[…] a far more than important 
operation and the first EU-led operation outside Europe, the first”, and appealed that the 
German decision would help strengthen European Common Foreign and Security Policy 
which had been damaged by the dispute over the invasion of Iraq.
423
  
German Chancellor Schröder finally changed his view on account of diplomatic pressure 
from France and the UK. German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer expressed the view that 
the decision of Germany was primarily in response to the insistence of the two most 
important partners in Europe: France and Britain.
424
 However, even after its endorsement of 
Artemis within the EU, Germany remained reluctant to identify precisely how it would 
contribute militarily to the mission.
425
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Following the UN Security Council’s decision to authorise the deployment of an IEMF in 
Bunia, the dynamic negotiations at the Council of the EU resumed to formulate a logistical 
map of the EU-led military operation, and to formally approve the implementation of the 
Security Council’s mandate. The initial EU approval for the mission came on 5 June 2003 
through a Joint Action by the European Council, which was then formally approved on 12 
June. In accordance with Article 25 of the TEU, the PSC set up a Committee of contributors 
and established the political control and strategic direction of the EU-led operation, including 
the chain of command and the rules of engagement.
427
 On 5 June, the Council of the EU 
adopted a joint action on the EU military operation in the DRC (2003/423/CFSP). This 
document described the command structure of the operation in detail. France took up its 
position as the Framework nation of the operation. The UK, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal were committed to contribute to the operation. Non-
European nations South Africa, Canada and Brazil joined forces with the EU in providing 
troops for the operation. On 16 June 2003, under Article 14 of the TEU, Operation ‘Mamba’ 
was finally renamed peacekeeping mission ‘Artemis’.
428
 
The Operation Headquarters were assigned at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des 
Operations (CPCO) in Paris, where the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 
supervised the operation by liaising with the operation commander. France also provided 
both Operation Commander and Force Commander.
429
 Other European states - Austria, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain - provided assistance at 
the Headquarters in Paris, although the national numbers were quite small.
430
 On 12 June the 
Council approved the Operational Plan (OPLAN) and the Rules of Engagement, and 
authorised the Operational Commander to start deployment. This was the formal launch of 
Operation Artemis.  
As table 5.1 illustrates, Operation Artemis was largely shaped by a major contribution from a 
single member state, France (90%). France admitted to providing 1,679 out of its 2,060 
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 in addition to main air strike capabilities and utilities. Sweden contributed 
approximately 80 troops, who cooperated with the French force. The Belgians sent 
approximately 48 medical and logistical personnel to help with transportation, who were 
stationed primarily in Uganda.
432
 The United Kingdom sent military personnel that amounted 
to 85, but they consisted primarily of engineers, medics, and staff officers. 70 of the UK 
troops, for example, were Royal Engineers who provided airfield services in Bunia.
433
 
Germany provided only medical and logistical assistance.
434
 Although Germany had 350-
strong troops stationed in Uganda, these troops were not deployed to Bunia.
435
 Italy’s 
contribution also remained minor by sending only one military observer.  
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 The table presents the EU members’ troop contributions to Operation Artemis deployed in the DRC 
in 2003. 
Table 5. 1 Contribution of the EU Member States to Operation Artemis (size)
436
 
    
Country Troops contributing  




Austria   x 
Belgium  x x 
Denmark    
Finland    
France x (1679) x x 
Germany  x x 
Greece   x 
Ireland   x 
Italy   x 
Luxembourg    
Netherlands   x 







With the exception of Sweden, the UK and to a lesser extent Belgium, most other EU nations 
were reluctant to take military risks in the DRC, and they were only willing to place their 
troops at a distance from the conflict area.
437
 In contrary, France played the most vital role 
“from the beginning to the end”.
438
 As such, Operation Artemis was largely viewed as a 
French-led operation, even though it was later transformed into the “EU category 
operations”.
439
   
Regarding the HR, Solana’s role should not be neglected, because the HR was central in 
facilitating the EU-level decision-making process.
440
 Following the request of the UN 
Secretary-General, Solana immediately served as the diplomatic surrogate for Annan to the 
EU, by presenting Annan’s request at the meeting of EU defence ministers on 19 May 2003. 
Solana also appeared to be a rapporteur for the EU, when the defence ministers in the PSC 
tasked him to investigate the feasibility of deployment. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests 
that Solana’s role at the EU level remained minor and limited to facilitating and promoting 
the rapid reaction of the EU to the UN’s request. One EU diplomat evaluated the role of 
Solana in this regard by saying: “Solana acts as a key diplomatic conduit for the EU 
[member states], but that’s it; he cannot play further role beyond a facilitator or mediator, as 
the HR is nominated by the MS, and so his role is restricted by the MS.”
441
  
To sum up, the European Union’s decision to launch the Operation Artemis was primarily 
shaped by the dominant role of France, which acted as a chief negotiator at both the UNSC 
and the EU. Operation Artemis is a good test case for scholars who seek a key explanatory 
framework to illuminate the primary factors that may have significantly conditioned the 
EU’s engagement in peacekeeping cooperation with the UN. Operation Artemis has been 
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Spain   x 
Sweden x (80) x x 
United Kingdom x (85) x x 
EU-15 Total 3 (1844) 5 12 
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often examined by two main IR theories: realism vs. constructivism.
442
 In the following 
sections, two hypotheses drawn from each of these theoretical insights are tested in order to 
determine the most important conditions under which the leadership and the active role of 
the chief negotiator, i.e. France, were most likely to have been influenced. 
 
5.3 Realist hypothesis 
 
Considering the nature of the realist politics of major European powers and the evolution of 
European military interventions in Africa, Gegout argues that EU military intervention in 
Africa was possible not because European great powers felt obliged to act on a humanitarian 
basis, but because they have not renounced their ‘self-proclaimed right’ to influence African 
politics.
443
 In light of the fundamental desire of a nation state to promote its own prestige and 
reputation as a major power in international affairs and, more specifically, to create and 
defend its zones of influence in Africa, French foreign policy toward the DRC can be 
understood within a realist framework. A realist approach is useful to investigate the 
important motivation of France to launch the first European military intervention in Africa 
alongside the UN’s mandate. 
France had recently increased its presence in the Great Lakes region, particularly from 1998 
to 2004. During this period, the DRC went through political instability caused by atrocities 
and conflicts involving various ethnic and rebel groups. France, which presented itself as the 
‘African advocate’ in the Security Council, demonstrated its fervent eagerness to get 
involved in military crisis management in the DRC under the UN structure, and committed 
itself to providing its full support to set up a transitional power-sharing government. Unlike 
many other francophone African countries which had been mostly former French colonies, 
the DRC had no direct relationship with France in terms of colonial legacy. The DRC had 
been under the rule of the Belgian government until its independence (1908-1960). Hence, 
France had not established a bilateral defence agreement with the DRC, which means that 
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France was not bound to any military responsibility or duty for the maintenance of 
Congolese peace and security.
444
 It may thus seem that the role of France to lead European 
military engagement in the DRC was somehow neutral and impartial with its own national 
interests aside. However, the American Ambassador to the DRC, Daniel Simpson, criticised 
France for supporting ‘decadent regimes’, asserting that France could no longer impose itself 
on Africa.
445
 In fact, from a realist perspective, the French readiness to support and lead the 
military intervention is closely linked to its political and geo-strategic interests; particularly 
the desire to re-extend its sphere of influence in the DRC.     
First of all, in order to reveal details of French political and strategic interests, the historical 
relationship between France and the DRC must be scrutinised. After World War II, the US 
became more interested in the safety and security of the DRC and took a leadership role in 
the country’s stability for the sake of the US’s political strategy, i.e. the balance of power.
446
 
When the DRC was given its independence by Belgium in 1960, Patrice Lumumba was 
elected as the first Congolese Prime Minister. But Lumumba displeased the western powers, 
particularly the US and France, as he appeared sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
447
 The CIA, 
supported by the Belgian force present in the Congo, deposed Lumumba and murdered him, 
and then displaced Mobutu Sésé Seko who was leader of the army and a dictator.
448
 Mobutu 
performed as a bulwark against Russian influence in southern Africa and served as a useful 
surrogate for the US and its partners - France and Belgium - for over three decades. However, 
after the collapse of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Mobutu regime was of no further 
use to the US. When the US found no more necessity to prevent the Mobutu regime from 
being drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence, the US determined not to support the 
Congolese regime and withdrew its troops as early as 1991.
449
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France, on the other hand, regarded Mobutu as underpinning its interests in Central Africa 
and continued to support his regime. French policymakers acknowledged that the DRC was 
potentially important for their foreign policies outside of Europe and predictably claimed 
that Francophone Africa, including Belgium’s former colonies, would be placed within 
France’s sphere of influence.
450
 President de Gaulle gradually developed a stronger bilateral 
relationship with the DRC. As a result, France occupied a place as one of the closest foreign 
allies of the DRC during the presidencies of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981), François 
Mitterrand (1981-1995), and Jacques Chirac (1995-until Mobutu’s downfall in 1997). The 
Mobutu regimes, under the constant auspices of France, enhanced their armament and 
attacked Rwanda, which led to the first Congo War in 1996-1997. Nevertheless, France 
seemed unwilling to impose sanctions on the Mobutu regime, believing that any strong 
sanctions against Mobutu could harm French interest in Zaire [DRC].
 451
  
This resulted, needless to say, in a vehement protest from Rwanda and opposition to French 
interests. Rwanda and Uganda supported the armed rebel group against Mobutu, inter alia, 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC), led by Laurent 
Kabila. After an eight-month-long clash led by Laurent Kabila against Africa’s longest-
ruling dictator, the rebel movement, under Rwandan support, overthrew President Mobutu in 
1997. When the Mobutu regime was destroyed and displaced by Kabila, the French position 
and its predominant influence and power over the Congolese regime began to decline 
considerably as well. The stronger Kabila’s opposition to western intervention in the DRC, 
the more difficulties France faced in regaining its influence in the country. During the period 
of Kabila’s government from 1997 until 2001, France became almost excluded from the 
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Secondly, parallel to the decline of the French position in the DRC, China began to evolve as 
a main power in the DRC. When the Mobutu regime was toppled and Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
assumed the position of head of the state, the relationship between the DRC and China was 
further consolidated. During his first year in power, in December 1997, President Kabila first 
made a visit to China and ministerial talks between the two countries increased.
453
 In the 
same year, China and the DRC signed an ‘Agreement on reciprocal protection and 
promotion of investments’, which gave China privileges to invest in Congolese industry and 
exploit abundant resources.
454
 Given the significant loss of its prestige, France felt threatened 
by the emergence of China as a new power in the DRC.
455
 In such circumstances, Operation 
Artemis was deemed as an important raison d'être for France to regain access to expand its 
influence in the DRC by intervening in military crisis management and supporting the 
establishment of the transitional government.  
Thirdly, it is important to note that the French commitment to deploy peacekeeping troops 
came only two months after the Iraq invasion which had significantly revealed the divergent 
attitudes and values among the European major powers. France and Germany had 
vehemently opposed the UK’s position on the Iraq War within the Security Council. It 
critically damaged the EU, remaining an infamous reference for the divergence of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy. Also, such a dispute over the Iraq crisis clearly exposed 
that the EU had only a limited political will when it comes to any major political or military 
agreement that is essential for collective European military action in international peace and 
security.
456
 Furthermore, the disruption of European solidarity led to pessimism regarding the 
incompetent diplomatic as well as political ability of France. According to Jahier, the event 
seriously tarnished the image of the French political leadership both in the European and 
                                                                                                                                          
relations with China only. In barely a year under the new Kabila rule, Kabila even quarreled with 
his Ugandan and Rwandan backers and demanded that they withdraw their forces from the DRC. 
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 In addition to the significant loss of image and power of France over 
the EU’s external role, France also sought to repair its infamous image of “biased 
intervention in Rwanda”.
458
 Hence, Operation Artemis was viewed as an important 
opportunity for France in a bid to reinforce a particularly ‘European’ approach to 
international crises and to recover the power of French leadership. France wanted to be able 
to lead the EU to agree on its first military intervention beyond Europe, enabling an 
enhanced ‘self- and international perception’.
459
 
Finally, France considered the EU as an intermediary to balance NATO and the US.
460
 
According to a realist argument, the distribution of capabilities and power is essential to 
understanding the functioning of international politics. In light of the balance of power, the 
fundamental changes in international politics, notably the attempt by one state unit to 
dominate a region or the world, will lead to counter-balancing actions. Since the end of the 
Cold War, it has been understood that the world order and the concept of international peace 
and security would only be ensured by a preponderance of US power.
461
 Jahier argues that 
Operation Artemis was a first step for France to challenge and counterbalance the US 
hegemony.
462
 As a leading advocate of European power, France has intended to create 
checks and balances of power against the US hegemony, and to demonstrate to the US the 
EU’s capacity in leading an autonomous military operation without recourse to NATO assets.  
In the same context of the balance of power, Javier Solana hinted his assertive view of 
Europe’s balance against the US. Solana claimed that the EU wanted to show how far 
European military capability had advanced, and for the first time the EU could demonstrate 
Europe’s own ability to deploy troops rapidly and separately from NATO. In regard to 
Operation Artemis, Solana also insisted that the EU should do the operation, because “neither 
the Americans nor NATO had any interest”.
463
 In this respect, Jahier argues that what 
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motivated the EU, particularly France, to launch the military operation in Africa was nothing 
else than a “classical struggle for power in order to counterbalance the US”.
464
   
Based on the realist proposition which underlines strategic and economic interests of major 
powers, not only have the Congolese rich natural resources triggered massacres, fatal 
violence and conflicts in the region, but at the same time they played a magnetic role to 
attract Western foreign powers to become directly involved in military intervention in the 
DRC. According to interview evidence, states are extremely reluctant to have military 
adventures which often entail expensive costs in military personnel, materials and financial 
resources.
465
 Thus, from a realist point of view, whenever a state would strongly commit 
itself to providing military support, in return there is likely to be a considerable expectation 
of reward for such a contribution. However, it is difficult to unveil the real motivation for 
states’ behaviour in peacekeeping operations, particularly when it comes to strategic and 
economic interests. European states ostensibly defend their EDSP missions as a ‘normative 
project’ aiming to promote the humanitarian and peaceful norms of the European Union.
466
 
Nonetheless, Mehler argues that European foreign and security policy towards Africa was 
strongly aligned with strategic interests; and France sought hard to expand its influence in 
Africa not only to generate political support in the global arena, but also to secure privileged 
access to “natural resources and key markets”.
467
 In fact, French policy towards Africa, 




It must be underlined that when the French agreed to provide the bulk of military forces in 
the DRC, France emphasised that the operation should be strictly limited to Bunia. 
Interestingly Bunia, where French-led EU military forces were deployed, is the core rich 
repository of vast natural resources of the DRC.
469
 It is endued with abundant and valuable 
natural resources such as cobalt, copper, rubber, zinc, silver, tin, uranium, iron, diamond, 
gold and oil. Copper is an important mineral, which makes the country rank among the 
world’s leading cooper-producing nations. But what is most important in the mining sector 
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 See Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3, and Figure 5.4 for areas of abundant and various natural resources 
exploited in the DRC. 
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in the DRC is gold and diamonds. The DRC leads the world in production of diamonds; 
approximately 10% of the world’s diamonds. According to the information provided by the 
U.S. Department of State, the diamond sector currently accounts for about 10% of the DRC's 
export revenue.
470
 As shown in Figure 5.2, vast diamond mines are distributed in the north 
east of the DRC. Moreover, there is also the biggest goldfield in the world near Bunia (see 
Figure 5.3). In the Ituri area, as Figure 5.4 illustrates, across the border into Uganda, there 
has been also an increasing amount of exploitation of Congolese oil and gas.  
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European countries have been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the DRC’s mining 
industries. In 1999, Belgium remained the main destination of the DRC’s exports, 
accounting for 59.7%, principally owing to its diamond imports, followed by the USA 
(18.5%), Finland (4.2%), and Italy (4%). During that year South Africa strengthened its 
position as the DRC’s main supplier, providing 28.4% of all imports, followed by Belgium 
(13.5%), Nigeria (8.9%) and Kenya (6.6%). In 2000, Belgium was the main destination for 
the DRC’s exports, accounting for 61.1% of the total, followed by the USA (17.4%) and 
Finland (6.1%). In the same year, South Africa maintained the leading position among the 
DRC’s suppliers, with 21.2% of total imports, followed by Belgium (15.7%), Nigeria (10.4%) 
and Zambia (5.2%). In 2001, Belgium was the first destination for DRC exports (59.7%), 
ahead of the USA (12.9%), Zimbabwe (7.4%) and France (6.9%). During that year, South 
Africa retained its leadership among the DRC’s suppliers accounting for 18.2% of the value 
of total imports, followed by Belgium (16.4%), Nigeria (11.4%) and France (5.9%).
474
 
The data above on the main destination of the DRC’s exports and imports demonstrates that 
France hardly appeared on the list of main trade partners of the DRC until 2001. This was 
primarily due to Kabila’s regime with which France came into disfavour. Under Laurent-
Désiré Kabila’s rule (1997-2001), France became left off in beneficiaries of Congolese 
natural resources and even excluded from trade. However, France faced a major 
breakthrough when Joseph Kabila assumed the new presidency after the death of his father 
in 2001. Joseph Kabila opened trade avenues to France, and the trade partnership and 
cooperation between the two countries recommenced in 2001. France wanted to more 
actively engage than had previously been the case in the DRC, aiming to become a key 
partner and main donor of development aid, which is essential for economic involvement.
475
 
Yet, compared to the market share of some other European countries that continued to 
maintain the major part of trade with the DRC, particularly Belgium, the French position in 
Congolese trade and economy remained relatively minor and weak.
476
   
In addition, the DRC significantly lacked the transparency in its trade arrangements. Almost 
90% of the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was undeclared. In other words, 
thousands of individual and illegal miners have allegedly exploited the DRC’s mineral 
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resources informally and illegally.
477
 What is even worse, since the Ugandan army’s 
withdrawal in May 2003, the conflict in Ituri was fuelled further by the country’s vast 
mineral wealth, which allowed all sides to take advantage of the power vacuum to plunder 
and control wealthy natural resources in the region.
478
 Under these circumstances, France 
sought to strengthen its influential role in controlling the Congolese mining industry and 
dealing with the DRC’s conflict resolution. France supported the constant consolidation of 
MONUC to take part in stabilising security, particularly in the eastern regions of the DRC.
479
  
Parallel to the breakout of the violence in 2003, France extended its military presence and 
power by initiating and leading the EDSP mission in the Ituri province. The analysis of this 
case study uncovered an interesting finding: following Operation Artemis, which was 
accomplished in September 2003, there has been a considerable change in the trade flows of 
the DRC.
480
 Since 2003-2004, the DRC’s major export items, including diamonds, gold, 
cobalt, copper, and oil, began to significantly shift to France. In contrast, as Figure 5.5 shows, 
little change happened in the direction of trade between the DRC and the UK, Germany and 
Italy. Regarding the flow of natural resources and the direction of trade of the DRC, Robert 
and Mwinyihali claim that historically political changes and foreign influence in the control 




As the evidence of this research clearly illustrates, Germany, Italy and the UK, which 
remained reluctant to get involved in the military intervention in the DRC, have not seen any 
dramatic changes in their trade or economic relations with the DRC. However, France 
achieved outstanding results in terms of establishing trade and economic partnerships with 
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the DRC, and it gained access to Congolese natural resources by becoming one of the major 
security, economic and trade partners of (as well as investors in) the country.  
In sum, evidence from this case analysis confirms that the French motivation to launch 
Operation Artemis was clearly conditioned by the political and strategic interests of France; 1) 
to project its own national power and interests in the DRC; 2) to counterbalance the US and 
NATO by enhancing autonomous European military capabilities; and 3) to ensure securing 
access to natural resources. The realist hypothetical relationship between the political and 
strategic interests of the chief negotiator and the likelihood of its active leadership which led 
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5.4 Constructivist hypothesis 
It is an obvious fact that France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has played 
a key role in peacekeeping operations at both political and operational levels, especially for 
countries with which France once had colonial ties. However, considering the UNSC 
mandate for a ‘French-led’ EU military operation in the DRC as well as France’s 
overwhelming efforts to launch the operation, the following two questions arise: why did the 
Secretary-General call first upon France to reinforce military force in the DRC?; and in 
response to Annan’s request, why did France agree to undertake the role of ‘framework 
nation’ and lead the ESDP operation in the DRC? The DRC had been ruled by Belgium from 
1884 until it was granted independence in 1960. France had no particular colonial ties with 
the DRC. There seemed to be no reason, therefore, to oblige or expect France to undertake 
such a heavy military burden for the DRC’s peace operations. In order to examine the high 
level policymaking profile of France in Operation Artemis from a constructivist angle, this 
study suggests that a historical approach is useful to scrutinise whether, and if so to what 
extent, the French decision and its decisive leadership role as chief negotiator were 
influenced by a sense of common responsibility for the European colonial legacy.  
During the decolonisation process, Belgium “did virtually nothing” to promote political or 
social conditions for its former colonies, which ushered a series of mutinies and civil war in 
no less than five days following Congo’s independence from Belgium.
483
 The Belgian 
empire had no intention to train or educate indigenous elites who could conduct an orderly 
transfer of power. The decolonisation process followed by a gradual withdrawal of Belgian 
troops bred a significant void of power in the country. As a result, foreign intervention 
exacerbated the crises in the Great Lakes region.  
Moreover, as the generation of insular-minded policymakers of the colonial era has changed 
after the Cold War, the Belgian African polity lost its appetite and had a tendency to view its 
colonial era as a ‘shameful period’ in Belgian history.
484
 Whereas Belgium admitted to the 
steady erosion of its ambition in the African arena, France began to evolve its foreign policy 
interests in the Great Lakes region. The French government, from de Gaulle to Mitterrand, 
acknowledged that Francophone Africa was important to their foreign policies outside 
Europe. France sought to strengthen and promote the further gloire of the French language, 
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culture and prestigious traditions, particularly in Francophone Africa.
485
 The French policy 
towards l’Afrique Francophone is best represented by the Franco-African Summits where 
French policymakers claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified 
placing Francophone Africa within France’s sphere of influence, including Belgian former 
colonies, counting the DRC.
486
  
Belgium had initially committed itself to provide peacekeeping troops to African crisis 
management, particularly in the Great Lakes region. However, the idea of ‘African solutions 
for African problems’ became a central guideline for Belgian foreign policy toward the Great 
Lakes region in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, where Belgian soldiers were 
assassinated along with Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in 1994.
487
 The 
Belgian government immediately withdrew its peacekeeping forces from the region, and 
expressed its great reluctance to commit further troops to peacekeeping missions. In contrast 
to Belgium’s backing out in the region, France took an active role in undertaking military 
interventions and has dedicated its military forces to peacekeeping operations in the Great 
Lakes region since the 1990s. The combination of Belgium’s inability to maintain stability in 
the DRC amid African participants in the Congolese crisis and the passive role of Belgium 
being one of ‘absolute neutrality’ vis-à-vis various foreign interveners provoked a French 
desire to more closely bind Belgium’s former colonies to France’s sphere of influence.
488
  
In sum, despite its colonial ties with the DRC, Belgium played a very limited and rarely 
visible role in the negotiations on the launch of the military operation. Instead, France 
demonstrated its considerable concerns about the Congolese crises and played an important 
role as a chief negotiator. From a constructivist perspective, France was constrained by its 
foreign policy that aimed to pave the way to integrate Francophone Africa into the French, 
and to a lesser extent European, sphere of influence.
489
 This case study found little evidence 
that France, Belgium, or other EU actors directly expressed ‘colonial legacy’ per se or 
European responsibility driven by colonial history as an important motive for Operation 
Artemis. Nevertheless, as Hoffmann argues that the moral, ideational and ethical awareness 
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 would restrain their behaviour and determine states’ foreign policy,
491
 this 
study suggests that French foreign policy’s viewing of the DRC as a part of ‘Francophone 
Africa’ can be explained by a constructivist approach, in the context of collective identity 
based on colonial responsibility within the EU. In this regard, the study suggests that it is 
important to maintain continuous peaceful and sound post-colonial relations between the 
European super powers and former European colonies, as it would also influence the 
likelihood of leadership to actively undertake responsibility for operations. As the case study 
manifested, Belgium’s abandonment of its colonial responsibility for the DRC’s crises and 
less interest in its former colonies could have decreased the likelihood of EU-led 
peacekeeping operation.   
In order to determine to what extent the normative framework is likely to influence the 
French leadership which led to the EU’s decision to engage in a military peacekeeping 
operation, the study also seeks to identify the role of each of the normative conditions - 
normative commitment, normative entrapment, and normative suasion. According to a 
constructivist argument, states tend to associate more closely with a number of pre-existing 
norms and values that they embody rather than with individual interests based upon rational 
choice approaches.
 492
 Constructivists would lead us to believe that despite various degrees of 
interests in, and physical ability to contribute to, the operation, the EU member states were 
constantly shaping commitments that would formulate the common rules of the EU and 
fundamentally steer the member states into undertaking responsibility for an EU military 
operation.
493
 Put differently, once states have committed themselves to a particular set of 
norms or policy course, they are likely to find themselves too entrapped to take any further 
action that does not reflect their original intentions or current preferences. Simon Duke 
argues that the very first independent EU military operation, Operation Artemis, fits into the 
scheme of this normative framework. According to Duke’s argument, France created the 
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normative environment that would operate normative entrapment and normative suasion 
during the policy formation process among member states in the EU.
494
  
In the context of normative commitment, there are four substantial commitments by which 
France seemed to be constrained to undertake the military operation in the DRC. The 
normative basis of the French role in Africa entered a new transition in 1994 when an Anglo-
French summit sought to reach agreement to converge two seemingly separate European 
perspectives towards Africa; Anglophone versus Francophone camps.
495
 Ulriksen et al. 
remark that the EU had a low profile on the issue of military engagement in Africa until 
1994, because France used to act alone in Africa, “when, where and how it wished to do 
so”.
496
 However, since 1994 French foreign and military policy in Africa had changed from 
being an exclusive domain to encompassing a wider range of actors, including the EU in 
general and Great Britain in particular. In November 1994, France and the UK formally 
established the Anglo-French defence agreement for two main purposes. The first aim was to 
establish an initiative to strengthen European military capabilities, which resulted in the 
creation of the European Air Group (1995).
497
 The second was to boost African 
peacekeeping capabilities through a bilateral strategy in which Britain would maintain forces 
for Anglophone African states, while France would do the same for Francophone states.
498
 
Despite the first attempt to establish Franco-British cooperation for African peacekeeping, 
however, little progress was made in achieving broader defence cooperation, as this 
agreement only confirmed a separate territory of responsibility for the military forces of 
France and the UK respectively. 
In 1998, the British-French summit was held in St. Malo, which paved the way for a 
common security and defence policy. For the first time, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac both 
agreed, in the form of a declaration, to harmonise their policies towards Africa and to create 
a new European defence policy by establishing joint forces. Furthermore, France and the UK 
also decided to strengthen practical cooperation on security issues in Africa.
499
 Coinciding 
with crisis unfolding in the DRC, France and Britain were concerned about the crisis in the 
Great Lakes region and demonstrated close Franco-British cooperation to promote 
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“democracy, human rights, good governance and reform of Africa”, which was highly 
symbolic for European policy towards Africa.
500
 More specific visions of European military 
actions were emphasised in this statement that “the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.
501
 The Franco-British 
bilateral agreement was consequently presented as a milestone which enabled the EU to 
become competent in military and defence issues.  
After the St. Malo summit in 1998, France and Britain together mounted the first joint 
Foreign Ministers’ mission to Africa and constantly demonstrated their desire to work 
collectively to address political crises there. Then at the Cahors summit in 2001, the United 
Kingdom and France reaffirmed their strong commitment to Franco-British cooperation in 
Africa, and expressed their determination to cooperate as closely as possible in the region.
502
 
Also, President Chirac addressed that Franco-British cooperation in the countries of Africa 
could particularly be a driving force for the European Union, by “promoting peace and 
development and respect for human rights and the rule of law”.
503
  
In terms of humanitarian intervention in Africa, France and the UK achieved further pivotal 
development on cooperation in 2003. At the Anglo-French summit at Le Touquet, these two 
most powerful European states acknowledged their responsibility for promoting peace and 
security in Africa, and reaffirmed the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance in the face 
of threats. France and the UK urged that the EU ought to “contribute to conflict prevention 
and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations, in close 
cooperation with the United Nations.”
504
 The Touquet Summit raised the African issue as 
one of the primary concerns to be discussed, emphasising the need for cooperation between 
France and the UK on African crises. The agreement delineated more specific dimensions of 
practical cooperation between France and the UK. For example, both countries stressed that 
strengthening air-naval capabilities is a key element in carrying out effective crisis 
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management; and the solidarity between France and the UK should develop the capacity for 
rapid reaction by the EU in the face of threats which affect international security.
505
  
Social constructivists would argue that such a series of Franco-British commitments and 
substantial initiatives formulated normative pressures under which France, and to a lesser 
extent the UK, were entrapped to fulfil their pledges and take collective action for African 
peacekeeping. In fact, during the negotiation process, it emerged that consensus on the 
operation was heavily influenced by French leadership in accordance with its normative 
commitments.
506
 Operation Artemis is unique, because it was 1) the first EU military 
autonomous operation; 2) outside Europe; and 3) alongside the UN. All of these three special 
aspects of the first UN-EU peacekeeping operation were key elements that had been 
discussed at consecutive Franco-British summits as well. More precisely, at the Franco-
British summit in 1994, France and Britain agreed to strengthen European military 
capabilities. Both countries demonstrated their desire to cooperate closely in African crisis 
management at St. Malo, in 1998. At Cahors in 2001, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair 
reaffirmed their commitment to promote humanitarian intervention for African stability. 
Finally, in 2003, the Le Touquet summit explicitly expressed a strong willingness to 
establish the EU’s autonomous military capability particularly without recourse to NATO 
assets in line with close cooperation with the UN. To sum up, Franco-British commitments 
provided a significant impetus to France to carry out its normative commitments by 
launching the first EU military operation in the DRC. In this respect, France was normatively 
entrapped by its commitments (normative entrapment).   
The UK, however, which remained a constant ‘pro-Atlanticist’,
507
 seemed less likely to 
support such a French-backed demonstration of the EU’s independence from NATO in crisis 
management. Nevertheless, due to the British agreements to promote European autonomous 
capability and to strengthen the EU’s role in Africa alongside France, Britain could by no 
means reject French initiatives. In this regard, Gegout argues that the UK position on 
Operation Artemis is quite ‘surprising’,
508
 because the UK was also entrapped by its 
normative commitment outlined alongside France. 
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In terms of normative suasion, France was challenged by normative pressures when it had to 
persuade other EU members to endorse Operation Artemis. Germany was initially cautious 
about Artemis, but its reluctance to contribute to the combat operation turned into approval 
for the French initiatives in the end. According to Ukriksen, German foreign minister Joshka 
Fischer came under intense pressure to support the operation from combined Franco-British 
cooperation.
509
 Although Germany’s actual contribution remained limited, German approval 
for Operation Artemis reflects a significant role for Franco-British cooperation facilitated by 
the normative framework. Belgium, on the other hand, remained discreet about military 
involvement in its former colonies. As a consequence of a Senate debate on the 
parliamentary inquiry regarding Belgium’s participation in the peacekeeping operation, 
Belgian authorities officially announced in a legislative document that Belgium ought not to 
deploy combat troops to countries with which it has colonial ties.
510
 Belgium provided only 
logistic support, such as transport, medical support, and financial contributions.
511
 Thus, the 
normative framework was not successful in persuading Belgium to change its own national 
foreign policy and to provide a military contribution to Operation Artemis.   
Duke criticises that the realist approach failed to explain ‘why Artemis resulted in far more 
cooperation at the EU level’ and stresses that a normative framework offers the key 
explanation for shaping consensus in the EU.
 512
 It may be less controversial, in this regard, 
that Franco-British cooperation and normative commitments established from 1994 to 2003 
paved the way for strengthening the ESDP, which accordingly led to an EU-led military 
operation in the DRC. In sum, the analysis of the case study suggests that pre-existing norms 
or normative commitments of the chief negotiator were an important condition in the 
decision-making of the EU to cooperate with the UN in international peacekeeping. Hence, 
the constructivist hypothesis on the normative pressures is accepted in the case of Operation 
Artemis; normative pressures would increase the likelihood of French leadership to lead an 
EU decision to engage in a military peacekeeping operation with the UN.  
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Although Artemis is often perceived as a ‘French operation with an EU cover’,
513
 operation 
Artemis has been normally labelled as a successful test of the first EU military autonomous 
operation carried out beyond Europe without recourse to NATO assets. It also showed 
consolidation of the EU by responding promptly to the request of the UN. In this context, 
Scheuermann notes that Operation Artemis became a litmus test of the ambitious role of the 
EU as a multilateral security governor.
514
 This chapter primarily focused on the most 
important factors that may have significantly influenced the likelihood of the EU’s decision 
to deploy its first military operation for DRC crisis management in support of the UN.   
France was identified as a chief negotiator. During the negotiations at both the UNSC and 
the EU, France played an outstanding role in initiating a possible military operation in 
response to the request of the UN Secretary-General. At EU-level negotiations, the UK 
endorsed the French initiative and supported the French position. However, the UK remained 
sceptical about EU military intervention in the DRC, particularly without NATO, and was 
reluctant to provide military forces. The UK’s position was therefore not substantive, but 
rather symbolic. Like the UK, Germany and Italy were also likely to be distant from the core 
task of the operation, and contributed very limited resources. The German approval of the 
EU military operation was due primarily to Franco-British pressure. The Italian position was 
utterly indifferent to Operation Artemis. The Italian vice president of the Defence Committee, 
Mr Roberto Lavagnini, confirmed that “no discussions took place in their committees or on 
the floor of the house concerning the Framework Nation concept and its significance for 
future EU-led external military operations”.
515
 The High Representative served his role as an 
important surrogate for the UN SG, which was strictly limited only to facilitating. Overall, 
the case study confirms that none was more important than France in the negotiations and 
decision-making at both the UN and the EU levels.  
Various conditions under which France seemed most likely to influence the likelihood of EU 
decision were examined by testing theoretical propositions. The evidence from the case 
study suggested that France had both political and strategic interests in the peacekeeping 
operation. France viewed Operation Artemis as an important opportunity 1) to re-establish 
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and project French national powers in the DRC and 2) to counterbalance the US hegemony 
and strengthen the EU as a global power. The evidence also showed that the military 
operation brought further considerable economic benefits to France in trade relations with 
the DRC, while Germany, Italy and the UK did not achieve any dramatic changes in their 
trade and economic relations with the DRC in the aftermath of the operation. Hence, the case 
study accepted the realist hypothesis that the increase in political and strategic interests of 
the chief negotiator would also increase the likelihood of its leadership to lead the EU’s 
decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation.  
In contrast, the constructivist hypothesis highlighted the importance of historical memory 
and normative conditions in decision-making. The evidence from the case study suggested 
that Operation Artemis was to a certain extent shaped by the normative and collective 
responsibility of France driven by European colonial legacies. The analysis also revealed that 
France was constrained by the normative framework – normative commitment, entrapment 
and suasion. In sum, the case study accepted the constructivist hypothesis that normative 
pressures triggered by colonial legacies and the normative framework would increase the 
likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership to drive the EU’s decision to engage in a 



















Chapter  6 
UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping II: 








In summer 2006, the European Union launched an autonomous EU-led military operation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, code-named EUFOR RD Congo.
516
 Following Operation 
Artemis in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo was the EU’s fourth military ESDP operation and 
second military intervention which took place in the DRC from June to November 2006. In 
accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1671 of 25 April 
2006, EUFOR RD Congo was assigned to support the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC). 
Its mandate was to stabilise the situation during the Congolese election process, protect 
civilians and secure the airport in Kinshasa. The Council of the EU adopted a Joint Action 
2006/319/CFSP on 27 April 2006, and EUFOR RD Congo was launched on 12 June 2006, 
one month before the general elections. The operation comprised of 2,000 troops with a total 
of 21 member states participating. EUFOR RD Congo became another significant milestone 
of cooperation between the UN and the EU in the field of international peacekeeping.    
Although EUFOR RD Congo is the EU’s second military intervention conducted in the same 
country within the context of UN-EU cooperation, EUFOR RD Congo is clearly 
distinguishable from Operation Artemis. First, whilst Operation Artemis was mandated to 
take over military responsibility from the UN mission on a temporary basis as a ‘bridging 
model’, EUFOR RD Congo was authorised to support MONUC in close cooperation in 
terms of ‘stand-by’ or ‘over the horizon’ model.
517
 Second, for the first time, the Secretary 
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General called upon the EU to support MONUC without national detours.
518
 Third, during 
the dynamic interactions between the UN and the EU, more than one EU actor was identified 
as chief negotiator. Furthermore, due to a significant lack of willingness of EU member 
states to participate in the military operation in the DRC, a decision could not be reached for 
almost half a year. Undoubtedly, there is considerable variation between EUFOR RD Congo 
and Operation Artemis.  
Considering previous EU operations conducted in the DRC, Gross argued that the motives of 
the EU to launch EUFOR RD Congo seemed indisputable. According to her argument, 
EUFOR has been considered a “logical prolongation of EU commitments” by both the EU 
and the UN.
519
 Unlike the case of Operation Artemis, however, the inner-European decision-
making process on the launch of EUFOR was revealed as extremely complex and difficult. 
There existed some initial uncertainty and internal debates on the main question over which 
country should lead the military operation in the DRC. Given the significant reluctance 
among member states to take on the leadership role in the operation, EUFOR RD Congo was 
regarded as an important test of the EU’s capacity to support a UN peacekeeping mission 
beyond Europe.  
This chapter seeks to explore the simultaneous negotiations between the UN and the EU on 
the issue of peacekeeping cooperation in the DRC. This chapter sketches out a brief 
backdrop of the situation in the DRC under which the UN and the EU came to cooperate in 
both the political and military realms (6.1). Then it analyses negotiations and decision-
making at both the UNSC and the EU levels. The analysis of this case study aims to identify 
the most important chief negotiator(s) (6.2). Various conditions that may have influenced the 
EU’s decision to engage with the UN in a military operation in the DRC are investigated by 
testing hypotheses. The hypotheses drawn from realist theories (6.3) and constructivist 
theories (6.4) are tested respectively. This chapter aims to determine to what extent each of 
the theoretical assumptions provides plausible explanations for the likelihood of the 
leadership of chief negotiator(s) which led to the EU’s decision to cooperate with the UN in 
the realm of a military peacekeeping operation in the DRC. 
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A transitional government of the DRC was set up in July 2003.
520
 Joseph Kabila remained 
president to lead the country until the general elections and the leaders of the main former 
rebel groups were sworn in as vice presidents.
521
 The aim of the transitional process was to 
successfully achieve general elections scheduled for mid-2005.
522
 The democratic elections 
were a crucial foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national 
reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law.
523
 In this context, Martin presents the 




The transitional government was tasked with paving the way for the country to finally 
eradicate decades of dictatorship and civil wars and to establish a new constitutional 
government. The transitional government has thus taken a number of important steps, 
including the demobilisation processes in accordance with one of the provisions in the 
‘Global and All-Inclusive Agreement’.
525
 The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was 
established under the Draft Constitution of the Transition under which the main role of the 
IEC was defined to guarantee the “neutrality and impartiality of the process for holding free 
and transparent democratic elections”.
526
 The IEC carried out practical functions to prepare 
the country for the electoral process, in particular establishing mechanisms and rules for 
elections, including voter registration, the maintenance of voters’ roles, voting operations 
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 In November 2004, the transitional government promulgated laws on 
Nationality and Defence Forces reform programs, and the Commission prepared a budget for 
expenses related to the elections with the support of the MONUC.
528
 The transitional 
government held a successful constitutional referendum in December 2005, which paved the 
way for the first presidential, parliamentary and senatorial elections in 45 years since its 
independence. The elections also allowed the Congolese to choose their provincial and local 
councils.  
In parallel with a number of crucial achievements and efforts provided by the Congolese 
transitional government, the EU became more actively engaged in dealing with post-conflict 
settlement and peace-building in the DRC. For example, after its first military operation, 
Artemis, the EU launched two civilian ESDP missions at the request of the Congolese 
government in close cooperation with the UN to facilitate the smooth running of electoral 
operations. EUPOL Kinshasa, which was followed by EUPOL RD Congo in 2007, 
conducted its police mission in the capital Kinshasa from April 2005 to June 2007. This 
police mission was mandated to provide a framework and advice in helping the Congolese 
national police keep order during the DRC’s transition to democracy, particularly during the 
electoral period in 2006.
529
 In June 2005, the EU launched an advisory and assistance 
mission for security reform in the DRC in support of the armed forces, named EUSEC RD 
Congo, which mandate runs until 2012.
530
  
Despite considerable efforts to achieve the objectives of peace, development and stability in 
the DRC, the transitional process faced serious challenges. Massive logistics difficulties and 
strong disagreements in adopting essential legislation inevitably caused a postponing of the 
election. Furthermore, insecurity and factional fighting in the east of the country continued to 
pose a serious threat to Congolese political stability. Given the precarious political situation, 
sustainable transitional progress was frustrated and remained a serious concern for local and 
national elections. In order to enable the elections to take place as scheduled for July - 
                                                 
527
 Electoral Institute for the Sustainable of Democracy in Africa (EISA), ‘DRC: Independent 
Electoral Commission’, July 2007, available at http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/drcec.htm (accessed 
on 8 Dec 2010). 
528
 UN Security Council (S/2004/1034), ‘Sixteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United 
Nations Organization [sic] Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 31 December 2004. 
529
 EUPOL Kinshasa has been followed by EUPOL RD Congo after the Congolese elections, whose 
main tasks consist of supporting and assisting the Congolese authorities in reforming the security 
sector with regard to the police and its interaction with the justice sector. For further information, 
see Council of the European Union, EU Common Security and Defence Policy operations, available 








 maintenance of order and stability in the capital Kinshasa was considered 
by the UN as a key objective of the peacekeeping operation. Although MONUC had 
conducted the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission in the country since 1999 with the 
dispatch of a peacekeeping force comprising 18,000 plus civilian personnel, the UN faced 
difficulties due to the lack of peacekeeping troops to cover the vastness of the country during 
the election period. From the beginning of the elections until the end of the transitional phase, 
MONUC had to be re-deployed to organise the complicated election processes in the whole 
country. Besides, as the bulk of MONUC troops were concentrated in the unstable East of 
the country,
532
 additional forces were urgently appealed for by the UN to back up a latent 





6.2 Decision-making in Practice 
 
Level I: International UN level 
The Congolese referendum on a draft constitution took place on 18 and 19 December with 
minimal security problems, resulting in a ‘yes’ vote. Nonetheless, the UN’s concerns greatly 
increased about the possibility of violence occurring before, during or immediately after the 
elections, which neither MONUC nor the Congolese Force (FARDC, Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo) would be able to manage robustly. In order to deal 
with a potential escalation of violence during the transition phase, additional military support 
for MONUC was required to enhance its capacity. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, requested 
the Security Council to extend MONUC on a temporary basis during the election period. 
However, Annan’s request was rejected for financial reasons.
533
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Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that the UN’s request was directly channelled 
to the EU without national detours. On 27 December 2005, in his letter to the EU 
Presidency,
534
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, requested the EU to consider the possibility of making available a deterrent force 
to be deployed to the DRC in support of MONUC during the electoral process.
535
 Given the 
relatively limited time available for the necessary planning and consultation to organise such 
a force, the SG urgently requested the EU to consider the suggestion. It was highly 
exceptional that the UN’s request was directly sent to the EU via both the outgoing British 
and incoming Austrian presidency without having a prior informal consultation.
 
Considering 
the direct dialogue between the two organisations, one EU official notes that “although it 
provided a very good example for a politically and bureaucratically pragmatic 
communication between the UN and the EU for the first time, the UN’s straight request was 
quite surprising and unusual for the European countries.”
 536 
 
In this respect, it may be noteworthy that Jean-Marie Guéhenno played to a great extent a 
visible and important role in facilitating and liaising the bilateral communication between the 
two organisations.
537
 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a former French diplomat and a foreign policy 
intellectual, served as the catalyst for the Western countries’, more specifically the EU’s, 
engagement in UN’s peacekeeping mandates. He suggested that Western personnel 
contributions to UN peace operations are “inadequate. We need a lot more. If UN Blue 
Helmets only come from a certain part in the world, our position weakens because it does not 
give a strong political signal.”
538
 In regard to the EU’s role in peacekeeping operations in 
Africa, Mr. Guéhenno stressed that “the UN Blue Helmets are the answer of the international 
community to Africa. And Africa really matters. That is why we are increasing our 
cooperation with the EU. We want a presence of the EU in Africa now, with Blue 
Helmets.”
539
 Similarly, he also reiterated to the Council “the important role played in the 
DRC by the European Union, particularly the assistance given during last year’s polls by the 
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European Union Force (EUFOR RD Congo) and its help to the UN Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC).”
540
 His role as a normative entrepreneur thus seems to be crucial during the UN 
level negotiations, as he encouraged “the members of the Council and other partners such as 
the EU to continue to provide the generous assistance rendered during the 2006 electoral 
process”,
541  
which led the largest expansion of peacekeeping in the history of the UN, 
overseeing approximately 130,000 staff on eighteen missions.
542
 
The UK, France, Germany and Italy ostensibly welcomed the UN’s request and reiterated the 
important role of the EU in enhancing MONUC’s capacity during the Congolese electoral 
period. However, in practice, none of the Big-four was likely to provide a vital leadership 
role in terms of both providing troops and offering a planning framework. Unlike the case of 
Artemis (2003), there was by no means strong willingness among the Big-four countries to 
become a framework nation for operation EUFOR DR Congo. The UK, France, Germany 
and Italy were ‘constantly cautious’ about committing themselves to undertaking a leading 
role as chief negotiator.
543
 Such uncertainty about the chief negotiator, in addition to the 
absence of a clear political guidance at the UNSC, resulted in a considerably prolonged 
reconciliation and negotiation process. 
When the Secretary-General called for European military support, it was the UK which 
received the letter on behalf of the EU. Despite its EU presidency as well as an important 
permanent position in the Security Council, the UK showed strong reluctance to be involved 
in a military operation in the DRC. The UK hardly produced official statements or 
documents on the issue. According to a British official, due to its commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the UK could neither undertake leadership nor strengthen the quota.
 544
 
By referring to its heavy military burden as an excuse, the UK expressed its general aversion 
to involvement in the operation.  
France, which had previously played an active role in crisis management in the Great Lakes 
region, avoided leading the EUFOR operation. According to a UN official’s view, even 
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though France was willing to support the peace process of the DRC, France had to decide not 
to undertake leadership because there had been a critical public impression that EUFOR was 
led by French interest.
545
 As a matter of fact, following Operation Artemis, EUFOR was 
viewed as a partial force due to the huge amount of French soldiers, suspected of being 
supporters of Kabila’s government.
546
 Hence, France became conscious of public opinion; if 
France led the European military operation in the DRC again, it could be perceived as a 
political backer of Kabila’s regime, which may also bring up questions regarding the 
impartiality and neutrality of European troops. In addition, France did not have combat-
ready troops available, whereas Germany did.
547
 Under these circumstances, France thought 
that it would be a wise decision to convince the other possible ‘ESDP-motor’, i.e. Germany, 
to be the lead-nation for the operation.
548
 Consequently, France insisted that Germany should 
take a leading role with constant French support. 
The UN’s request for European military support was accordingly passed on to Germany. 
Germany came under great pressure to make financial as well as military contributions to the 
operation. Initially, the German government strongly opposed participation in a military 
operation and resisted taking on responsibilities. Given a primary and traditional role for 
Germany in ESDP operations, which has been as a civilian power, Scheuermann notes that it 
was no surprise that Germany was reluctant to engage in EUFOR RD Congo, which was 
mandated to serve as a military operation.
549
 According to a report from the German 
newspaper Die Welt, German policy-makers warned against a hasty troop deployment and 
insisted that Germany should not and could not be the first troop contributors.
550
 The 
chairman of the German Federal Armed Forces Association, Bernhard Gertz, strictly rejected 
a deployment of German troops to the DRC by arguing that there must be other nations 
which have a better experience and thus are better suited for the operation than Germany.
551
 
Gertz insisted that “it would be prudent and wise if the government decide not to send 
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combat troops to the Congo.”
552
 Therefore, the question over whether Germany should and 
would act in line with the Secretary-General’s request attracted considerable attention.  
The significant negotiating role of France, however, brought Germany to begin to abate its 
reluctance and change its stance.
553
 In the wake of the French call for German presence, 
possibly with armed forces in the DRC, German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, 
outlined Germany’s special responsibility for Africa, which implied the possibility of 
German participation in EUFOR.
554
 Angela Merkel, the German Federal Chancellor, visited 
President Jacques Chirac in Paris for consultations on the Congolese issue. After her visit to 
Paris, Merkel clearly announced that the Bundeswehr (Federal Defence Force) was to 
participate in any case in a European mission in the Congo in close cooperation with 
France.
555
 Once it emerged that Germany could no longer avoid taking on an important task 




After going through months of controversial and tense negotiations, the EU officially 
confirmed its commitment to deploy EU military forces to the DRC in support of MONUC. 
In its letter to the UN Secretary-General on 28 March 2006, the EU clearly stated that the 
EU’s autonomous command of the operation would be a key point of the resolution. It also 
made it clear that the EU would set out the nature and scope of the operation on a strictly 
limited time and space basis. On 26 April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1671, authorising “for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the 
presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
557
 The mandate was clear in defining time and scope, 
the arrangement of the operation, and its objectives. EUFOR RD Congo was authorised to 
take all necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to carry 
out the following tasks:  
- to support MONUC to stabilise the situation, in case MONUC would face serious 
difficulties in fulfiling its mandate within its existing capabilities;  
                                                 
552
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 UNSC Resolution, S/RES/1671 (2006), 25 April 2006. 
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- to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence 
in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
Government of the DRC;  
- to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa;  
- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of personnel as well as the 
protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo; and 
- to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger. 
 
Once the UK declined to participate in the operation by referring to its military overstretch 
and the inadequate language ability of its troops, albeit it was something which also 
concerned German military planners, and Italy maintained a low profile for supporting the 
operation at the political level,
558
 France and Germany became central to initiating EUFOR 
RD Congo. Franco-German cooperation was the most important above all in formulating a 
possible UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation.
559
 For the neutrality and impartiality of EU 
troops, France ostensibly abandoned its commitment to act as a lead-nation for the operation. 
However, the analysis of this case study suggests that EUFOR was primarily encouraged by 
the role of France rather than Germany. An EU official acknowledged that the French role 
was significant and unique, which led to a major driving force for EUFOR RD Congo.
560
 On 
the other hand, the consent of Germany to undertake a leadership role on the ground was 
primarily a result of France’s constant pressure and lobbying activities. Indeed, France 
played a major role as chief negotiator in the negotiations, whilst Germany was rather vital 
in providing operational planning and practical provision.   
With respect to the High Representative, Solana had a very limited role during the 
negotiations in the Security Council. Compared to the case of Operation Artemis for which 
the Secretary-General had directly appealed to Solana to help muster EU forces in support of 
the UN operation in the DRC, the second UN call for European support with military forces 
was directly delivered to the British EU presidency. Hence, the EU SG/HR was neither 
asked for any specific tasks nor played a significant role in the decision-making process, but 
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only presented the result of the EUFOR mission to the UN as required by the UN-EU 
agreement.
561
 In January 2007, Solana presented his report in New York, which was 
published by the Council in March, entitled a ‘lessons learned review’. However, this 
document could not provide any publicly accessible analysis, as most of the content had not 
been declassified.
562
 The role of the HR at UN-level decision-making remained minor and 
less influential. 
 
Level II: Domestic EU level 
The UN’s official request was followed by lengthy intra-European negotiations in Brussels. 
Due to a general aversion among foreign ministers to consenting to force generation and 
planning processes, the EU decision-making process was inevitably delayed. Initial 
discussions on the proposal were held in Brussels on 11 January 2006, in which the UN’s 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Council General Secretariat (CGS) of 
the EU, and military planners in the EU simultaneously discussed a potential EUFOR and 
the composition of the force.
563
 Nonetheless, the EU’s decision did not get off the ground 
until the end of January, because an option paper for a possible military operation and the 
tasks of a potential EUFOR, under the CGS’s responsibility, lacked clear political guidance 
and strategic planning. As a result, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) protracted 
this process prior to a political approval for Concept of Operation.
564
 From 30 January to 2 
February 2006, a fact-finding mission took place in Kinshasa in order to “refine the 
operational and logistic parameters for the force”.
565
 Following the fact-finding mission, in 
the PSC meeting on 13 February, the amended CGS option paper was initially discussed. Yet, 




The intra-European decision-making process faced further challenges during the operational 
planning phase. Although member states seemingly consented to the launch of a military 
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operation, the most urgent problem still remained unsolved due to the significant reluctance 
of member states to commit themselves to contribute to the necessary military capabilities. 
Franco-German cooperation was deemed indisputably essential;
567
 however, neither of them 
seemed willing to offer an Operational Commander or Operational Headquarters (OHQ). 
France considered itself not well-placed to lead the EUFOR in the DRC again. Germany also 
refused to take on the responsibility when it was asked to lead EUFOR and to offer the 
Headquarters stationed in Potsdam. The UK refused to get involved in the operation due to 
its overstretched military burden in Afghanistan and Iraq. Italy and Greece declined as well. 
Given this uncertainty in terms of the lead-nation, the decision was postponed until the 
Franco-German joint ministerial meeting in Berlin was held on 14 March, which led to an 
initial political compromise. According to Werner Hoyer, the foreign policy spokesman of 
the German FDP (Free Democratic Party), EU-level preparation was ‘catastrophic’.
568
    
While the Operation Commander and OHQ were not yet identified, the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS) was forced to act as the ad hoc Operational Headquarters, albeit not having the 
expertise or precise means to do so.
569
 In parallel, there was a suspicion that Paris and New 
York would arrange a deal behind the scenes that would place Germany in a position in 
which Germany had no choice other than to take on the leading role.
570
 Accordingly, 
pressure started mounting on Germany to take leadership, to provide troops and to offer 
command structures. As it emerged that Germany could no longer avoid taking on the 
responsibility for the operation, the German government began setting out provisions for its 
involvement. Chancellor Merkel determined the nature of the operation, including a limited 
time scope and a strictly limited military deployment to the capital Kinshasa. The Chancellor 
called for fair burden sharing among the member states, by suggesting that the EU force 
should be composed of a broad range of troop contributors from the EU member states.
 571
 It 
was clearly announced that Germany would not agree to its involvement as long as all the 
conditions outlined were not put in place.  
France and Germany agreed that each would contribute a third of the requested forces, and 
the rest of the EU would provide another third of the forces. Despite the Franco-German 
commitment to a major troop contribution, the launch of EUFOR seemed to be far from 
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approval as uncertainty still emerged concerning the leadership question. HR Solana 
recommended that Germany take the lead in negotiations over the makeup of the EU 
force.
572
 German Foreign Minister Steinmeier organised a meeting on “Military aspects of 
UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management operations in light of EUFOR RD Congo” on 19-
20 March in Berlin.
573
 This meeting provided a platform for all stakeholders - EU Member 
States, DPKO, the EU Council Secretariat, the EUFOR DR Congo, and MONUC 
Headquarters - to discuss contribution to the force as well as the possible agenda of some 
leading EU states towards the operation. With a view to further improving the effectiveness 
of EU support to the UN, Germany finally declared its intention to lead the EU mission in 
Congo on 21 March. It also agreed to offer its Operational Headquarters in Potsdam, while 
France announced its willingness to deploy the Force Headquarters (FHQ) to Kinshasa. 
On 23 March, the EU Council approved the Concept of Operation for the EUFOR mission 
and decided to launch the military strategic planning process.
574
 This led to a formal 
agreement that the EU Presidency confirmed the principles for EU military support to 
MONUC in a letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 28 March 2006.
575
 On 25 April 2006, 
UNSC Resolution 1671 authorised the EU to deploy forces in the DRC under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Two days later, on 27 April 2006, the Council of the EU adopted the Joint 
Action 2006/319/CFSP, which formed the legal basis of the operation EUFOR RD Congo. 
The military command of the operation was shared between Germany and France. 
Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany) was appointed EU Operational 
Commander, with the EU OHQ to be located at the Armed Forces Operations Command in 
Potsdam, Germany. Meanwhile, Major-General Christian Damay (France) was designated 
EU Force Commander (FCdr), to be stationed in the FHQ based at N’Dolo airport in 
Kinshasa. EUFOR was strictly limited to the electoral period, i.e. only for four months after 
the first round of elections. It clearly announced that an extension would not be acceptable. 
In terms of the geographical scope of deployment, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, EUFOR was 
‘triple-tracked’; it was composed of three pillars:
 576
  
1) an ‘advance element’ deployed in Kinshasa   
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2) battalion-size ‘on-call’ forces on stand-by in Libreville/Gabon577 
3) a ‘strategic reserve’ stationed in Europe (in France and Germany)   
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The operation involved 2,400 troops drawn from 19 EU Member States and two non-EU 
states, Switzerland and Turkey. The forces were deployed in pillars one and two. The reserve 
battalion for the third pillar in Europe was around 1,500 personnel, which brought EUFOR 
overall to 4,000 troops stationed in DRC, Gabon, France and Germany. More than two-thirds 
of the force came from France and Germany, and the remaining one-third from other nations. 
As Figure 6.2 displays, the biggest contributors were France (1,090), followed by Germany 
(780), Spain (130), Poland (130), Belgium (60), Italy (56), Sweden (55), Portugal (53), the 
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Despite British commitments to strengthen European cooperation on security issues in 
Africa,
580
 the UK did not perceive this particular military operation as valuable for pushing a 
European agenda.
 581
 The UK had no objection to the approval of the operation and gave its 
political consent to EUFOR RD Congo. However, the UK abstained from EU-level 
negotiations and operational planning. The UK refrained from offering military troops to the 
DRC and provided a very small contribution – two personnel: one in the OHQ in Potsdam 
and the other one in the FHQ in Kinshasa. Hence, the role of the UK was not significant in 
EU-level decision-making.  
It was not surprising that Germany initially faced domestic pressures not to intervene in 
Africa crisis management. Historically, the German view on ESDP operations has 
significantly focused on civilian crisis management rather than military operations, for every 
military engagement is viewed as very critical and a taboo by the German public.
582
 
Therefore the military operation was a political issue within Germany, which triggered 
criticism and strong reluctance. However, Germany changed its stance and finally accepted 
to take on a leadership role for the EUFOR. It was largely due to the French lobby and 
pressures to push Germany to do so. In this context, there was a concern in Berlin over being 
“instrumentalized [sic] by Paris, which was pushing Germany into Africa”.
583
  
France played a vital role in the diplomatic activities preceding the launch of EUFOR RD 
Congo.
584
 France lobbied for the approval of member states for an opinion paper to express 
EU support for MONUC, which led to the formal agreement to deploy EU military forces.
585
 
At the operational level, given the considerable reluctance of EU members to contribute the 
bulk of military forces, France was willing to contribute the largest amount of troops as well 
as the EU Force Commander to the operation. More importantly, Gross argues that France 
was not only crucial to launch the EUFOR, but also important to leading Germany to assume 
responsibilities for command over the military mission in Africa.
586
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In light of the role of the HR, Solana manifested a more active and important role at the EU 
level compared to his limited role at the UN level. The HR was mandated to act as a 
‘primary point of contact’ with the UN,
587
 the authorities of DRC, neighbouring countries 
and other relevant actors by being assisted by the EU Special Representative in close 
cooperation with the EU Presidency. Solana was an important liaison who facilitated 
cooperation between the EU Operation Commander, the DPKO and MONUC. Also, 
Solana’s role included providing essential information about the operational situation on the 
ground. These arrangements had been finalised by an exchange of letters between Javier 
Solana and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the end of July 2006.
588
 The role of the 
HR was constrained to facilitating the smooth and effective operation of the EU in line with 
UN cooperation, so that the UN and the EU were able to handle the security situation during 
the Congolese general elections. Thus the HR did not exert any influence on decision-
making per se, but acted as a facilitator in operating EUFOR RD Congo.  
In sum, the revised two-level game analysis suggests that there are two important chief 
negotiators in the case of EUFOR RD Congo: France and Germany. Although the German 
role has more often been highlighted concerning its important position as a lead-nation, 
France indeed had a broader vision and more profound interest than any other EU member 
state in the operation, which led the EUFOR to be the central issue in Brussels. Given the 
important roles of France and Germany as chief negotiators, the next sections seek to 
examine French and German foreign policy toward the DRC and identify the important 
conditions under which France and Germany were likely to influence the likelihood of the 
EU deciding to launch the EUFOR RD Congo.  
 
6.3 Realist hypothesis 
Realists would lead us to believe that stated humanitarian ambitions and normative 
understandings of ESDP are largely superficial.
589
 According to a realist assumption, 
collaboration and cooperation in peacekeeping are possible when states identify strategic 
interests or power aggrandisement in a mission. Realists would posit that the EU is used by 
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its member states as a collective instrument for “shaping its external milieu by a combination 
of hard and soft power”.
590
 From this realist point of view, the launch of EUFOR RD Congo 
is deemed as nothing less than a struggle for the interests of EU actors. As the two-level 
game analysis identifies France and Germany as most pivotal chief negotiators in the case of 
EUFOR RD Congo, the realist hypothesis will be examined by investigating the French and 
German political and strategic motivation respectively.   
 
1) France 
It is commonly acknowledged that French foreign policy has progressively followed two 
main trends: a supranational approach to reinforce the EU’s capabilities as a global power, 
on the one hand; and a more egoistic and national approach to enhance its own strategic 
interest and project its power, on the other.
591
 In fact, France tends to conceive the national 
and the European dimensions as nearly identical, as French foreign policy has pursued a 
fundamental preference for a stronger EU profile in terms of ‘Europeanisation’ as a means of 
bringing French national power into the region.
592
 The role of France as a chief negotiator 
with respect to the launch of EUFOR RD Congo demonstrates considerable evidence of 
French foreign policy preferences towards the DRC, along with evidence of the 
Europeanisation of French military defence policy.  
The general election was certainly a salient issue for the DRC to build upon the democratic 
and peace process for the first time since its independence. But it was also deemed crucial 
for France to maintain its own influential position in the country, as well as in the African 
Great Lakes region. The Congolese transitional government, which was set up in July 2003, 
kept Joseph Kabila as the president, and France seemed likely to continue to support 
Kabila’s regime by being part of a multilateral UN-EU platform.
593
 The realist interpretation 
is associated with the idea that a French-led unilateral intervention might be more risky than 
a European multilateral intervention within which risks are shared among states.
594
 However, 
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French foreign policy and its strategic interest toward the DRC seemed to be hardly feasible, 
when the EU was faced with significant misgivings and criticism spread throughout the DRC 
about European military engagement. Congolese politicians and the local population 
criticised that EUFOR was sent to ensure Kabila remained in power. Consequently, EUFOR 




Given the serious criticism and public aversion to EU military deployment, France had to 
urgently convince Congolese politicians and the local population that the operation was 
neutral and impartial.
 596
According to Mehler, EUFOR’s local reputation is likely to 
determine France’s future engagement in Africa; whether France will and can continue to 
have an interest in the “African playground”.
597
 Hence, France had to assure the local 




Meanwhile, violent confrontations, with the greatest potential for destabilisation, took place 
on 20-22 August 2006, following the announcement of the results of the first round of the 
presidential elections.
 599
 Jean-Pierre Bemba, the vice president and presidential candidate, 
came under attack from the militia supporters of the leading candidate (and eventual winner) 
Joseph Kabila. The all-out battle between the supporters of the two parties killed at least 23 
civilians and soldiers, injured 43, and destroyed Bemba’s HQ (including helicopters) before 
police and the MONUC took control of the city.
600
 EUFOR was brought in to handle the 
most serious outbreak of violence in concert with MONUC, and made it possible to separate 
the conflicting parties. Already during the operation, EUFOR was widely considered a 
success by the EU and some observers.
601
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Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the EUFOR operation revealed a great deal of European 
tokenism, which had in fact primarily focused on gaining a credible reputation and 
readjusting in line with a damaged image of European forces. First of all, it is interesting to 
note that EUFOR was determined to limit its operational dimension in the DRC only to 
Kinshasa, the capital city of the DR Congo. As Figure 6.3 shows, most of Bemba’s support 
comes from the west of the country, including the area around the capital Kinshasa. 
According to an analysis, Kinshasa has been the bastion of anti-Kabila expression and 
Kabila was unpopular and even regarded as an outsider in this particular area.
602
 Given the 
strong regional divisions and the tense political frictions, EUFOR seemed to defend against 
an all-out attack and to protect the residence of Bemba in Kinshasa in which the 
representatives of the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (known by its 
French acronym, CIAT) were also located. However, in reality, by stationing the major 
military forces only in Kinshasa, EUFOR intended to demonstrate to the Congolese that the 
EU military operation was not launched to promote Kabila’s personal guard, but was 
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603
 The results of the first round elections in August 2006. The red provinces indicate a Bemba 
majority; the blue a Kabila majority; and the green a Gizenga stronghold. Source: the figure is made 
based on information (percentage data) from the United States Institute of Peace. 



























Yet, of course, this does not imply that France abandoned or renounced its strategic 
preference in favour of the odds-on presidential candidate, Joseph Kabila. On the contrary, 
Paris continued to be guided to promote Kabila in accordance with a commitment to the 
principle of respect for the country and to maintain a close relationship with Joseph Kabila. 
As “Kabila’s strongest advocates”, France, along with Belgium, emerged playing a key role 
in the West’s endorsement of Kabila as the DRC’s elected president.
604
 This French foreign 
policy strategy came to be clear when the results of the first elections were announced. 
Joseph Kabila took 45% of the votes, whereas his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, took 20%. 
The EU greeted the results, which established Kabila as the new leader of the country, “with 
tremendous relief”.
605
 Furthermore, the EU and its member states officially congratulated the 
newly elected President Joseph Kabila.
606
 
Second, evidence indicates that EUFOR carried out a range of campaigns and activities in 
order to reassure the inhabitants of Kinshasa about its stabilising role and impartiality.
607
 
Being mocked by the local people and nicknamed “EU-Faible”,
608
 EUFOR conducted civil 
actions in addition to its required task of military performance to improve EUFOR’s image 
and win over the public’s hearts and minds. EUFOR launched various initiatives to benefit 
the citizens of Kinshasa, including publishing its own newspaper called La Paillote, which 
was distributed for free. The newspaper was published ostensibly for the purpose of 
providing general information about elections and enlightening the public about the impartial 
activities of EUFOR. As a matter of fact, however, it ended up revealing competition 
between French and German units about who had primary responsibility for the newspaper, 
which caused the incorrect wording of the title, although the correct French is Paillotte.
609
  
Such civilian performances and activities of EU military forces illustrate that the EUFOR 
primarily focused on gaining recognition from the local population. EU forces appealed to 
the public that they were impartial and neutral. Martin argues that the military intervention 
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led to a successfully transformed perception of EUFOR among the Congolese; from being 
perceived as part of a “Western attempt to support Kabila”, to the EUFOR troops gaining a 
reputation as both “a neutral power and a credible force”.
610
 In parallel, France also fulfilled 
its political strategic interests towards the DRC by using the EUFOR as a vital means of 
ensuring its positive image in military intervention. France assured a safe European military 
presence and its influence in the DRC. Hence, the realist hypothesis that the political 
interests of the chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of leadership of the EU 
deciding to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation is accepted.  
 
2) Germany 
According to a national official, the German commitment, which made up a third of the 
overall EU forces, was by no means an insignificant contribution in military terms, given its 
typical tendency in foreign and defence policy, which has perceived “military assertiveness 
as specific historical taboos since the post-World War II (1945)”.
611
 Germany had 
traditionally seen military engagement as ultima ratio, and the concept of development of 
German military engagement has been profoundly restricted by the legacy of non-military 
action.
612
 Accordingly, the proactive role and use of military force has been merely available 
for national defence; and other than this purpose, German military deployment seemed 
unlikely to be legitimised by the public, which still experienced fears and suspicions.
613
 
Then under what conditions was Germany likely to decide to carry out such a heavy military 
task and responsibility, especially for African peacekeeping? Despite the significant meaning 
of German military engagement in the DRC, little effort has been made to identify 
Germany’s real motivations to launch and lead the EUFOR mission. This was primarily due 
to the grudging acceptance of Germany as being pushed by France on the one hand, and the 
indisputably visible preference of Germany towards ESDP, which has been widely 
acknowledged by the international community on the other hand.
614
 However, realists would 
argue that the European military contribution would normally entail strategic interests for 
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troop contributing countries, and this is the case with Germany. In this respect, the 
hypothesis drawn from realist theories would argue that the foreign policy strategy and 
political interests of the Bundestag towards the DRC increased the likelihood of the EU 
deciding to engage in the military operation in the DRC.  
The analysis of this case study suggests that the German national preference and its clear 
stance on the EUFOR were displayed during the EU-level discussion over operational 
planning to some extent, and during conducting the operation on the ground to a larger 
extent. First of all, once it emerged that German policy makers had to determine whether to 
take over responsibility for EUFOR, they began to prepare how to protect their own national 
forces while minimising military risks and burdens. When Germany expressed its 
willingness to contribute forces at the PSC meeting on 21 February, the nation explicitly 
insisted that other countries should contribute troops for fair burden-sharing. The 
Bundeswehr did not want to take over a great deal of military burdens alone and strongly 
appealed to other member states to collaborate in distributing responsibilities together.
615
 The 
only concern of the Bundeswehr seemed to focus on lightening the heavy military burden 
and risks, rather than pursuing humanitarian responsibility.  
Secondly, when Germany planned the precise modality of the EUFOR deployment, it 
imposed a clear limitation in time and space for its own national deployment. German troops 
were only allowed to operate in Kinshasa, whereas most of the other units were mandated to 
operate throughout the territory of the DRC. It is interesting to note that most of the German 
troops were nevertheless stationed outside the DRC, in neighbouring country Gabon. Out of 
the total 1,000-strong German force, around 300 soldiers were stationed in Kinshasa, and 
more than half of the forces were in Gabon as reservists for the EUFOR mission.
616
 
According to the French FCdr, Christian Damay, the majority of the EU’s forces were 
stationed in Gabon because of the infrastructure in Libreville, the capital and largest city of 
Gabon, which allowed the EU to set up a force that could be deployed rapidly to the Congo 
by air.
617
 However, the ‘on call’ forces based in Gabon were expected to temporarily back-up 
EUFOR in Kinshasa ‘if necessary’. Put differently, it reduced the probability of German 
deployment. Germany did not intend to actively engage in the operation, but it rather 
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schemed to avoid military loss or risks as much as possible. Hence, the deployment of two-
thirds of the EUFOR’s forces in Gabon, hundreds of miles away from the potential conflict 




It has been often assessed that the EUFOR deployment was crucial to containing a number of 
incidents and preventing the spread of potential violence at sensitive moments during the 
election period. However, EUFOR did not face serious military challenges.
619
 In practice, 
EUFOR engaged in stabilising tasks only on a few occasions.
620
 The first incidents especially, 
which took place between 20 and 22 August, with the greatest potential for further escalation 
of violence, revealed significantly passive and limited performance by German troops. Only 
the 130-strong Spanish force, which was the only effective combat unit in Kinshasa at the 
time, participated in the operation. The group of ambassadors of the five permanent members 
of the UNSC visiting Bemba’s HQ alongside the members of CIAT were brought to safety in 
armoured vehicles, but after this evacuation, an additional 180 German paratroopers were 
flown in from the contingent in Gabon for reinforcements.
621
  
Thirdly, because of limited time for the operation and the withdrawal of the EUFOR forces, 
the evidence of this case study suggests that any norm-oriented or responsibility-driven 
motivation of Germany was hardly found. Germany initially announced that EUFOR would 
be deployed only for four months, from 30 July to 30 November 2006, and after 30 
November the EU troops started to leave. Given the unexpected delay of the second round of 
elections, the question of extending EUFOR’s mandate was raised several times. France and 
Belgium particularly wished to extend the operation as a precaution against the danger of 
disturbances which might break out during or shortly after the delayed second round of 
elections and particularly after the withdrawal of EUFOR.
622
 The other European authorities 
in the field, including national ambassadors, the EU Special Representative, EUPOL, 
EUSEC and the Commission, as well as UN organisations like DPKO expressed a great 
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concern about the inappropriate timing of the withdrawal process. Nevertheless, the 
operation seemed unlikely to be extended, as Germany did not want to have to go through 
another vote in the Bundestag on this issue.
623
 Germany reaffirmed that the departure would 
be going ahead as originally scheduled. Germany again made a merely perfunctory effort in 
the EUFOR mission with no sense of humanitarian responsibility.    
Overall, EUFOR was present in the DRC for about 6 months, including the pre-deployment 
and withdrawal phase. Although the EU forces remained until December, the only way to 
maintain the capacity was to limit operations to self defence and to relieve the current forces. 
Each unit began to withdraw under its own steam and its own space, and Germany had its 
troops back home by Christmas as it initially programmed. The entire withdrawal process 
was completed when the last French troops left the DRC (end of December 2006, beginning 
of January 2007).
624
 While the EU seemingly fulfiled its responsibility to assist MONUC in 
providing a stable environment during the electoral process, it must be underlined that 
Germany overlooked an essential point of the operation, which aimed to alleviate the 
suffering of the civilian population by supporting humanitarian security and the peace 
process. The decision of the Bundestag to withdraw the troops in the most critical moment 
caused serious insecurity in the DRC. Tensions were still high in the capital and clashes 
reached a much higher intensity than those of August 2006, causing around 300 deaths 
including many civilians and significant material damage.
625
 
EUFOR actually fulfiled nothing more than the restricted objectives along the authorised 
measure of time and scope, which was temporarily feasible and low in risk.
 
Although 
Germany was active in delineating precise and strict aims and tasks for EUFOR, Germany 
brought neither humanitarian responsibility nor normative issues into EU-level discussions 
concerning DRC crisis management. The primary motive of Germany to decide to launch 
EUFOR DR Congo seems unlikely to be driven by either moral or humanitarian ideas, or a 
particular political interest towards the DRC. The German role as a chief negotiator was 
merely an inevitable choice. Germany might view this particular operation as a vehicle to 
increase the German scope for action, to meet European pressure, and to extend its 
influential position as a security actor in international peace and security. In sum, the 
hypothesis that the political interests of chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of its 
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leadership to lead an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation is relatively weak in 
the German case.   
In recent years, Africa has emerged as a potential supplier of energy and raw materials and 
has become an important trade and investment partner for Europe. Although Africa still 
plays a minor role for German business compared to other parts of the world,
626
 Germany 
has increasingly acknowledged the great potential of Africa. Hence, Germany, along with 
France and the UK, focused its attention on improving Africa’s overall political and 
economic conditions so that they can promote sustainable economic and trade partnerships 
with Africa.
627
 From a realist point of view, Germany and France might view operation 
EUFOR as a strategically important opportunity to assess Africa’s natural resources and 
improve their own economic power there. It is important to note that although the UN 
mandate did not impose geographical limitations, Germany and France decided to station 
their troops with limitation on space to Kinshasa in the DRC and Libreville in Gabon. Why 
did Germany and France deploy their major forces to Gabon in addition to the DRC, though 
the main task of EUFOR was to protect Congolese civilians?  
This study acknowledges that it would be difficult to establish a clear causal relationship 
between economic interests and actual political decisions; which exactly caused which? 
Nevertheless, it argues that there are some clear correlations between political decisions and 
economic interests in a military peacekeeping operation. Accordingly, this study also seeks 
to explore evidence that may show strategically important economic relationships between 
sub-Saharan African countries and Germany and France. More specifically, it examines 
whether there existed notable changes in trade directions between Gabon and 
France/Germany as well as between the DRC and France/Germany, before and in the 
aftermath of the EUFOR operation, respectively. 
 
3) France and Germany in DRC 
As in the case of Artemis in 2003, France’s vital role in launching EUFOR RD Congo 
seemed to beget another visible improvement in economic relations with the DRC. France 
                                                 
626
 For example, African trade volumes stood at 40 billion euro, almost 3% of German foreign trade in 
2008.  
627
 See the Federal Foreign Office announcement, “Economic relations with Africa”, Berlin, 22 
September 2009,  
 174 
maintained and even enhanced “a relationship of trust” with the DRC through the EUFOR 
operation.
628
 According to a French national report, France became the DRC’s fourth leading 
supplier, with a market share of 7% after South Africa (18%), Belgium (11%) and 
Zimbabwe (8%).
629
 Although French imports from the DRC remained modest due to 
political unrest there, French exports to the DRC continuously increased, which led France to 
enhance its position in the DRC’s market. French exports are made up of capital goods 
(mechanical and electronic) (34%), consumer goods (21%), intermediate goods (chemicals, 
plastics, metals) (17%), products in the agricultural and food industries (11.5%), products in 
the automotive industry (7.9%) and agricultural products (5.9%). Moreover, in addition to 
the total French investment in the DRC, various French companies have been encouraged to 
be present in diverse sectors in the DRC.
630
  
The weight of the DRC’s economy and potential market sector became gradually important 
for France.
631
 The evidence of the analysis suggests that French foreign policy strategies 
towards the DRC became more feasible after the EUFOR operation. Figure 6.4 illustrates an 
interesting feature. The index of DRC imports from France shows an upward movement in 
2006 following an increasing rise since 2003. At these two particular junctures in both 2003 
and 2006, France undertook a key role as chief negotiator for military peacekeeping 
operations in the DRC. As the realist hypothesis anticipated, trade and economic relations 
between the DRC and France considerably improved. Hence, the empirical evidence clearly 
confirms that France’s military engagement under the EU cover in the DRC was followed by 
economic and trade benefits.  
Germany established diplomatic relations with the DRC in 1960, after the DRC’s 
independence. However, political and economic relations between the two countries had 
remained inconsequential until the Congolese transitional process was initiated after the 
Congo Wars. Moreover, although Germany had been a development cooperation partner of 
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the DRC for more than 35 years, no inter-governmental meeting had been held before the 
EUFOR operation. By assuming the command of the military operation and securing the 
Congolese presidential and parliamentary elections, Germany became engaged in the 
country’s political and economic reconstruction process together with its European partners 
and the international community. At the first inter-governmental meeting which was held in 
Kinshaha in 2008, Germany and the DRC confirmed that they are important partner 
countries. Both countries agreed on three priority areas of cooperation: management of 
natural resources including environmental, forestry and mineral raw materials, water supply 
and sanitation, and microfinance.
 632
  
With regard to trade ties, Germany did not have a well-developed partnership with the DRC. 
Besides, when the civil war led to the political instability of the DRC in 1997, Germany 
discontinued its bilateral development cooperation with the DRC. There were only a few 
German investors active in the country. However, as Figure 6.4 illustrates, the trade index 
has greatly boosted since late 2006. While German imports from the Congo (mainly copper, 
crude oil and timber) have still remained at a low level of around 20-25 million US dollars, 
German exports to Congo (mainly motor vehicles, chemical products and machinery) have 
dramatically grown by more than 200 percent in 2007-2008 compared to the years before the 
EUFOR operation.  
 
                                                 
632
 Federal Foreign Office, ‘Bilateral relations: Democratic Republic of the Congo’, April 2010. 
 176 
Figure 6. 4 Trade of the DRC with France and Germany (2001 - 2009) 
633
 
DRC - France 
 
DRC - Germany 
 
 
Germany continues to expand its investments in various activities, including forestry, mining, 
and the medical, pharmaceutical, banking and logistics sectors. At governmental levels, 
Germany provides development support through the European Development Fund aimed at 
stabilising the country’s economy, improving its infrastructure, and establishing a 
constitutional state based on the rule of law.
634
 The German government also encourages 
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several major German mechanical engineering companies to relocate in the DRC to invest 
and manage natural resources effectively. The evidence from the case analysis suggests that 
the EUFOR operation considerably developed Germany’s relations with the DRC, 
particularly in the economic area, which led to dramatic changes in trade between the two 
countries. Therefore, the evidence clearly proved that military engagement of Germany in 
the DRC was followed by economic and trade benefits.  
In sum, the analysis of this study confirms that the economic conditions of the DRC with its 
large market potential and an abundance of natural resources were important factors under 
which chief negotiators (France and Germany) seemed more likely to engage the EU in a 
military peacekeeping operation.  
 
4) France and Germany in Gabon 
 
The EUFOR operation is often criticised for its inappropriate decision to station the majority 
of the French/German contingent in Gabon. Given the decision to place their troops there, 
the case study questions whether there exists a correlation between French and German 
economic interests in Gabon and the likelihood of the Franco-German decision to deploy 
their troops there. 
Gabon is a wealthy country with diverse natural resources. Given the abundance of natural 
resources, the country is significantly dependent on crude oil revenues to fund its economy. 
As of 2010, Gabon holds the third largest oil reserves among sub-Saharan African countries, 
and it is the fourth largest oil producer in the region. The ample natural resources represent 
over 40% of Gabon’s GDP,
635
 which is approximately four times the average of sub-Saharan 
African nations. Given the fact that the exports of crude oil have accounted for 
approximately 60% of the government’s budget, high oil prices have also helped raise GDP 
growth in Gabon. Hence, the oil industry of Gabon plays a critical role in the economy, 
representing approximately 80% of the country’s export revenues. Besides its oil revenues, 
Gabon also produces natural gas, timber and manganese. Logging and manganese extraction 
were the pillar of the Gabonese economy prior to the discovery of oil. In particular, 
manganese mining activity remains as one of the major income generators and a potential 
area for growth. The country is estimated to hold around one-fourth of global reserves. 
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Gabon has been continuously developing other important natural resources. Recent 




It is by no means surprising that Gabon has been considered geo-strategically important by 
Western powers. Oil giants, including Total, Shell, Perenco, and Addaz, have long engaged 
in the exploitation of Gabon’s natural resources.
637
 Half of Gabon’s crude oil exploitations 
are often exported to the US, and the rest of it goes to China and Western Europe. However, 
the oil sector has been expected to decline in coming years as it passed its peak production in 
the late 1990s.
638
 Despite the rapid decrease in oil revenues, the Gabonese government lacks 
post-oil economic plans and is only beginning to consider an after-oil scenario.
639
 Given the 
challenges that lie ahead, Gabon began to open its limited market and industry, which France 
has exclusively dominated, and to promote foreign investments that steer diversifying the 
economy.
640
   
Bilateral relations between Germany and Gabon had not intensified until recently, as Gabon 
had remained biased towards its former colonial power, France. The potential market of 
Gabon was limited to France.
641
 Moreover, as the country was classified as a medium-
income country, Gabon was not a beneficiary of German development cooperation. There 
has been only minor assistance that Germany indirectly provided as a part of the EU or other 
international development organisations and financial institutions.
642
 Accordingly, there 
hardly existed particular occasions during which Germany and Gabon could meet and 
develop bilateral relations in political and economic areas. In this context, from a realist 
point of view, Germany might have considered the EUFOR operation an important 
opportunity to establish a close relationship with the Gabonese government by stationing 
German forces in Libreville, the capital of Gabon. Building amicable political, foreign and 
security relations with the Gabonese government based on mutual trust and confidence was 
deemed more essential for Germany than any other direct economic investment or activities, 
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The foreign policy of Germany towards Gabon and vice versa has changed since the EUFOR. 
Various members of the Gabonese government have made official visits to Germany. 
Federal Defence Minister Jung visited Gabon in July 2006 as part of the EUFOR DR Congo 
operation, which was followed by the official visit of Federal Economics Minister Glos 
accompanied by a business delegation in December 2007. Economic relations as well as 
political and diplomatic relations between Germany and Gabon intensified, and Germany 
insists that the bilateral relationship could be further expanded given Gabon’s potential.
644
 In 
fact, since operation EUFOR RD Congo, Germany has been more willing to engage in 
various projects including in the health sector, the timber industry, in cement production and 
in the infrastructure sector.  
Interestingly, evidence from the case analysis shows that Gabon’s trade with Germany has 
dramatically changed after EUFOR RD Congo in 2006-2007. As Figure 6.5 shows, Gabon’s 
exports were not that considerable to Germany, remaining around 18-20 million US dollars 
until 2006. In 2007, however, its export index dramatically increased up to 71 million, and 
raised 200% reaching 137 million dollars in 2008. This increasing export flow from Gabon 
to Germany continued in the next year in 2009, with over 251 million dollars. Considering 
Gabon’s economy and limited trade market which France has traditionally occupied as the 
country’s major supplier and exporter, the increasing position of Germany in Gabon’s 
economy and trade market implies a very significant achievement.  
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Figure 6. 5 Trade of Gabon with France and Germany (2001 - 2008) 
645
 
Gabon - France 
 
Gabon - Germany 
 
France has maintained strong ties with Gabon in both political and economic areas, which 
has been an important element of Gabon’s economy and commercial setting. According to 
the French Ministry of Economy and Commerce, France is the main supplier of goods to 
Gabon, furnishing half of Gabon’s imports.
646
 French firms and subsidiaries have dominated 
the local formal private sector, and Gabon is the second largest recipient of French Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa. Most French investment is concentrated in the oil sector, 
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in petroleum (Total) and manganese (COMILOG/ERAMET).
647
 Given the incomparable 
prestige of France in Gabon’s economic sectors, EUFOR RD Congo seemed to bring further 
considerable economic benefits to France in trade relations. As Figure 6.5, above, shows, the 
index of Gabonese exports to France went through a period of stagnation, remaining at 
around 330 million US dollars between 2003 and 2005. However, the trade index 
dramatically rebounded between 2006 and 2007, coinciding with the France’s stationing of 
its military contingent in Libreville for the EUFOR operation.  
Some, inter alia some International Political Economists, would argue that the increase in 
exports cannot be considered as French and German domestic economic interests, because 
those Gabonese exporting products would be competing with French and German firms. 
However, this study argues that the Gabonese exporters are not threatening or competing 
with domestic French and German industries. Rather, it should be in French and German 
economic interests to get more products from Gabon into their market because most of the 
Gabonese exports are heavily concentrated on minerals, crude oil and manganese.
648
 In sum, 
this case study confirms that EUFOR RD Congo was followed by a significant increase of 
economic and trade benefits for France and Germany, which presented the clear correlation 
between the active leadership of the chief negotiators and their economic benefits in the 
aftermath of the operation.  
 
6.4 Constructivist hypothesis 
 
Whereas realists argue that the very essence of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping engages 
some powerful EU states who seek to maximise their own relative power in shaping world 
order better than going alone,
649
 constructivists underline the normative power of Europe, 
focusing on the power of ideas and norms rather than the empirical power as an important 
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motive for peacekeeping operations.
650
 Constructivist theories would lead us to believe that a 
process of gradual consensus on the common rules and collective norms leads EU member 
states to recognise that cooperation is appropriate and important, even if it is not necessarily 
the most rational approach in a given case or the one likely to maximise their own 
benefits.
651
 Hence, the value of common norms and principles constrains the member states 
to be socialised or institutionalised into abandoning unilateral action and extending 
multilateral cooperation in international peace and security. According to Scheuermann, in 
this respect, the EU’s multifaceted involvement in crisis managements in the DRC clearly 
reflects that the EU member states are already institutionalised by ‘serious moral’ and 
‘normative responsibility’ within the EU framework on the issue of international 
peacekeeping operations.
652
   
The successful and safe democratic Congolese elections were seen as a crucial step towards 
sustainable peace and stability in the Great Lakes region as well as an important foundation 
for the longer term restoration of peace and security in the DRC. According to a report from 
the Council of the European Union, the EU also acknowledged the significant meaning of 
the Congolese general elections and announced that the EU had actively sought a lasting 
solution for conflicts in the African Great Lakes region by “being strongly committed to 
supporting peace, stability and development in Africa”.
653
 During the UN Security Council 
meeting in January 2007, Solana emphasised the important democratic transition period of 
the DRC which was about to enter its final and essential phase to create a secure 
environment. He reaffirmed the significant responsibility of the EU as a normative power in 
humanitarian security.
654
 Despite such normative commitments and statements on the 
responsibility of the EU, however, this study found little evidence that the EU directly 
expressed the colonial responsibility in formulating EUFOR RD Congo.  
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In the case of Operation Artemis, the analysis determined that French foreign policy, which 
tends to view the DRC as a part of Francophone Africa, was an important factor that 
triggered Europeanised collective identity and responsibility based on a colonial legacy, 
which in turn led to the launch of the operation. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, however, 
the evidence from the case study suggests that a colonial legacy played an opposite role; it 
decreased the likelihood of the European major powers’ leadership in bringing the EU’s 
consent to engage in a military peacekeeping operation in the DRC. According to a Die Welt 
report, German policy-makers warned against ‘a hasty troop deployment’ and insisted that 
“Germany should not and could not be the first troop contributors”.
655
 German politicians 
stressed the colonial responsibility in other European countries.
656
 Colonial legacy provided 
Germany with a good excuse to avoid undertaking a serious military burden and shift the 
core responsibility to Belgium, which was the former colonial power in the DRC. 
Nonetheless, the role of Belgium remained very informal and minor, albeit it had a colonial 
tie with the DRC. The colonial legacy thus seemed unlikely to generate a Europeanised 
collective identity and normative responsibility within the EU framework. Hence, the study 
confirms that colonial legacy was less influential to motivate chief negotiators to lead the 
EUFOR operation.  
The normative institutionalist approach to European foreign and security policy, on the other 
hand, highlights that the EU’s substantive and procedural norms shape member states’ 
behaviour.
657
 In what follows, the constructivist hypothesis based on the normative 
institutional argument is examined to determine to what extent normative commitment, 
normative entrapment and normative suasion were important factors to increase the 
likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership in decision-making on the launch of EUFOR RD 
Congo.   
Once the UK declined to participate in the operation, Franco-German cooperation became all 
the more important; and the Franco-German tandem played a central role in launching 
EUFOR RD Congo.
 658
 Franco-German cooperation is based on the Elysée Treaty, which 
was signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer on 22 January 1963. The treaty 
contained a number of agreements for joint cooperation between the two countries in foreign 
policy, economic and military integration. The treaty has especially become the emblem of 
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intense cooperation between France and Germany in peace and security within the EU 
framework.
659
 These provisions were further extended by the establishment of new structures 
of cooperation. On the occasion of the 25
th
 anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, in 1988-1989, 
the Franco-German Defence and Security Council (CFADS) was created. Franco-German 
cooperation was further reinforced in 2003, in parallel with the 40
th
 anniversary of the Treaty, 
which led the two countries to strengthen their institutional and political association.
660
   
Concerning the issue of the EU military operation in the DRC, the first Franco-German 
meeting was held in Paris on 23 January 2006, in which France and Germany sought to 
coordinate positions during initial discussions. Since then, President Chirac and Federal 
Chancellor Merkel discussed Congo issues and the possible deployment of EU troops on 
several occasions. During the Franco-German Council of Ministers meeting, on 14 March 
2006, France and Germany committed themselves to pursue efforts to ‘enable the European 
Union to react even more efficiently and swiftly to crisis situations in the world.’
661
 
Furthermore, France and Germany together urged the EU to respond positively to the UN’s 
request to support MONUC during the general and presidential elections in the DRC. It is 
important to note that France and Germany reiterated that they were ‘willing to make a 
significant contribution to this military operation’ and appealed to other member states to 
‘provide joint responsibility and fulfilment’ for the operation.
662
 Moreover, when the 
CFADS met at the Elysée Palace, in October 2006, France and Germany reiterated their 
commitment to consolidating peace and democracy in the DRC. The two countries expressed 
their abiding Franco-German commitments that aimed at ending the uncontrolled movement 
of weapons and promoting the democratisation process in the DRC.
663
 In sum, the evidence 
suggests that Franco-German commitments stimulated both countries to take further robust 
and active action to fulfil their pledge. France and Germany were thus considerably 
constrained by their normative commitments.  
Although France and Germany often faced tensions especially with respect to the question of 
who would provide the operational leadership, the Franco-German partnership and a series 
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of normative commitments certainly played a crucial role to enable the EU to prepare a 
possible military deployment for the operation in a timely manner. In light of normative 
suasion, however, it seemed that Franco-German cooperation and normative pressures could 
not sufficiently convince other EU member states of the necessity of EU military 
engagement in the DRC. According to a normative institutionalist argument, normative 
suasion is primarily pursued by communication among actors involved in negotiations. In 
other words, EU actors would discuss normative reasons why particular European collective 
action is more desirable and more appropriate than what particular member states 
preconceive their identities and fundamental interests to be. Whatever the circumstances 
under which each of the member states may engage in the discussions, normative 
institutionalists believe that successful normative suasion would produce a convergence in 
the different preferences of member states.  
The case study sought evidence of normative suasion to examine whether France and 
Germany used normative language during negotiations to get other members to change their 
reluctant position and to contribute to the EUFOR operation. It systematically looked 
through every public document provided by the Council of the EU, statements of the French 
and German government and foreign ministry respectively, as well as news reports released 
by various mass media sources between January 2006 and February 2007.
664
 The systematic 
primary and secondary data analyses displayed some remarkable outcomes. First, the use of 
normative language of ‘European responsibility’ to protect civilians from serious conflict in 
the DRC started to increase since 2008, after EUFOR RD Congo.
665
 In other words, the 
EUFOR operation may have resulted in a change of EU actors’ ideas about the concept of 
the normative responsibility of the EU. However, during the time when the EU went through 
simultaneous discussions and negotiations on the operation, the normative argument per se 
was hardly present in most documents. Second, although there was some data in which 
normative terms or verbal alert were highlighted by EU actors, those documents explicitly 
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indicated that it was “the responsibility of the Government of the DRC” rather than the 
responsibility of the EU to build sustainable peace and security in the Congo.
666
  
According to the result of the analysis, France, Germany or any other EU member state 
seemed unlikely to use normative terms reflecting European norms and responsibility to 
support EUFOR RD Congo. While France and Germany fulfilled a major responsibility for 
the operation, most EU member states, particularly the UK, Italy and Belgium, remained 
significantly reluctant to provide a military contribution to the EUFOR operation. 
Consequently, this study confirms that the Franco-German normative pressures were not 
successful in presenting normative reasons to EU member states on why the EU should 
embrace normative and humanitarian responsibility for the operation and participate in a 
cohesive and collective action for the EUFOR RD Congo. In sum, the hypothesis drawn 
from a constructivist theory is partially accepted; whereas the argument regarding normative 
commitment and normative entrapment is strong, normative suasion is relatively weak in this 
specific case.   
 
Conclusion 
Whereas Operation Artemis was mainly carried out by France as a framework nation under 
the EU flag, EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated a truly European character not only within the 
political decision-making arena but also on the ground, albeit with all its political and 
operational drawbacks. The case analysis identified that there are two most important chief 
negotiators: France and Germany. This chapter focused on the multi-faceted conditions 
under which France and Germany were likely to provide active leadership to influence the 
EU’s decision to launch the peacekeeping operation on the UN’s request. 
The realist hypothesis claimed that the geo-strategically important conditions of the Great 
Lakes region would attract the considerable attention of France and Germany, which led to 
their active role in EU’s decision-making on a peacekeeping operation in the DRC. The 
evidence from the case study revealed that France and Germany concentrated on gaining a 
credible reputation aimed at projecting their political influence in the country through a 
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military contribution during the Congolese peace process. It illustrated that during the 
military operation on the ground, France and Germany manifested their divergent national 
preferences rather than performed a coherent action driven by a humanitarian or normative 
purpose. This claim was also supported by the fact that the EUFOR operation was strictly 
limited in time and space, regardless of the potential for dangerous disturbances after the 
withdrawal of EUFOR.  
The abundance of natural resources and economic interests were another important 
proposition of the realist hypothesis. The study investigated the operational areas where EU 
military forces were mandated to be deployed. The analysis revealed that majority of French 
and German military contingents were stationed in Kinshasa and in Libreville. These two 
sub-Saharan African countries have emerged as potentially vital suppliers of energy 
resources and important trade partners for Europe. The evidence in this study showed that 
following the EUFOR mission in 2006, there were notable changes in the trade flows of the 
DRC and Gabon towards France and Germany, respectively. In sum, the case analysis 
confirmed that the realist hypothesis provides plausible explanations for the likelihood of 
chief negotiator’s leadership which may have increased the EU’s motivation to launch 
EUFOR RD Congo.  
On the contrary, the hypothesis derived from constructivist theories seemed less convincing 
and less compelling in this specific case. In light of Europe’s colonial legacy, the 
constructivist hypothesis stressed the important functions of pre-existing norms or the 
normative responsibility of Europe which are likely to constrain the behaviour of the MS, 
inter alia chief negotiator, in decision-making on a peacekeeping operation. However, the 
existence of a colonial legacy turned out to be less important and even had a negative impact 
on negotiations. The constructivist proposition that the existence of a colonial legacy would 
increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator’s active role in the EU’s decision to engage in 
a peacekeeping operation was rejected.  
The constructivist hypothesis also argued that Franco-German bilateral commitments 
provided normative pressures under which EU actors seemed likely to decide to launch the 
operation. The analysis determined that Franco-German commitments were important 
factors by which France and Germany became entrapped to act cohesively in accordance 
with their pledge and commitment. However, apart from the Franco-German commitments 
and bilateral dialogue, normative discussions were not in fact used to facilitate normative 
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suasion to get other member states to participate in the operation. Accordingly, this case 
study confirmed that the constructivist hypothesis is partially accepted; historical memory or 
responsibility of EU was less influential; and the absence of normative suasion makes the 
















Chapter   7 
UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping III:  








Over the course of 2007, the UN and the EU reached an agreement to create simultaneous 
peacekeeping operations in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). In accordance 
with the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1778, the EU decided to 
deploy a military mission in eastern Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic, 
named EUFOR TChad/RCA.
 667
 Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian 
population by protecting the numerous refugees and displaced persons and the local presence 
of UN personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The UN Mission in the 
Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), on its part, conducts a civilian operation 
mandated to train and monitor national security forces.
668
  
EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the EU’s fifth ESDP military deployment following Concordia 
(2003), Artemis (2003), Althea (2004) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006). It is the largest as 
well as most ambitious operation in terms of the number of troops deployed. It is also the 
most multinational and longest autonomous military mission that the EU has deployed in 
Africa so far.
669
 Moreover, within the context of UN-EU joint action in crisis management, 
Chad and the CAR is the second region where the EU conducted an EU-led military 
operation in support of a UN mission. However, given the dominant role of France in the 
region, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has been recognised as “the most complex and 
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ambitious European mission to date”,
670
 and even controversial.
 
Thus it may not be 
surprising that the operation encountered a critical question of how and why the EU decided 
to deploy a sizeable and multidimensional force in the middle of the desert, thousands of 
kilometres away from Europe, for twelve months.  
This chapter analyses the third empirical case of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping 
through which the EU conducted an autonomous military operation in close cooperation with 
the UN in Chad and the CAR. This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section 
begins by briefly glancing at the emergence of conflict in the region (7.1). The second 
section explores the dynamic negotiations and decision-making process at the UN and the 
EU on the issue of peacekeeping operations (7.2). By doing so, this chapter seeks to identify 
the most important actor(s) who played a vital role in negotiating, initiating and 
implementing the operation. The two following sections examine the hypotheses derived 
from the two IR theories, realist hypothesis (7.3) vs. constructivist hypothesis (7.4) 
respectively. The aim of this chapter is to determine important factors which may influence 
the likelihood of the chief negotiator’s leadership role which led to the EU’s decision to get 




Contrary to the two previous operations conducted in the DRC, the peacekeeping challenge 
facing Chad was deemed more complex and multifaceted, because the conflict of Chad has 
not been generated by its own single internal factor. In fact, insecurity and instability in Chad 
and the CAR have mingled with several different conflicts in neighbouring areas for decades, 
which have been exacerbated in recent years due to the spill-over from the ongoing conflict 
in Darfur. As a consequence of refugees from Darfur, Chadians became displaced, which 
caused “crime, banditry and the power vacuum inside its borders”.
671
 The concept of 
insecurity in Chad thus cannot be separated from the continuous tensions between Chad and 
Sudan that have heightened after reciprocal attacks on the two countries’ capitals by rebel 
forces.  
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Chad is a landlocked country with an area of 1.25 million km² and 10 million inhabitants. 
According to UN Development reports, as of 2009, Chad ranks eighth from last in the 




 Even though its GDP has been 
growing by five times the rate of that of China over the last few years due to oil revenues, 
Chad still remains very poor and has never experienced a long period of stability.
673
 Despite 
oil revenues, poor conditions within the country have not been alleviated, because most of 
them flowed into subsidising military groups to repel the offensive Chadian rebels.
674
  
The highly unstable situation of the Chadian government has significantly deteriorated since 
2003 due to the war in Darfur.
675
 Darfur is an extremely poor and arid region in the west of 
Sudan close to the borders with Chad and the CAR (see Figure 7.1). Darfur has gone through 
volatile situations for many years due to a conflict between the Arab nomad population and 
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa farming communities.
676
 The instability and insecurity in the 
region worsened in 2003 following a spate of attacks against Sudanese Government 
installations by African rebel groups who reproached the Sudanese Government for its pro-
Arab stance and policy of repression against the African population.
677
 This led to violent 
reprisals against the local African population, with the Sudanese Government openly 
supporting a number of ‘self-defence’ militia groups. In particular, the pro-Arab Janjaweed 
militias engaged in the systematic massacre, abuse and rape of local African villagers, 
establishing a climate of terror and causing nearly two million refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) to flee.
678
 Accordingly, the Darfur conflict had an inevitable 
consequence of insecurity that has spilled over into Chad and the CAR, due in particular to 
the floods of refugees.  
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The situation in Chad became even more volatile due to the violence and conflicts between 
rebels and government troops, as well as due to the presence of armed criminal militia 
groups, which brought about further movements of refugees. According to a report of the 
UN Secretary-General, fighting between the Chadian armed forces and rebel groups, some of 
which were armed and supported by Sudan, and the attacks by militia on the civilian 
population continued to destabilise eastern Chad, leading to widespread insecurity and 
human rights violations, including a number of internal displacements of civilian 
populations.
680
 As a result of the ongoing violence and militias attacks on the Chadian 
population, the refugee population in eastern Chad had reached around 232,000, whilst the 
number of IDPs had risen from an estimated 92,000 in December 2006 to 120,000 by 
February 2007.
681
 The increase in IDPs, newly displaced persons and refugees has 
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad. As a consequence, Chad was extremely 
weakened as it faced rebel movements in Sudan and an intensification of violence between 
ethnic groups.  
International involvement in the regional crisis started in the aftermath of the outbreak of the 
war in Darfur and has taken many different shapes since then. In order to protect civilians in 
danger, the African Union (AU) undertook the first peacekeeping efforts in Darfur with the 
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. As this relatively small operation rapidly acquired a 
reputation for ineffectiveness, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 mandated to 
incorporate AMIS into the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007.
682
 This 
civilian-military mission, with the authorised troop strength correspondingly raised from 
AMIS’s 7,700 to 26,000 (20,000 military and 6,000 police contributions combined), has 
taken over the command. Despite the efforts of the UN-AU hybrid operation to contribute to 
protecting civilians, particularly refugees and displaced persons, UNAMID was plagued by 
much the same problem as AMIS. The insecurity of Darfur caused more serious problems to 
its neighbouring countries, Chad and the CAR.     
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7.2 Decision-making in Practice 
Level I : International UNSC level 
When the UN first contemplated taking over AMIS under the UNSC command, the 
establishment of a ‘multidimensional presence’ in Chad and the CAR had already been 
evoked.
683
 At the UN Security Council meeting on 31 August 2006, the Council adopted 
Resolution 1706 concerning the situation in Darfur, in which the UNSC reaffirmed its 
concern about the regional security situation, particularly in neighbouring areas along the 
borders between Sudan and Chad and between Sudan and the Central African Republic. The 
resolution requested the Secretary-General to vest international efforts to protect civilians in 
refugee and internally displaced persons camps in Chad and to seek answers on how to 
improve the security situation on the Chadian side of the border with Sudan.
 684
  
France became the political driving force behind the operation in Chad and the CAR. As a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, France drew the Security Council’s 
attention to the regional aspects of Darfur, emphasising the spillover effects of the crisis into 
the areas of Chad and the CAR. From September 2006, France started convening open 
debates within the Security Council and urged the need to ensure stable and secure 
conditions within Chad’s borders.
685
 During subsequent informal consultations and 
discussions, the Secretary-General was requested to deploy an advance mission to Chad and 
the CAR as soon as possible.
 686
 In response to the request to take robust action to protect 
civilians at risk, the UN Secretariat came up with some preliminary options regarding the 
possible mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multidimensional United Nations 
presence in both eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.  
On February 2007, the Secretary-General initiated and presented a finalised plan to deploy 
the UN operation to Chad and the CAR, namely MINURCAT. In the first outline of the plan, 
this multidimensional presence would encompass three component activities: military, police, 
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and civilian. The military operation would assist in protecting civilians at risk and provide an 
“umbrella of relative security” under which the UN and the humanitarian aid community 
could establish a more secure environment in the area of deployment.
687
 The police pillar 
would undertake to police refugee camps and support national law enforcement activities in 
combination with a UN military presence that would be required to provide security in a 
wide area for the UN operation. Finally, the civilian pillar would be comprised of various 




However, the UN faced difficulties in deploying a multidimensional presence along the 
Chad-Sudan border, as the President Idriss Déby expressed strong opposition to the military 
presence provided by the UN. Although the Chadian authorities agreed, in principle, to the 
deployment of a multidimensional UN presence to eastern Chad, President Déby and his 
Government feared that the increased international presence would limit their margin for 
manoeuvre.
689
 Such a difficult situation caused by the Chadian and Sudanese opposition, 
however, became alleviated by the active negotiating role of France. France held high-level 
meetings in Paris and led the numerous discussions with EU members along with the UN 
and other stakeholders in New York.
690
 More importantly, in light of their historical 
relationship as well as a bilateral agreement between France and Chad, the French Foreign 
Minister, Bernard Kouchner, tried to convince and persuade the Chadian government to 
accept a military operation.
691
 On 10 June, President Déby met with Kouchner to discuss the 
situation in eastern Chad. Having subsequent discussions with the French Foreign Minister, 
Déby agreed to the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad.
 692
 In 
July 2007, President Idriss Déby finally came to an agreement on the presence of a military 
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component, but proposed a French and European military component instead of military 
force run by the UN.
693
  
Based on the Chadian consent and proposal for the mission, the UN Security Council began 
redesigning an international-multidimensional operation in Chad and the CAR. In August 
2007, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon unveiled a revised concept in his report 
S/700/488. One of the distinguishing features of this new concept is that it called for the 
deployment of an operation authorised by the UN with three distinct elements:
694
 the UN 
would handle the civilian operation, including civil affairs, human rights, rule of law and 
mission support; while the Chadian Government would comprise the police component with 
UN backing; and the EU would take charge of the military component of the mission. 
The five permanent members of the Security Council favoured the new draft resolution that 
authorised the deployment of MINURCAT supported by a military component under EU 
leadership.
695
 Russia, in particular, committed itself to the participation in the EUFOR 
mission associating with the two other non-EU countries, Albania and Croatia.
696
 Finally, on 
25 September 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1778 
authorising the deployment of a multidimensional presence in the eastern part of Chad and 
north-eastern region of the Central African Republic, consisting of three components:
697
 
- a multidisciplinary UN mission (MINURCAT) comprising police officers, 
military liaison officers and civilian personnel, whose mandate includes the 
selection of Chadian police officers and providing training in the field of 
humanitarian protection and the monitoring and promotion of human rights; 
- a Chadian Police for Humanitarian Protection (Police Tchadienne pour la 
protection humanitaire, PTPH) dedicated to maintaining law and order in 
refugee camps; 
- an EU military presence to support the UN action. 
The UN-level negotiations suggest that France certainly played a key role as a chief 
negotiator. France showed its important role not only by initiating the peacekeeping mandate 
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at the Security Council but also by leading a substantial agreement among stakeholders on 
the deployment of a UN-EU multidimensional presence in Chad and the CAR. The UK and 
Germany, however, did not play much of a role during negotiations and decision-making at 
the UN level.
698
 The study systematically went through every UN document that Britain, 
Germany and Italy produced related to this subject.
699
 However, neither the UK nor Germany 
significantly demonstrated any official support or commitment or provided any official 
statement or paper on the given issue.  
The High Representative Javier Solana, on the other hand, appeared once at the end of Level 
I negotiations as a facilitator. Solana addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 17 
September 2007, informing that the EU Council had approved the concept of crisis 
management for the operation envisaged in Chad and the CAR.
700
 In his letter, Solana 
confirmed the readiness of the EU to support the UN action, and he suggested an urgent 
condition to make a precise identification of detailed modalities under which the EU would 
carry out the mission.  
Before the EUFOR mission was completed, Javier Solana had another chance to present a 
message on behalf of the EU at the UN Security Council. When senior officials from both 
organisations initiated a meeting to discuss the mid-mandate Review process, which would 
eventually lead to the termination of the operation and accordingly the handover to 
MINUCAT, Solana attended the meeting at the Security Council in June 2008. This was 
quite a remarkable occasion, as the Security Council normally meets at the ambassador level. 
Apart from a visit to Chad in May 2008, Solana had not been involved in the EUFOR 
operation and was largely absent from the whole process. During his visit to the Security 
Council, Solana urged a “quick decision from the Security Council” to lead to the 
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appropriate handover to the EUFOR by the UN. And he affirmed that the EU would do its 
best to support the UN in all areas and thus to make the transition a success.
701
 
In sum, the High Representative demonstrated his minor role at the international UN level. 
Javier Solana did not have any influence on decision-making in the Security Council but 
facilitated negotiations. In this respect, one EU official pointed out that the HR hardly played 
a significant role in negotiations as a decision-maker by stressing that “Solana only did his 
role as a facilitator liaising simultaneous interactions between the UN and the EU within the 
inter-organizational framework.”
702
    
 
Level II : Domestic EU level 
When the bilateral discussions between French Foreign Minister Kouchner and the Chadian 
President Déby were ongoing, the EU simultaneously began to prepare for undertaking the 
military component of the EUFOR mission. On 21 May 2007, the very first mentioning of 
the idea of a possible deployment of an ESDP operation in Chad and the CAR was discussed 
at the meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC).
703
 At the PSC meeting, the 
French Delegation proposed that “the EU should intervene in the Chad/Darfur crises” and 
suggested an initiative for the Chad operation.
704
 According to a French national official, it 
was followed by “further discussions on the possibility of EUFOR in Chad and CAR, which 
was also exclusively proposed by the French ministry of foreign affairs.”
705
 Moreover, the 
French government suggested that other EU member states provide the military element of a 
multidimensional UN mission in Chad and CAR.
706
 The French initial proposal to engage the 
EU in Chad gradually led to a joint Commission-Council Secretariat Options Paper to be 
adopted on 13 July 2007, in which the security dimension was especially emphasised.
707
 At 
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the Council meeting of 23-24 July 2007, the Council finally approved the EU’s involvement 
in a multidimensional UN presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern CAR.
708
  
France played a central role at the EU level as a chief negotiator. A French official stresses 
that “France made significant efforts to launch the operation in Chad and CAR by lobbying 
to win the EU approval for the operation and to convince our partners [EU members] to 
participate in EUFOR Tchad/RCA.”
709
 During the negotiation phase in Brussels, France 
worked particularly hard to persuade the reluctant EU countries who suspected that the 
mission would serve nothing but French interests, and simultaneously lobbied to get 
unanimous agreement on the deployment of the ESDP mission in the area.
710
 At the 
operational level, given the lack of sufficient soldiers for the mission, France announced that 
it would “plug the gaps” by supplying about 2,000 soldiers or half the total number for the 
ESDP mission.
711
 Furthermore, France pledged to fulfil logistical requirements, including 
helicopters and transport aircraft. 
In light of the ESDP operational planning process, France viewed the options paper as the 
opportunity to address its willingness to be the lead nation, which meant that it would 
activate the Mont Valérien Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for that purpose.
712
 However, 
France expressed that it would not provide the Operation Commander for political reasons, 
and thereby noted that “one of the other member states would have to carry out the 
responsibility of the Operation Commander”.
713
 France certainly seemed to lose strong 
support from the most powerful and vocal nations in the EU, i.e. Germany and the UK. 
Whereas Germany and the UK were active in the Darfur situation; in the case of Chad, both 
counties were the most reticent about the action, considering the operation another “pet 
project in support of Françafrique”.
714
 In addition, Germany and the UK made explicitly 
clear that while they would not block the operation, they would not contribute to it either.
715
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In contrast with the less likely cooperative position of Germany and the UK, Italy confirmed 
it would take care of medical needs and provide a field hospital, not military forces.
716
 This 
meant that “[…] France would probably have to carry out much larger than foreseen military 
and financial burden. Under these circumstances, France would have to approach other 
member states to make sufficient troops available and to put the position of the operation 
commander on the EU table.”
717
 In spite of significant efforts by France to convince other 
reluctant EU member states, however, the scepticism among member states that the mission 
would serve French interests seemed unlikely to be eased.  
Whilst the question of who would provide the Operation Commander still remained 
uncertain, Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, initially demonstrated a keen interest in the 
operation.
718
 According to the interview evidence, Sweden had planned to provide a sizable 
contingent by sending a Swedish General to command the operation. Yet, this was misread 
by France, which viewed Bildt’s interest as a possible deployment of a Swedish-led Nordic 
Battle Group of 1,500 troops.
719
 After a visit to the region in early September, the Swedish 
Government changed its mind. Minister Bildt announced that Sweden would not contribute 
such a large amount of troops nor accept the position of Operation Commander, for the 
mission seemed to be more challenging than expected.
720
 After all, Sweden confirmed that it 




Hence, when the UN visited the Mont Valérien OHQ in early September, the EU was not 
able to provide any precise information, as the Operation Commander had still not been 
assigned.
722
 Nevertheless, the political-strategic planning phase at the EU level got back on 
track as of the beginning of September 2007, when the PSC began seeking a commander for 
the operation. The EU organised an informal force generation conference on 24 September, 
but apart from France, very few states were willing to contribute.
723
 Given this difficult 
situation, President Nicolas Sarkozy made a call to his counterparts in Europe. According to 
an official from the French ministry of foreign affairs, Sarkozy’s calls were successful in 
finally bringing the position of Operation Commander to Ireland, who had expressed the 
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intention of sending a large (400-strong) contingent; also, Poland pledged to make a similar 




In parallel with the operational concept proposed by the UN Secretary-General, the Crisis 
Management Concept (CMC) of the European Union outlined a multidimensional presence, 
which became the first formal EU planning document. The PSC issued three distinct CMC 
domains - political, humanitarian, and security domains - and defined their specific tasks. At 
the meeting of 12 September, the Council approved the concept of crisis management for the 
operation envisaged in Chad and the CAR, and also released the Military Strategic Option 
(MSO).
725
 Five days later, on 17 September, the High Representative (SG/HR) of the CFSP, 
Javier Solana, reported to the Secretary General of the UN that the EU was willing to take 
charge of the military component of the operation during the first 12 months.
 726
 In his letter, 
HR Solana urged the Security Council to “adopt an urgent resolution providing a mandate 
adapted for the European force and authorising the deployment of elements of the European 




As a consequence, UNSC Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 approved the 
establishment of a UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and 
authorised the EU to deploy military forces under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which allows the use of force if necessary, even taking “all necessary measures” to 
fulfil its functions.
728
 The EU was mandated to deploy EU-led forces in eastern Chad and the 
north-eastern CAR for a period of 12 months from the declaration of initial operating 
capability.
729
 In accordance with the mandate set out in UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006), 1769 
(2007) and 1778 (2007), the EU reaffirmed its commitment to conduct a military bridging 
operation in Chad and CAR, named EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The Council unanimously adopted 
Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, on 15 October 2007. The objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
were the following: 
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- to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and 
displaced persons; 
- to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of 
humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; 
and 
- to contribute to protecting United Nations personnel and activities. 
Under the mandate provided by UNSC Resolution 1778 and Council Joint Action 
2007/677/CFSP, the EU launched its military bridging operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The 
EUFOR mission deployed the forces in support of humanitarian and police action for 
MINURCAT from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009. Although the operation was initially 
planned to begin in mid-January 2008, due to the heightened level of instability and insecure 
conditions in Chad culminating in an anti-government rebel attack, the deployment of EU 
forces had to be suspended.
730
 Consequently, after the postponement of the deployment, the 
EU-led military operation was officially declared operational on 15 March 2008, and the 
operation continued for a period of 12 months until the UN took over from EUFOR on 15 
March 2009.    
Despite a highly suspicious political atmosphere among member states, the force generation 
phase was finally completed in January 2008. Fourteen members expressed commitment to 
providing forces on the ground and twenty-two member states contributed personnel to OHQ 
in Mont Valérien. The fourteen member states contributing to the forces on the ground were 
the following:
731
 Austria (160), Belgium (70), Finland (40), France (2100), Greece (4), 
Ireland (400), Italy (97), the Netherlands (60), Poland (400), Portugal (30), Romania (120), 
Slovenia (15), Spain (80) and Sweden (200). Four other member states, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg and the UK were only represented at the Force Headquarters (see 
Table 7.1). Germany stationed four personnel only at the Operation Headquarters in Europe. 
The fact that neither Germany nor the UK engaged with troops critically exhibits a limited 
operational consensus among the major powers (Big-four) on the EUFOR mission, despite 
the unanimous adoption and implementation of the Joint Action.  
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As Figure 7.2 displays, the biggest troop contributor was France (2,100 out of 3,700 troops). 
In addition to a number of troops, France supplied high-tech facilities and equipment: two 
unmanned aerial vehicles, nine helicopters, etc. Poland provided 350- to 400-strong forces 
composed of various units, including infantry, engineering, support, an intelligence unit, as 
well as two multirole helicopters. Poland also provided the Deputy Operation Commander. 
The third major contributor was Ireland, with 400 soldiers. Ireland also provided the 
Operation Commander, Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash. 
 
Table 7. 1 Contribution of the EU Member States to EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
    
Country Troops contributing Represented at FHQ Represented at OHQ 
Austria 160 13 4 
Belgium 70 4 6 
Bulgaria - 1 1 
Cyprus - - 2 
Czech Republic - 1 1 
Denmark - - - 
Estonia - - - 
Finland 40 2 2 
France 2100 114 69 
Germany - - 4 
Greece 4 2 2 
Hungary - - 3 
Ireland 400 10 18 
Italy 97 2 4 
Latvia - - - 
Lithuania - - 2 
Luxembourg - 2 - 
Malta - - - 
Netherlands 60 5 3 
Poland 400 5 4 
Portugal 30 - 2 










In light of the role of chief negotiators, the positions of the Big-4 on EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
were remarkably split in comparison to any other issues on ESDP operations. While France 
displayed a dominant role in every stage of negotiations in Brussels, both the UK and 
Germany were strongly suspicious of the deployment of EUFOR during negotiations, which 
Slovakia - - 1 
Slovenia 15 1 1 
Spain 80 3 3 
Sweden 200 5 4 
United Kingdom - 2 2 




resulted in no contribution of any forces. Italy supported the initial entry forces, consisting of 
Austrian, French, Belgian, Irish and Swedish troops, by providing and running an Italian 
field hospital, “Role 2”,
732
 which was expected to demonstrate the “European identity of 
EUFOR”.
733
 However, the Italian role as chief negotiator was not found during political 
dialogues. 
According to one British diplomat, Britain’s low profile on this EUFOR operation was 
related to “the nature of British foreign policy”.
734
 It was claimed that having carefully 
considered the trade-off between success and failure of the mission, the UK was aware that it 
might damage itself by approving a French-led EU military operation, which seemed likely 
to fail or be extremely difficult to achieve success.
 735
 Within the EU, the UK is obviously 
not a small country that would provide few troops. Instead, the UK would have been more 
likely to make a significant contribution had it committed itself, which means that the nation 
could be more seriously damaged and suffer losses as well. At the time, EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
was the third and biggest EU military operation which demanded a tremendous financial as 
well as personnel contribution in addition to various resources such as vehicles, helicopters, 
medical facilities and many infrastructures. As Britain was neither very keen on the situation 
in Françafrique Chad and the CAR, nor found any necessary reason to get involved in this 
challenging mission, the UK wanted to keep a low profile on this operation.  
Like the UK, Germany was also very reluctant to support the deployment of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA. Germany held the EU presidency at the time when negotiations were ongoing 
in both Brussels and New York. Yet Germany tried to keep the issue off the agenda in favour 
of other priorities, such as the “final settlement of the constitutional debate”.
736
 As discussed 
earlier in the previous case chapter, Germany developed a bilateral relationship with France 
on a wide range of policy areas, namely Franco-German cooperation (known as the Elysée 
Treaty). Novosseloff stresses that “Franco-German issues are widely seen as the engine of 
European integration and a key partnership when it comes to particular foreign and security 
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policy within the EU framework.”
737
 Also, according to one German military advisor, 
“humanitarian intervention to protect civilians against violence is one of the top priorities for 
German security foreign policy.”
738
 Despite such commitments by Germany to share 
significant responsibility in promoting effective humanitarian and multilateral peace 
operations along with France, however, Germany remained very sceptical of the operation. A 
global intelligence STRATFOR report criticised that Germany believed that EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA would be nothing but a “product of French self-aggrandizement [sic]”.
739
 
Germany was thus not happy to accept the ‘pet project’ in support of French interest.  
In terms of the role of the High Representative, Kuehne claims that Solana made efforts to 
dispel the suspicion among member states.
740
 However, Javier Solana played a merely minor 
and limited role as a facilitator, rather than as an influential decision-maker, at EU-level 
negotiations.  
In sum, the case analysis confirms that France was the chief negotiator. The identification of 
the most important chief negotiator would provide a key answer to the main research 
question about ‘under what conditions do EU Member States lead peacekeeping operations?’ 
Mattelaer quotes a passage from his interview that the operation was launched for many 
different reasons of varying importance [for France], but “there is no single dominant 
motivation”.
741
 Various experts and authors suggest that the interpretation of the French 
incentives that pushed UN-EU multidimensional cooperation in Chad and the CAR can be 
diverse.
742
 In the next two sections, important conditions under which France seemed likely 
to provide its active leadership which increased the likelihood of the EU’s decision to launch 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA are further examined. Hypothetical propositions drawn from realist 
theories vs. constructivist theories are tested. The goal of this chapter is to determine which 
of these diverse motivations were most important.   
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7.3 Realist hypothesis 
 
The African continent has recently faced the re-emergence of great powers whose primary 
concerns largely focus on regional security in Africa based on various strategic interests. 
From a realist perspective, states want to develop military power and the capability to 
influence the international arena whenever they can.
743
 Realists would argue that EU member 
states seek to expand their military influence beyond their borders regardless of whether 
there is a threat to Europe. For realists, European security and defence policy is seen as a 
product of a series of processes through which individual member states transfer their power 
and authority to the European Union; by doing so, member states believe that they can 
maximise and achieve greater influence on the international stage than doing it alone. 
According to a realist argument, the development of the ESDP significantly reflects such 
strategic interests of member states. Accordingly, strong interests of some individual 
member states are often likely to be transferred to the EU’s ESDP interest.
744
 
This realist assumption is similarly found in Olsen’s article which depicts that the identity of 
the EU is closely related to European interests driven by those of powerful member states.
745
 
More specifically, Olsen argues that the development of the EU’s military conflict 
management policy, particularly towards Africa, has first and foremost been motivated by 
two sets of interests: European common interests in general, and the French national interests 
in particular. Olsen’s realist approach can be further strengthened by Howorth’s claim, 
which was discussed in the previous case chapter. According to Howorth, France tends to 
conceive of the national and the European dimensions as nearly identical. French foreign 
policy has pursued a fundamental preference for a stronger EU profile in terms of 
‘Europeanisation’ as a means of bringing French national power to the region.
746
  
The foreign security and defence policy of France towards Africa has considerably changed 
since 2007, when Sarkozy’s new government was formed. In comparison with the extent of 
foreign security and defence policy projected reforms in the previous governments of five 
successive presidents, from 1958 up to 2007 - de Gaulle (1958-1969), Pompidou (1969-
1974), Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), Mitterrand (1981-1995) and Chirac (1995-2007) - 
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there is indeed a great potential for change in Sarkozy’s administration.
747
 Over the past half 
century, the world changed and accordingly the position of France in the world also changed. 
According to Mesfin, France found its position drastically weakened, in fact “becoming one 
medium-size power among many others”.
748
 In such a dramatic depreciation of the French 
position in the world, French policymakers might want to come up with a new way of 
recovering its reputation and place dans le monde. Sarkozy’s authorities first proclaimed that 
they would establish a ‘strong French-led Europe’ and maintain an inherently prestigious 
power towards Africa.
749
 In addition, the new government declared that they would replace 
Françafrique with Eurafrique, which implies Europeanisation of actions that France has 
undertaken in Africa.
750
 In parallel with this new agenda, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was put on 
the table for the first test of French capability. 
In light of the relationship with Chad, France had developed a defence agreement with the 
country after its independence in 1960. In 1986, France and Chad agreed a permanent 
bilateral military presence, namely Operation Epervier, through which France reflected its 
“vested interest” in Chad’s stability.
751
 Since the nominal independence of Chad in 1960, 
France has always kept a sizeable military presence in the country and accommodated 
whoever was in power, such as Malloum, Goukouni, Habré and Déby, in order to maintain 
French influence in Chad. Yet, France’s exclusive influence on the Chadian government 
began to falter when crude oil became the county’s primary source of revenue. Chad’s oil 
production brought an influx of non-European external powers to the country. Washington is 
very much present, and more recently China appeared in Chad and signed several contracts 
in the oil, mining and energy sectors, followed by oil companies such as Esso and Chevron, 
which are the main exploiters of Chadian oil on the basis of concessions granted to them by 
Déby.
752
 As a consequence, the exclusive and absolute power of France over its old ally 
Chad declined in the political, cultural and economic arenas.  
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Hence, from a realist point of view, it was deemed important for France to recover its 
prestige and influential position in Chad for political, strategic and economic reasons. 
Despite difficult circumstances posed by escalating rebel threats, demand for enormous 
financial as well as personnel contributions to crisis management, and the suspicious glance 
of other member states within the EU, France strived to deploy a French-led EUFOR to 
Chad and CAR. France stressed that it needed to fill a power vacuum in arid Africa.
753
 In this 
respect, one eminent analyst noted that “[…] among various opinions about French 
motivation to deploy a EU mission to Chad, it was primarily due to the French political 
interests in the region to re-establish its great power in Africa by helping the fragile and 
insecure political system of their friend, President Déby”.
754
  
The British low profile on the military intervention in Chad and CAR serves as important 
evidence of French political interests in terms of power projection. Olsen argues that the UK 
and France have created a division of foreign policy in Africa; Britain would be passive 
when French interests were at stake and vice versa when British interests were at stake.
755
 In 
this respect, one British diplomat suggested that “[…] in this specific case [of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA], we might have a different and difficult position from that of France. I think the 
UK understands that France may have particular interest in Francophone Africa, and the UK 
may have particular interest in Anglophone Africa.”
 756
 The British official highlighted again 
that “[…] perhaps in rational terms, France is more likely to have interests in Francophone 
Africa than Anglophone Africa to sustain its great power.”
757
 This claim seems to coincide 
exactly with the realist assumptions that given the anarchic international system, powerful 
states are forced to safeguard their own security protection and exert all their national power 
and interests as much as possible.
758
  
In light of French foreign policy and political interests in recovering its strong reputation as a 
great power on the international stage and sustaining its influence towards Francophone 
Africa, the realist approach enables this case study to account for the important motive of 
France to launch a French-led EU military intervention in Chad and CAR. Given a 
depreciation of the French position, as well as the emergence of new external powers in 
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Chad, France would not want to relinquish its exclusive interests and power in those 
Françafrique countries. These conditions seem to ultimately lead to a legitimate military 
involvement of France under the EU flag. In sum, the analysis of this case study confirms 
that political interests were an important condition of France to play a leading role to launch 
the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation.  
As part of the realist propositions, the case study also examines to what extent economic 
interests seemed to be concerned with the likelihood of the French dynamic leadership which 
led to the EU’s collaboration with the UN in a peacekeeping operation in Chad and the CAR. 
As discussed earlier in the previous chapters, concerns about Europe’s energy dependence 
have significantly increased over the last few years, for which the EU calls for the solidarity 
of all member states to support the security strategy through engagement with countries, 
particularly where oil reserves have been discovered, such as Central Asia, the Caucasus and 
sub-Saharan Africa.
759
 Given this situation, the international community has paid more 
attention to Chad as a possible safeguard for the flow of energy resources since it became an 
oil producer. Chad has primarily had an agricultural economy with a small industrial sector, 
of which major products are farming and livestock dominated by cotton.
760
 Recently, 
however, the Chadian economy continues to be boosted by major oilfield and pipeline 
projects. Oil production was non-existent in landlocked Chad prior to 2003, but with the 
completion of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline in July 2003, the country began producing oil. 
As Figure 7.3 illustrates, as of 2008, among the sub-Saharan African proven oil reserve 
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Figure 7. 3 Oil production in assessed sub-Saharan African countries (2008) 
  Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2008 
 
 
As of 2009, Chad ranks forty-ninth in the world in terms of total oil exports and has 
approximately 1.5 billion barrels in oil reserves.
761
 Nevertheless, it must be noted that only 
Chad is classified as a new producer at this production cycle in Africa, while other countries 
like Gabon and Cameroon are classified as ‘declining producers’ by the IEA.
762
 Since the 
exploitation of crude oil started, Chad’s production levels have climbed steadily (see Figure 
7.4), and its oil revenues enabled the government to deal with economic, political and social 
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crises. In other words, Chad is becoming more important and has potential for Europe, in 
particular for the oil market and energy security.
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However, as seen in Figure 7.4, the case study found an intriguing fact that the levels of 
Chad’s oil production started declining steadily since its peak in production in 2005. What 
happened, particularly between 2005 and 2006, to let oil production drop? As discussed 
before, Chad faced crises and suffered from an outbreak of riots and public disorder owing to 
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the war in Darfur, followed by massive flows of refugees from Sudan, and rebel movement 
and militias’ attacks on the Chadian government. Chad became significantly weakened, 
despite international efforts to bring peace and security back to the regions, such as the 
AMIS and UNAMID missions from 2004 to 2007. Such peacekeeping involvements were 
ineffective and insufficient to stop the conflicts and violence in the region. This brief 
analysis may help explain why oil production started to deteriorate in parallel with conflicts 
getting serious in 2005. According to Masfin, the deployment of EU Forces in Chad was 
driven by a French economic interest to ensure the stability of “oil-rich Chad”.
765
 The 
evidence shows an important clue for a realist argument: the decline of oil production should 
be a relevant motive for France to get involved in crisis management in the country, because 
France would want oil production to get back up to higher levels.      
Realists would argue that the launch of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is associated with French 
strategic and economic interests, which aimed at securing the Chadian oil market and 
resources. The abundance in natural resources and the economic potential of Chad are 
certainly of interest to France. Interestingly, in spite of Sarkozy’s public pledge to reduce the 
number of French troops and to close bases,
766
 France currently maintains military bases in 
Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo and Chad, which are all oil-rich countries in 
Africa (see Figure 7.5). Put differently, French military engagement in African countries 
suggests that French national interests lie in amplifying its influence and eventually 
becoming a main beneficiary of natural resources and trade in the region.  
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Besides French interests in Chadian natural resources, the significant question of who would 
be the main beneficiary of the operation per se was also raised. Mattelaer points out that 
Chadian infrastructure, such as airports, roads and camps, were essential for a robust military 
operation and would be renovated with EU funds.
768
 What became controversial on this 
question was that the EU would not remain engaged long-term, even though some individual 
member states would remain on the ground with MINURCAT after the EUFOR mandate 
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 Then France would unquestionably be the greatest beneficiary of the operation as 
well as an EU investment in the end. Consequently, questions of whether EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA would be able to wipe out doubts about the EU “being used as pawns in political 
and economic interests of France” and to demonstrate its “neutrality vis-à-vis the French 
dominant troops presence on the ground” became a major focus.
770
   
With regard to troop disposition, EUFOR Tchad/RCA consisted of three operational zones - 
north, centre and south - with a battalion in charge of each (see Figure 7.1).
771
 The major aim 
of the northern zone (zone I) mission was to secure the region in preparation for the 
deployment of the UN police mission, MINURCAT, and to guarantee a EUFOR presence for 
security operations, under the responsibility of a 400-strong Polish battalion. French 
engineers and private companies established the Polish base in this area, and the bulk of the 
refugees were essentially concentrated in the northern zone. The central zone (zone II) laid 
around Abéché, home of the FHQ, and extended as far as the area around Forchana near the 
Sudanese border. Part of the supplies for the central zone, oil in particular, were supplied by 
private Cameroonian and Chadian companies. This central zone was under the responsibility 
of a French battalion. The southern zone (zone III), on the other hand, was located around 
Dar Sila in south-eastern Chad under the responsibility of an Irish battalion reinforced with 
troops from the French and other contingents, in particular from Sweden, Finland and a 
small Dutch detachment. The aim of the southern zone mission was to guarantee a robust 
security presence in order to create a climate of stability in which displaced people would 
feel safe enough to start returning to their homes.  
France deployed its troops in central (zone II) and southern Chad (zone III) and the north-
east of the Central African Republic (zone IV). However, French troops were absent from 
the northern zone (zone I). As mentioned above, the northern region was logistically 
important for both EU and UN operations, because the war germinated in the north, and the 
security conditions of the northern area had been too vulnerable and weak to forestall 
rebellion.
772
 Despite heavy demand for security tasks in the northern zone, why did France 
decide not to place its troops in this particular operation zone? Would there be a clue, among 
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various possibilities, that helps to unfold a plausible correlation between the French 
economic and strategic interests and its decision to allocate its troops in particular zones on 
that account?  
Interestingly, a large deposit of heavy crude oil has been discovered in the vast area around 
the southern Doba region, the eastern Lake Chad region and part of the central regions of the 
country (see Figure 7.6). The central zone (zone II) is also potentially important in terms of 
oil supplies, because Sudan’s main oil reserves are concentrated in the southern area close to 
the border with the east-central part of Chad. Yet, in the northern zone, neither crude oil nor 
other natural resources have been exploited. One could possibly argue that oil and natural 
resources are not the cause for French military stations being located in central and southern 
zones, and those two zones just happen to have crude oil. From a realist perspective, 
however, the answer to that question seems to be clear. France might have no appetite for 
deploying its troops in the northern zone because there have been no petroleum basins 
discovered in that area. Consequently, in the absence of French interests to put its battalion 
in the northern area, the UN MINURCAT civilian police and Polish troops took 









































Sources: The map design unit of the World Bank (IBRD 31455, 2001) 
 
 
According to Falkinger, member states which took an essential part in the military operation 
in Chad primarily sought to control the country’s natural resources rather than be dedicated 
to humanitarian action.
773
 Falkinger posits that a large portion of oil reserves in Chad has 
been acting as a “magnet for the greed of the various new imperialist powers” and France 
was no exception to this approach.
774
 In this context, Mesfin criticises France’s “altruistic 
endeavours” in the EU military operation as only destined to cover up its prolonged desire to 
maximise its interests – “securing oilfields in Chad”.
775  
The vast mineral resources and oil reserves certainly offer an excellent potential for 
economic development and a trade market in Africa, which makes Africa a front-ranking 
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trade partner of France.
 776
 This study suggests that the analysis of the direction of Chad’s 
trade over the last ten years is worth paying attention to.
777
 Appendix III-4 shows the flows 
of imports and exports between Chad and each of EU members from 2001 to 2009. 
According to the data, only a few EU countries achieved the notable benefits in trade 
relations with Chad particularly after EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2007. Those members that did 
achieve considerable economic benefits from the operation include Ireland, Belgium, 
Sweden and France, who contributed a significant amount of military forces and took charge 
of important responsibilities for the military operation in Chad/CAR. Among the EU 
member states, France accounted for the largest jump. Figure 7.7 shows that France achieved 
a dramatic increase in its own economic gains from both imports and exports in trading with 
Chad.  
The data also illustrates an interesting finding. Whereas Ireland, the second largest troop-
contributing country following France, also achieved considerable economic benefits in both 
imports and exports from the trade relations with Chad, the UK and Germany, which initially 
held no interest in the operation, saw a negative impact on their trade relations with Chad. 
Italy, which had provided medical troops in the field, has received economic benefits from 
the trade relations with Chad, particularly in its exports to Chad, after the operation. Figure 
7.8 shows that the flows of Chadian exports to Germany and the UK, which must be mostly 
composed of mineral resources and crude oil, started to dramatically decline since 2007. On 
the other hand, the figure clearly indicates that Ireland’s trade relations with Chad in imports 
and exports grew stronger since 2007.  
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Figure 7. 8 Comparisons of Chadian Trade with Germany and UK vs.  Ireland 
Chadian Exports to Germany and the UK 
 





In sum, the case analysis of this study suggests that economic interests based on securing 
abundant natural resources could possibly be of an important condition which may increase 
the likelihood of the chief negotiator’s active leadership to influence the launch of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, it must not be overlooked that 
the realist proposition on the relations between the economic interests and the active 
leadership of chief negotiator in undertaking peacekeeping missions could fall into a logical 
fallacy, i.e. the post hoc ergo propter hoc error. Put differently, it is difficult to state that 
since peacekeeping engagements are followed by economic benefits, peacekeeping must 
have been caused by economic interests. Although one cannot determine the causality of 
economic interests as an important variable to influence the chief negotiator’s decision on its 
active leadership in peacekeeping, the empirical evidence proposes that there exist at least 














Hence, the study confirms that the realist hypothesis that political and strategic interests of 
the chief negotiator would increase the likelihood of the leadership to lead the EU’s decision 
to engage in a peacekeeping operation is accepted.   
 
 




“Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. 
Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this.” 
(Council of the European Union, 2005) 
 
 
According to a constructivist assumption, the colonial legacies of European states would 
inform a socially Europeanised identity of the EU, which encourages EU actors to feel 
normative responsibility towards African peacekeeping. Constructivists would argue that 
France’s former colonial history would eventually generate a normative responsibility of the 
EU to support humanitarian intervention in those African countries. For constructivists, 
therefore, the European military intervention in Chad and CAR is deemed a case of norms-
driven humanitarian crisis management based on the special historical relationship between 
France and Chad, i.e. a colonial legacy. 
One UN peacekeeping official made remarks about European peacekeeping operations in 
Africa, saying that “[…] we find that most African countries in conflict are ex-colonies of 
European nations. And European nations have maintained some kind of feeling and 
responsibility based on their former colonial relationship, even if it’s no longer master-
servant relationship. So for them [Europeans], it is their duty to protect and support their ex-
colonies’ peace and security.”
778
 In the same context, one French national official stressed 
that France has endeavoured to build a ‘friendship’ with countries which France had ruled 
over as a colonial power.
 779
 The French official also suggested that the “French approach to 
African military intervention should not be linked to the post-colonial interests. Instead, as a 
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‘former friend’ or ‘ancient friend’, if those countries are facing conflicts or cannot manage to 
be okay, France has responsibility to have them recover their sovereignty.”
780
 
In this regard, Novosseloff stressed that one of the most important factors that enabled the 
EU military operation in Chad/CAR was a ‘humanitarian aspect’ rather than colonial 
interests on the basis of realism.
781
 Because, “if France had any intention to take advantage 
of its former colonial power from the military operation, the countries would not open their 
door to France any more.”
782
 In fact, the French official argued that, “there always have been 
efforts of France to bring education, development, laws and institutions to protect 
humanitarian safety of African countries, which must be considered as normative 
purpose.”
783
 France tends to perceive its former colonies as ‘her traditional friends’.
784
 The 
humanitarian approach towards Africa seems to be particularly highlighted under Sarkozy’s 
government. As a new generation of French decision-makers that emerged recently, France’s 
African foreign policy has changed. Sarkozy’s administration has emphasised the central 
leadership role of France in EU-African relations, referring to its responsibility and 
‘humanitarian’ intention to make the African situation more stable and secure.
785
 President 




The constructivist proposition, that the presence of a colonial legacy of chief negotiator 
would increase the likelihood of its leadership to lead an EU decision to engage in a 
peacekeeping operation, at first glance seems plausible to explain the major motive for 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA. However, the case analysis suggests that the normative argument 
cannot fully exhibit the important role or influential impact of a colonial legacy to bring the 
common consent of EU members to the collective European identity and/or humanitarian 
responsibility for the operation. Colonial legacy was certainly an important condition for 
France to launch the operation, but it failed to generate a collective Europeanised colonial 
responsibility, and remained limited to spur only French motivation. Hence, the 
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constructivist proposition about the colonial legacy is partially accepted in the case of 
French-led EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Yet, the study suggests that it needs to be underlined that if 
colonial ties had been created by ‘strong European powers’, the likelihood of an EU decision 
to engage in a peacekeeping operation will certainly increase. And, of course, the more 
peaceful and sound the colonial relationship established, the more an EU-led military 
peacekeeping engagement is likely to be.    
From a normative institutionalist perspective, the study now investigates evidence of 
normative pressures to determine whether, and if so to what extent, normative conditions 
were important factors in decision-making on EUFOR Tchad/RCA. France has recently 
reviewed a list of its defence agreements with countries that used to be former French 
colonies. According to a French national diplomat, “France is willing to continue to help its 
former ‘friends’ in various forms and means” which
 
includes, for instance, defence contracts, 
defence treaties and defence agreements bilaterally signed between France and its former 
colonies in Africa.
787
 For France, a defence agreement seems to be more than cooperation 
per se with its former friends, because it enables France to help them build justice, maintain 
a secure border, and protect civilians by intervening legitimately with military means.
788
 
France has developed a very special relationship with Chad and the CAR in various spheres -
historic, linguistic and military - since decolonisation.
789
 The expression of France’s 
commitment to the maintenance of peace in Chad and the CAR originally stemmed from the 
defence agreement signed in 1960. Since its independence from France in the 1960s, Chad, 
like most other former French colonies, signed various military assistance agreements with 
France. Alongside recognising the independence and sovereignty of Congo, Chad and the 
CAR, France agreed to organise a joint system with these three countries for the purpose of 
ensuring their security and defence. The Defence Agreement came into force on 13 March 
1961. 
790
 According to Article 6 of Annex I,  
Each of contracting parties shall take, in so far as concerns it, the measures required by 
the armed forces mission for joint defence and in particular those relating to the 
requisitioning of persons and goods and to the protecting and security of personnel, 
installations and equipment.  
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The Defence agreement allowed France to keep military bases in the territory as well as to 
have rights to transit and over-flight. In return, France guaranteed external territorial security 
to its colonies and would consider all requests for assistance in the face of insurgencies and 
coup attempts. Additionally, France provided equipment, training and advice to the Chadian 
armed forces. Under the provisions of the bilateral defence agreement between France and 
Chad, French military involvement in Chad became binding in the mid-1970s and permanent 
in 1986 when Opération Epervier was launched in view of Libyan expansionism.
791
 Since 
then, France has stationed at least 3,000 troops in Chad to contribute to stabilising the 
country. Realists would claim that France has stationed sizable troops in Chad in order to 
“buttress the pro-French government”
792
 or to “keep an embattled regime in power” under 
President Idriss Déby.
793
 The French government insists, however, that decisions 
surrounding operation EUFOR in Chad and the CAR were largely determined by the norm-




At the Franco-African Summit in La Baule in 1990, President Mitterrand sought to publicly 
realign French policy towards Africa.
795
 President Mitterrand stressed rewarding African 
democratisation efforts, and France committed itself to expand its presence in Chad in order 
to increase stability, assist the local population, and support the Chadian national armed 
forces by providing training and material assistance to its various services and participating 
in the various peacekeeping operations.
796
 France reiterated its humanitarian responsibility in 
maintaining peace and security in Chad under the new government. In the spring of 2007 
Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidential election and he appointed Bernard Kouchner as 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in the past had frequently voiced grave concern about 
the regional crisis around Darfur.
797
 President Sarkozy and Kouchner made the Chad/Darfur 
crisis a top French foreign policy priority and began to convince unwilling EU member 
states to participate in the Chad/Darfur crisis.  
In light of Sarkozy’s enhanced foreign policy towards Africa, particularly in the case of 
Chad/Darfur, constructivists would argue that France has undoubtedly played an important 
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role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who fulfils its commitment and responsibility in accordance 
with the European identity as a normative power.
798
 Besides the French commitment to 
maintaining humanitarian stability and security in Africa in general, one French official 
argues that bilateral agreements which have been developed between France and Chad 
became ‘une des principales raisons’ that pushed France to intervene in the situation, by 
stressing that “we [French people] respect our commitment and keep our words.”
799
 The 
French official also highlighted that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was eventually being guided by a 
French normative commitment, because “that’s how we [France] work in international 
affairs.”
800
 The analysis of this case study considers that this may reflect important evidence 
of France’s normative entrapment, which constrained it to act in compliance with what it had 
pledged. As a result, France was actively involved in the Chadian situation, helping the 
Chadian Government to repel the rebel attacks, and protect IDPs. Hence, a series of bilateral 
agreements between France and Chad as well as normative commitments of France bred 
normative entrapment, which led France to act in accordance with its commitments.     
Of course France could have intervened individually in the precarious security climate of 
Chad and CAR, as it signed a bilateral military defence agreement which allowed it to 
manage conflicts in the region. However, France wanted to carry out its military intervention 
with consolidated support from other member states within a multilateral framework.
801
 
French Defence Minister Herve Morin suggests that “the UN declaration calling on all 
countries to support the [Chadian] government had not changed the terms of engagement”.
802
 
As discussed earlier in the previous theory chapter, normative entrapment is often facilitated 
by public attention to the issue (publicity), prior policy commitments (precedent), and by a 
site of negotiation and deliberation in which EU norms are salient (forum).
803
 Accordingly, 
once France had publicly announced its strong willingness to intervene in the Chadian crisis 
situation on the basis of multilateral consent for normative and humanitarian purposes, it 
would have been difficult for France to adopt a ‘no action’ position or a solely French 
intervention. Thus, the role of French leadership seemed to be influenced to a great extent by 
normative commitment and entrapment.  
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 Another reason why France emphasised multilateral involvement authorised by a UN resolution is 
because French fighter jets and reconnaissance planes had to fly over the border with Sudan. So, 
the operation inevitably required the multilateral support of countries mandated by a UNSC 
resolution. 
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In light of normative suasion, if any evidence shows France’s efforts to try to get other 
members to change their position and thereby to obtain European unanimous consent based 
on normative context, a constructivist argument would be stronger. One EU official 
suggested that the important motives of major EU troop contributors can be found in each of 
the national foreign policy preferences.
804
   
Ireland pledged to contribute the second largest forces with 400-strong soldiers, following 
France. Initially, Ireland had taken a very reserved attitude to EU military engagement in 
Chad and the CAR, raising a critical question regarding the neutrality of EU forces.
805
 
However, Ireland changed its sceptical position and decided to provide a number of military 
forces to the EUFOR operation. The Irish commander of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Lt. General 
Patrick Nash, insisted that the EU troops under his command would be “strictly neutral”, and 
he explained the motive for Ireland’s military participation as being based on the 
humanitarian aspect and security of the region.
806
 The real essence moulding the Irish 
motivation, however, seems to be revealed when a non-normative approach is applied to the 
interpretation. One EU official provided a realistic insight that the Irish troop contribution 
and military participation in the EUFOR operation must be seen as “an opportunity to restore 
its damaged reputation after [Irish] rejection of the Lisbon Treaty”.
807
 The official dropped a 
hint that “of course, France should know what each of the major TCCs considered and 
wanted first and most.”
 808
 According to evidence from the interview, France seemed more 
likely to use a non-normative argument when it had to hold bilateral dialogues with Ireland 
regarding the EUFOR deployment. France rather focused on what the Irish government was 
significantly concerned about, such as “the fear that a more ambitious ESDP contradicts the 
Irish neutrality”.
809
 Vis-à-vis the concerns of the Irish Prime Minister after the Irish ‘no’ to 
the Lisbon Treaty and the uncertainty about the ESDP military operation, President Sarkozy 
showed a ‘proactive role’ in his continuous consultations with Ireland to help the latter find a 
way to resolve such a difficult situation.
810
 In the end, the non-normative dialogue was 
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successful in leading to Irish military engagement with a significant number of military 
contributions to the EUFOR.  
For Poland, which sent the third largest contingent with 400 soldiers, African foreign policy 
and security matters have occupied a low profile in its national foreign affairs. Berg suggests 
that many of the eastern European states which had newly gained EU membership had 
“traditionally pursued no Africa policy of their own”.
811
 Like many of the other eastern 
European countries, Poland displayed little interest in the normative discussion per se on the 
issue of the EU military operation in Chad and CAR. Instead, the real motivation of Poland 
to pledge to take military responsibility and actively engage in EUFOR Tchad/RCA seemed 
to be closely linked to its national strategy and foreign policy towards the EU. Poland 
viewed the EUFOR operation “as a good opportunity to establish itself as a serious player 
willing to shoulder EU responsibilities” within the EU framework.
812
 Hence, there was no 
direct evidence of France using normative argument to get Poland to participate.  
Sweden was the fourth largest troop contributor providing 200 soldiers for the EUFOR. 
Sweden’s interest in EUFOR Tchad/RCA seemed to grow in parallel with the emergence of 
the Nordic Battle Group which was to achieve operational readiness at the beginning of 
2008.
813
 Like many other members of the EU, Sweden also faced a great domestic 
controversy when it had to decide to participate in the operation. According to an analyst on 
UN-EU peacekeeping operations, when the EU, particularly France, was struggling to obtain 
the necessary troop commitments from member states, “one suggestion came from France 
that the bulk of the force could be possibly made from the 2400-strong Nordic battle 
group.”
814
 One EU official suggested that as military engagement remained an unpopular 
theme in Swedish domestic politics, France seemed to find a way of justifying Swedish 
military engagement by referring to “the opportunity to test the Nordic Battle Group”.
815
 
Moreover, as the Swedish government had announced its intention to have “a fundamental 
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debate on EU Battle Group a theme of its EU Presidency (2009)”,
816
 President Sarkozy 
insisted that Sweden shall take a leading role in ESDP operations.
817
 In sum, the case 
analysis confirms that there is little evidence of France using normative arguments during its 
consultation with the Swedish government on the EUFOR operation.  
Austria announced its decision to contribute 160 military personnel which amounted to the 
fifth largest EUFOR contingent. As a member of the EU and of the UN Security Council for 
the upcoming period 2009-2010, Austria found its important position and responsibility as a 
global actor.
 818
 According to the foreign policy strategy of Austria, the Austrian government 
stressed the “increasing geostrategic importance of Africa” and was committed to “maintain 
and further develop the multifarious cooperation” in what concerned sub-Saharan Africa.
819
 
Furthermore, Austria confirmed its readiness to “actively promote peace, security, stability, 
democracy and human rights”, as a future Security Council member.
820
 On the issue of 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Austria seemed to understand the operation as a humanitarian 
engagement, underlining “the particular importance of the protection of the civilians in 
armed conflicts for Austria’s foreign policy”.
821
 Hence, Austria’s decision to engage in the 
military operation in Chad and CAR seemed to be largely driven by its own normative 
purpose to fulfil its responsibility and commitment in compliance with its national foreign 
policy, being aware of its important future position in the Security Council.  
The major motive of European TCCs for military intervention in Chad and the CAR varied 
depending on each domestic national foreign policy. Nonetheless, Berg argues that what the 
EU member states had in common on the issue of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was that they 
considered national interests foremost and to a much lesser extent European interests.
 822
 The 
evidence of this case study shows that many of the motivations of troop contributors did not 
coincide with the normative discourse that the EU usually presents to the world, and some of 
them had nothing to do with the conflict in the Sudanese/Chadian border regions or 
humanitarian intervention. The analysis confirms that normative commitment and normative 
entrapment certainly played a crucial role in triggering the important role of France in 
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shaping the European military action in Chad and CAR. The evidence of normative suasion 
of France, however, was hardly found during the bargaining and negotiations process. The 
findings of this case study claim that France and most of EU member states seemed more 
likely to focus on non-normative arguments depending on their national foreign policy 
priorities; this claim would weaken the constructivist hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis 
that normative conditions would increase the likelihood of the chief negotiator’s leadership 
to head an EU decision to engage in a peacekeeping operation is determined partially 






Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA became an important test case of the credibility of the EU as 
a promising peacekeeping partner of the UN for various reasons. First, it was the most 
ambitious operation in terms of the number of troops deployed, 3700 strong without recourse 
to NATO assets. Second, it provided an important opportunity for the EU to prove its 
capability to manage an autonomous military operation in a particularly hostile and highly 
unstable environment in African countries alongside the UN. Third, it was also essential for 
the EU to pursue the operation in light of enhancing European diplomatic capability and 
external power, because non-EU countries, including Russia, Albania, Norway, Ukraine, 
Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, expressed their wishes to 
participate in the EUFOR mission. This was the first time Russia had taken part in an EU 
military operation.
823
 Finally, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a challenge for the EU to 
demonstrate its neutrality vis-à-vis French national interests in the region. 
This chapter identified France as a chief negotiator who played the most prominent role in 
negotiations and decision-making at both the UNSC and the EU. The UK and Germany 
expressed a level of suspicion and reluctance regarding European military deployment to 
Chad and CAR, while Italy played a very limited operational role on the ground. The High 
Representative Solana demonstrated his essential tasks at both levels, but the role of the HR 
remained minor and limited to facilitating simultaneous interactions between the UN and the 
EU.  
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The interpretations for the major driving force behind the EU decision to deploy the EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA were controversial. The realist approach argued that French political interests in 
maintaining and extending its dominant power in the countries were an important condition 
which increased the likelihood of the French leadership to influence an EU decision to 
engage in the peacekeeping operation. The evidence from the case analysis also revealed that 
the French-led deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was followed by the noticeable economic 
benefits of France in the peacekeeping areas based on potential trade as well as Chadian oil 
reserves. Thus, the realist hypothesis that political and strategic interests would increase the 
likelihood of the chief negotiator’s leadership to lead the EU deciding to engage with the UN 
in a peacekeeping operation is determined true in this specific case.  
The constructivist hypothesis highlighted the importance of normative conditions. The 
constructivist hypothesis argued that a historical relationship between France and Chad/CAR 
in terms of colonial legacy was an important condition under which France felt its 
responsibility and played an active role as a chief negotiator to lead the launch of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA. The hypothesis also argued that the bilateral defence agreement as well as 
normative commitments of France generated normative pressures which increased the 
likelihood of the EU decision to get involved in the peacekeeping operation. However, the 
case analysis suggested that such normative arguments provided less sufficient evidence to 
support its primary propositions. Despite some crucial findings of France being constrained 
by colonial responsibility and normative commitment, the comprehensive case analysis 
determined that those normative conditions were limited only to the French national motive 
and could not bring European discussions and consent within a normative context. Thus, the 
constructivist arguments were partially accepted. 
In sum, lessons learned from the empirical research concerning the issue of EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA were quite impressive. According to interview data, France seems most likely to 
defend and justify its military intervention in Africa peacekeeping within a normative 
framework. In practice, however, little French norm-driven evidence was found during the 
negotiation. The case study suggested that what was expressed by other EU countries must 
not be underestimated. The two most powerful and reliable EU countries - the UK and 
Germany - which had also previously engaged in military operations along with France in 
Operation Artemis (2003) and EUFOR DR Congo (2006) expressed a strong aversion to the 




as nothing but another “pet project” in support of French interests.
824
 The official view of 
Britain and Germany may imply the best evidence to reveal the real driving force behind the 
French decision. The fact that the two most important members of the EU felt the operation 
was a vehicle to serve French national interests would make the realist argument stronger 
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Chapter 8 
Comparative Explanatory Analysis 






The study sought to examine the major driving force behind EU decisions to cooperate with 
the UN in peacekeeping operations. Given the inter-governmental nature of the EU’s 
decision-making in the specific area of foreign and security policy, the primary research 
question was clearly set up: ‘under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related 
peacekeeping operations?’ There have been two key steps taken for the analytical and 
theoretical process. First, building upon Putnam’s two-level game metaphor, the study 
proposed a new revised two-level game approach as an analytical framework. In assessing 
the two-level game analysis, the study identified the most important EU actors involved in 
the dynamic interactions between the UNSC and the EU on the issue of peacekeeping 
operations. The analysis referred to the most important decision-maker or negotiator as a 
chief negotiator. Besides the chief negotiator, it also examined the essential role of the High 
Representative. Yet, due to its limited legal status in decision-making comparing to the role 
of chief negotiator, the HR was defined as a facilitator in this thesis. Second, with insights 
from IR theories, the study investigated key motivational factors under which the chief 
negotiator(s) seems to increase the likelihood of their leadership, which may fundamentally 
determine the EU’s decision to engage with the UN in international peacekeeping operations. 
The analytical and theoretical endeavours were assessed across the three cases.    
This chapter aims to offer a comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases, by 
using scales to examine the key research outcomes. This chapter consists of three sections. 
The first section reviews the analytical conceptualisation of the revised two-level game and 
confirms the chief negotiators in each case. The second section revisits each one of the two 




accepted or rejected. The third section rounds up the overall results of the research. It 
discusses the important conditions which may determine whether UN-EU cooperation occurs. 
It also explores the implications of the findings on the contemporary phenomenon studied, 
i.e. UN-EU cooperation in international peace and security.  
 
 
8.1 Chief Negotiators and the Likelihood of Leadership 
As noted earlier, the decision on UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping 
significantly depends on the willingness and the role of chief negotiator(s). Hence, 
identifying the most important chief negotiator who possesses influential power to determine 
the EU’s decision is essential. Using a revised two-level game approach, the study evaluates 
the role of the European Big-four countries - the UK, France, Germany and Italy - and the 
High Representative. This section discusses the results of the assessment of the level of 
leadership role of the big-four and the HR, and confirms the most important chief negotiator.  
 
Chief Negotiators 
According to Putnam, each side of a negotiation is represented by a single national leader, 
namely a chief negotiator, whose central goal is to achieve an agreement at the international 
level that will be approved and ratified at domestic level. However, as Collinson noted, this 
study claims that there is possibly more than one chief negotiator who links Level I and 
Level II interactions. In this thesis, the chief negotiator is formally involved in the UNSC 
negotiations, leading to a tentative agreement or UN Security Council resolution. The chief 
negotiator also plays a central role at domestic EU level, seeking to bring the negotiations to 
a successful agreement and to the approval of a Council Joint Action.  
In assessing the role of the Big-four countries in decision-making, three possible degrees of 
the role of chief negotiator were considered: 
1. A low degree of the role of chief negotiator connoted that the negotiator made little 
contribution to the negotiations at both the UN and the EU levels. In addition, the 
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negotiator expressed a certain level of scepticism on a peacekeeping initiative, 
although it had no objection on the approval of the operation. 
2. A medium degree of the role of chief negotiator meant that the negotiator provided 
official documents or commitments to support an operation and endorsed a 
deployment of an EU operation in close cooperation with the UN. However, the 
negotiator did not undertake an active role during the negotiations to bring other 
member states to participate in a peacekeeping operation. 
3. A high degree of the role of chief negotiator involved significant contributions to 
negotiations and decision-making at both levels. The negotiator produced essential 
documents and official commitments to support a peacekeeping operation without 
reservation or objection. More importantly, the negotiator demonstrated an important 
leadership role during the negotiations to persuade other states to endorse and 
participate in the operation. 
In the case of Operation Artemis (2003), France displayed a high degree of the role of chief 
negotiator at both Level I (UNSC) and Level II (EU) negotiations. In response to the 
UNSC’s request for EU military support in the DRC, France indicated its readiness to act as 
the lead nation for the military operation. Level I negotiations were heavily spurred and 
determined by France’s major role, which shaped the nature and scope of the operation. 
France also showed a high degree of the role at Level II negotiations, bringing a tentative 
idea of a possible military deployment into an EU-level agenda. France induced other 
member states which had been sceptical about the operation to endorse the EU-led military 
operation in the DRC. The French chief negotiating role led to ratification at the EU level. 
On the other hand, the role of the UK remained at a medium level at both Levels I and II. 
Despite its official statements and commitments to support and strengthen the EU’s 
capabilities for humanitarian crisis management, in practice, the UK provided little effort 
during the negotiation as well as the implementation processes. The degree of Germany’s as 
well as Italy’s role as a chief negotiator appeared at a low level at both the Security Council 
and the EU levels. Whilst Italy showed neither particular interest in nor objection to the 
approval of the operation, Germany initially questioned the EU’s endorsement of Operation 
Artemis. Germany was extremely reluctant to give the EU responsibility for a military 




The case of EUFOR DR Congo (2006) presented interesting findings. The analysis of this 
case study suggests that the degree of the role of chief negotiators can lead to different 
interpretations. This study claims that the identification of the most important chief 
negotiator would vary depending on whether the assessment focused on the political 
negotiation phase or the operational planning phase. In the case of EUFOR DR Congo, 
France is often deemed less important than Germany, as France refused to take on the 
leadership role on the ground. Nevertheless, during the negotiations and the decision-making 
process, no one manifested a more vital role as chief negotiator than France. Given a strong 
aversion and significant lack of political will of many of the other EU member states to 
engage in the military operation, the role of France as a chief negotiator crucially led to the 
EU’s endorsement and approval of EUFOR DR Congo. The high degree of the French role 
in negotiations also influenced the German decision to become the lead-nation for the 
operation.  
The UK’s contribution was limited to a low degree at both Levels I and II. The UK was 
holding the EU Presidency when it received a letter from the UN SG requesting a European 
military presence in the DRC. Despite its important position, however, the UK abstained 
from any kind of negotiation and bargaining processes. Referring to its heavy military 
overstretches in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the UK avoided providing either commitments or 
military support for the operation. The Italian role was presented as a low degree during the 
negotiations at both levels. Although Italy had no objection to the operation, it hardly 
provided any official document or commitment to support the operation. Germany displayed 
a low degree of the role of chief negotiator during Level I negotiations. When the UN’s call 
for EU military support was presented to Germany, Germany strongly opposed its military 
engagement in the DRC. Thus it seemed almost impossible that Germany would participate 
and act in line with the UN SG’s request. However, once Germany was placed in a position 
in which it had to take on the leadership for the operation, it demonstrated a high degree of 
the role of chief negotiator at EU level. Germany, along with France, made substantial 
efforts and provided constant pressure to other member states to induce them to contribute to 
the EUFOR RD Congo. 
In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, France demonstrated a high degree of the role of chief 
negotiator at Level I negotiations. France drew the Security Council’s attention and provided 
a platform where substantial formal and informal consultations among stakeholders took 
place, which led to an initiative for a UNSC mandate. During negotiations at the EU level, 
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France also displayed a high degree of the role of chief negotiator. France made a significant 
effort to convince other reluctant EU members that EUFOR would be a neutral and impartial 
European military operation. The Italian role was perceived as important when Italy 
expressed its willingness to provide troops and support the initial entry force in the field. 
However, Italy did not undertake further active role as a chief negotiator to bring other 
members to participate in the operation. Instead, it merely acted in a medium degree of the 
role of chief negotiator at the EU level, and in a low degree at the UN level. The UK and 
Germany, on the other hand, exhibited a low degree of the role of chief negotiator in the 
UNSC. On the issue of European military support in Chad and the CAR, neither the UK nor 
Germany provided substantial commitments nor played an important role during Level I 
negotiations. Likewise, the role of the UK and Germany as chief negotiators was observed to 
be at a low degree at the EU level. Despite the development of British-Franco cooperation in 
European foreign and security policy, the UK kept a low profile in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. 
Germany remained very sceptical about the nature of the EUFOR, referring to the operation 
as a pet project in support of French self-aggrandisement.  
 
Table 8. 1 Identification of the degree of chief negotiators 
Cases 
Actors 
I. Operation Artemis II. EUFOR RD Congo III. EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
Level I Level II Level I Level II Level I Level II 
UK medium medium low low low low 
France high high high high high high 
Germany low low low high low low 






As summarised in Table 8.1, the degree of the important role of the European Big-4 in each 
level of negotiations varied across the three cases. The two-level game analysis has 
identified that France is the most important chief negotiator in every EU military 
peacekeeping operation in line with cooperation with the UN. It revealed that the UK, 
despite its unquestionably prestigious permanent position in the Security Council, is less 
likely to become an important chief negotiator insofar as the issues of UN-EU peacekeeping 
cooperation are concerned. Although the UK is unlikely to be an encumbrance to France 
when France carries forward a UN-EU peacekeeping initiative, the UK always tends to be 
cautious and sceptical about committing itself to EU-led autonomous military peacekeeping 
operations. Germany had been expected to become one of the most important advocates of 
‘the EU as a global security actor’ alongside France. However, the findings of the case 
studies suggest that the role of Germany, particularly for the launch of EU military 
operations, seems less important to increasing the likelihood of EU decisions. Germany 
exceptionally undertook a leadership role for the EUFOR mission in the DRC. But it must 
not be underestimated that such an outstanding role of Germany in formulating European 
consensus on military deployment was to a considerable extent a result of French pressure, 
lobby and suasion to get Germany to change its position and to participate in the operation. 
The evidence of the case studies also confirms that Italy seems less likely to become an 
important chief negotiator on the issue of UN-EU peacekeeping cooperation. Although Italy 
did not express any objection or scepticism on the peacekeeping initiatives, its contribution 
to the political dialogues to bring the European approval remained relatively insignificant.  
 
Likelihood of Leadership   
The revised two-level game analysis revealed that the EU’s decision to engage with the UN 
in a peacekeeping operation depends considerably on the effective role of the chief 
negotiator(s). The first case analysis confirmed that France is the chief negotiator in 
Operation Artemis. In the second case, EUFOR RD Congo, France played an influential role 
with substantial support from Germany. France and Germany were thus identified as chief 
negotiators in the EUFOR RD Congo case. The third case study confirmed that France is the 
most important chief negotiator in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Any other EU actors 
seemed unlikely to be equalled with France in the context of the role of chief negotiator in 
bargaining and decision-making at both UNSC and EU levels.  
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Under what conditions are the chief negotiators likely to play their decisive role to increase 
the effectiveness and the likelihood of the EU cooperating with the UN in international 
peacekeeping operations? In order to evaluate the motivations, this thesis examined the 
hypothetical relationships between important conditions (independent variables) and the 
likelihood of the Big-4’s leadership which may significantly determine the EU’s engagement 
with the UN in a peacekeeping operation (dependent variable). The next section reviews the 
results of hypotheses testing for each case study. It aims to determine which theory provides 
the best answer to the main research question of this thesis. 
 
8.2 Independent Variables and the Likelihood of Leadership 
 
This thesis proposes two hypothetical propositions drawn from theories. According to the 
hypotheses, the likelihood of the EU Member States’ leadership to lead a EU’s engagement 
with the UN in a peacekeeping operation would increase if :
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From a realist perspective, there is: 
 Hypothesis 1: political and strategic interests of the EU Member States in the 
peacekeeping areas. 
From a constructivist perspective, there is: 
 Hypothesis 2: normative pressures of the EU Member States in a peacekeeping 
operation. 
Important conditions that may significantly determine the likelihood of chief negotiator’s 
leadership are independent variables. Based on the leading theoretical insights of IR - 
realism vs. constructivism - the thesis depicted two broad contours of hypothetical 
assumptions: political and strategic interests (PSI) and normative pressures. The variables of 
PSI were drawn from the main ideas of realist theories, which primarily focused on the 
political interests (exertion of powers) and the strategic interests (economic benefits and 
acquisition of natural resources) of the chief negotiator in the peacekeeping areas. The realist 
hypothesis proposed that if political and strategic interests of the chief negotiator increase, 
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the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership to promote the EU deciding to engage in a 
peacekeeping operation will also increase. Normative pressures, on the other hand, contained 
two core theoretical assumptions, i.e. historical memories and normative conditions, of 
which the ideas were generated from constructivist theories. The constructivist hypothesis 
proposed that if there are normative pressures of the chief negotiator in a peacekeeping 
operation, the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership to lead the EU’s decision to engage 
in a peacekeeping operation will also increase.  
This thesis accordingly created two plausible hypothetical relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. Each of the hypotheses was examined 
across the three cases to determine whether they are accepted or rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Political and strategic interests increase the likelihood of chief 
negotiator’s leadership to lead the EU’s engagement in a 
peacekeeping operation.  
 
 
The hypothesis drawn from realist theories defined the concept of political interests of the 
chief negotiator as a desire for extending power. The hypothesis argued that as the political 
interests of the chief negotiator increase, the likelihood of leadership of the chief negotiator 
will also increase. The political interests of the chief negotiator were evaluated using the 
following ordinal scale: 
 
1. Low level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator had no particular political 
interests in the peacekeeping areas in light of the extension of both national and 
European power.  
2. Medium level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator sought to defend its national 
power foremost, but manifested a lesser intention to strengthen European power. 
3. High level of Political Interests: The chief negotiator intended to view a 
peacekeeping operation as an opportunity to extend its own national power and 
European power.  
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A high level of political interests means that a chief negotiator embodied a clear motivation 
driven by both national interests and European common interests. Especially, given the 
emergence of new external powers and thereby a potential threat of losing its own relative 
position within particular areas which are geo-strategically important, the realist hypothesis 
argued that the political interests of a state would normally entail a strong desire to create 
and defend the zones of its own influence, promote its national prestige, and enhance its 
reputation as a major power. Moreover, a chief negotiator who has a high level of political 
interests would be likely to fulfil European common interests and reinforce European power. 
If any evidence of a chief negotiator seeking the European balance of power and the 
projection of national power exists, this study confirms that the chief negotiator had a high 
level of political interests. A medium level of political interests posits that whereas the chief 
negotiator clearly demonstrated its political interests at national level, the desire to pursue 
the European interests was absent. The chief negotiator rather focused on maintaining the 
status quo in political leverage and national power in particular peacekeeping areas; yet it 
has to a lesser extent an intention of strengthening European power. A low level of political 
interests denotes that the chief negotiator seemed unlikely to have particular interests in a 
peacekeeping operation. The chief negotiator presented a very defensive attitude and only 
tried to protect itself in operating a peacekeeping mission. It puts its own efforts only to 
minimise military risks and losses of national power.  
In the case of Operation Artemis, France demonstrated a high level of political interests in 
both national and European power projection. First, the case analysis clearly showed 
evidence of France seeking to regain its influential national power in the region. France had 
supported the Mobutu regime as underpinning its national interests and power in the Great 
Lakes region. However, following the collapse of the Mobutu regime, which was displaced 
by Kabila, the French position in the DRC began to decline. Furthermore, the stronger 
Kabila’s opposition to the western intervention into DRC became, the more difficulties 
France faced to re-establish its important status in the DRC. Consequently, such critical loss 
of prestige and power for France became an important driving force to lead to the EU-led 
military intervention in the DRC. Second, in light of the enhancement of European power as 
a global security actor, the findings of the case study also illustrated that France was largely 
aware of the importance of recovering European capability and the European image that had 
been critically damaged by the dispute over the Iraq invasion. The analysis of this case study 




multilateralism to balance power against U.S. unilateralism, by conducting the EU-led 
autonomous military operation outside Europe independent from NATO.           
In the second case of EUFOR RD Congo, France presented a medium level of political 
interests and national strategic preferences towards the African Great Lakes region. Since the 
first military engagement in the DRC (Operation Artemis), France continued to support 
Kabila’s regime, and thereby could establish further closer and enhanced bilateral relations 
with the Congolese government. The evidence of this study suggested that France viewed the 
operation EUFOR RD Congo as an important opportunity to maintain its support for Kabila 
and to enable it to project national influence as a great power in the region. Facing the 
criticism and misgivings about neutrality and impartiality of the EUFOR among the local 
population, however, France seemed most likely to need the EUFOR to gain a credible 
reputation. In this regard, the study confirmed that EUFOR RD Congo was merely 
considered as a vehicle for a French national interest to protect, maintain and ensure its 
strong relationship with the Kabila regime and Kabila remaining in power. In light of 
European interests, France hardly displayed a desire to promote European power and interest 
in this specific case.  
On the other hand, Germany displayed a relatively low level of political interests in the case 
of EUFOR DRC. The findings from this case study stressed that the German decision to 
launch the military operation was not made by its own voluntary will, but was simply a result 
of external pressure from France to take over the leadership for the EUFOR operation. 
Initially, Germany was by no means interested in the military intervention in the DRC. 
Germany had to grudgingly accept to play chief negotiator alongside France, despite its 
strong aversion to holding military responsibility. Once it could no longer turn down the 
French proposal to undertake a major leadership task for the EUFOR, Germany sought to 
defend its national reputation as an important security actor of the EU while minimising 
military risks and losses of forces as much as possible. The primary motive of the German 
decision and behaviour was viewed as being driven by a rational calculation, which led to a 
criticism that German activities were nothing but a ‘paper tiger’ to vaunt the Union’s 
presentation as a serious security actor.  
In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, France showed a high level of political interests. France 
had maintained historically, politically and militarily an exclusive position in the Chadian 
regimes. As new external powers emerged as strategically important partners of the Chadian 
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government, however, the change of power distribution within the country resulted in a 
relative weakening of the French position in the region. Consequently, France lost its great 
power in the international system and got a reputation as a medium-size power among many 
super powers. Given these circumstances, the French-led EU military operation in Chad and 
the CAR was deemed an important opportunity for two political purposes. First, it was a vital 
chance for France to prove European capabilities as a reliable partner of the UN in civil-
military peacekeeping operations; and secondly, it was an attempt of redemption for French 
foreign policy to ensure its prestigious power not only in the region, but also in the world. In 
sum, the case study presented the evidence that the French-led military intervention in Chad 
and CAR under the EU flag was primarily driven by a high level of political interests for 
France to achieve the reinforcement of French national and European power in both regional 
and international arenas. 
The second hypothetical variable drawn from a realist assumption implies that global 
distribution of power is rapidly shifting to energy exporters and oil producers, which will 
have been central in the minds of national foreign policy-making of European states. The 
hypothesis claims that if there is an economic interest of the chief negotiator in particular 
peacekeeping areas, the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership to lead to the EU deciding 
on an EU-led peacekeeping operation will increase. Yet, as it would be difficult to clearly 
reveal causality, this study seeks to elucidate to what extent correlations exist between the 
variables. A nominal classification was thus used to examine this variable: 
 
1. Presence of correlations: evidence shows that there exist clear correlations between 
the economic interest of the chief negotiator in particular peacekeeping areas and a 
significant increase of economic benefits for the chief negotiator following the 
operation.  
2. Absence of correlations: there is no or limited evidence to show some links between 
economic interests of the chief negotiator and economic benefits for the chief 
negotiator following the operation in particular peacekeeping areas. 
 
In the case of Artemis, France manifested its strong economic interests in the abundance of 
natural resources of the DRC. When France agreed to provide the bulk of military forces to 
the DRC, France attached two important conditions: a strictly temporary basis and an 




natural resources of the DRC. The case analysis showed that the DRC’s major export 
production began to shift dramatically to France after the French-led EU military 
peacekeeping operation in the DRC. France undoubtedly became an important trade partner 
of the DRC and one of the main beneficiaries of Congolese vast natural resources. Hence, 
the evidence of this case study confirmed that there is a clear presence of correlation 
between economic interests of the chief negotiator in the peacekeeping area and an increase 
of economic benefits of the chief negotiator following the EU-led military peacekeeping 
operation in the DRC.  
In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, the evidence suggested that France’s vital leadership role 
as a chief negotiator was largely encouraged by its strong national economic interests, which 
focused on the securing of plentiful natural resources of the Great Lakes region. The analysis 
of the case study elucidated that whereas the French position had remained relatively modest 
in the Congolese market as well as in economic relations in the past, the EUFOR 
considerably strengthened the French economic position in the country. Furthermore, France 
also achieved considerable economic benefits from trade relations with Gabon after the 
EUFOR mission. The case study showed evidence that the French decision to station its 
major military forces in Libreville, Gabon, led to increasing economic advantages for France 
as well. In sum, the case study confirmed that EUFOR RD Congo was followed by a 
significant increase of economic benefits for France, which presented the clear correlation 
between the economic interests of the chief negotiator and the economic benefits for the 
chief negotiator on the EUFOR operation. 
Germany, as it turned out in the case analysis, was the main economic beneficiary of the 
military operation in the DRC. When Germany confirmed its decision to lead the EUFOR 
mission, it strongly insisted that the majority of German forces would be stationed in 
Kinshasa and Libreville, the capital cities of the Congo and Gabon, respectively. The 
evidence of this case study showed that the EUFOR operation led to Germany’s considerable 
economic growth in trade relations with the DRC since 2006. The evidence also clearly 
proved that German military presence in Libreville for a rapid back-up of EUFOR in 
Kinshasa brought Germany a dramatic increase in economic benefits in relations with Gabon 
as well. Hence, the case analysis confirmed that there existed a clear correlation between the 
economic interests and benefits acquired by the operation for the chief negotiators. 
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In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the study suggested that the economic interests of the 
chief negotiator was of an important condition which may have triggered the active 
leadership of the chief negotiator and led to the launch of a French-led EU military operation 
in Chad and the CAR. France displayed its strong economic interests in the peacekeeping 
areas, particularly in ensuring the stability of the oil-rich fields of Chad and CAR. The case 
study examined the operational zones where the main battalion of French troops was 
mandated to be stationed. The findings from the case study presented that every location of 
French forces was in the core areas where there was a large concentrated deposit of heavy 
crude oil. The evidence of the study also showed that France achieved dramatic economic 
benefits in its trade relations with Chad after the EUFOR mission. Hence, the study 
confirmed that there existed a clear correlation between France’s economic interests in the 
areas and economic benefits following the launch of the EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Presence of normative pressures increases the likelihood of chief 
negotiator’s leadership to lead to the EU’s engagement in a 
peacekeeping operation. 
 
The second hypothesis is drawn from a constructivist theory. According to a constructivist 
assumption, the foreign security policy and behaviour of individual EU member states is 
largely influenced by a common identity and collective responsibility within the EU 
framework. The constructivist hypothesis argued that the presence of a colonial legacy as 
part of historical memory will increase the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership to 
determine the EU deciding to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation. This variable 
was assessed using a nominal classification: 
 
1. Presence of normative responsibility  for colonial legacy 
2. Absence of normative responsibility for colonial legacy 
 
In the first case of Operation Artemis, evidence from the case analysis showed that the 
decisive French leadership to launch the EU-led military operation in the DRC was to some 




of Belgium’s capability to maintain the stability and security of its former colony, the DRC, 
France expressed its desire to collaborate closely with Belgium in the peacekeeping 
operation in the DRC. Although France had no direct feeling of colonial responsibility for 
Congolese crisis management, French foreign policy towards Francophone Africa viewed 
the operation as part of Europe’s collective and normative responsibility. Hence, the first 
case study confirmed that the presence of a normative responsibility of the chief negotiator 
for the colonial legacy of Europe increased the likelihood of leadership of the chief 
negotiator to determine an EU-led military operation in the DRC. 
In the second case of EUFOR RD Congo, on the other hand, neither France nor Germany 
presented normative responsibility for the colonial legacy of Europe. France seemed unlikely 
to be constrained by colonial responsibility or its historical relationship with the DRC. 
Germany rather used the colonial legacy as an excuse to shift the responsibility to other 
European countries, particularly Belgium. Germany insisted that the first troop contributors 
should not and could not be Germany, referring to the colonial responsibility of the former 
colonial empire of the DRC. Hence, the analysis of the case study confirmed that normative 
responsibility for colonial legacy was absent in the case of the EUFOR DRC.  
In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, colonial legacy was identified as an important 
motivation for France, which led to the French active leadership role in the launch of a 
French-led EUFOR operation. When France expressed its intention to conduct a European 
military operation in Chad and the CAR, French authorities officially mentioned that France 
had endeavoured to build a friendship with its former colonies. France committed itself to 
maintain and support the peace and security of French ‘former friends’.
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 Moreover, France 
emphasised a norm-driven responsibility and humanitarian intention to make its ancient 
African friends’ situation more stable. Therefore, the case study confirms that the EUFOR 
operation was conditioned by the presence of a normative responsibility of the chief 
negotiator for its colonial legacy. 
The second hypothetical proposition on the normative pressures is drawn from a 
constructivist theory inspired by the work on normative institutionalism. The hypothesis 
argued that as the normative conditions increase, the likelihood of leadership of the chief 
negotiator to lead an EU decision to engage in an EU-led peacekeeping operation will also 
increase. The normative conditions were measured using the following ordinal scale:  
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1. Low level of normative pressures: evidence presented that the chief negotiator’s 
leadership was unlikely to be conditioned by normative pressures. 
2. Medium level of normative pressures: evidence showed that normative commitment 
of the chief negotiator was followed by normative entrapment. However, evidence of 
the chief negotiator using normative language in suasion was hardly illuminated. 
3. High level of normative pressures: evidence clearly displayed that the normative 
commitment of the chief negotiator resulted in normative entrapment, which led to 
the chief negotiator’s efforts to bring normative suasion within the EU. 
 
In the case of Operation Artemis, the analysis of the study confirmed that the chief negotiator 
was conditioned by a high level of normative pressures - normative commitments, normative 
entrapment and normative suasion. France reaffirmed its normative commitments through a 
series of Franco-British summits since the 1990s, in which France pledged to intensify its 
efforts to enable the EU to equip autonomous military capabilities in the case of threats 
confronting African crises. Operation Artemis was the very first result of a high level of 
expectation of France to fulfil its international peacekeeping commitments in close 
cooperation with the UN. By its commitments to promote European solidarity in pursuing 
international peace and security, France was normatively constrained and entrapped. 
Furthermore, the evidence showed France trying to vest its efforts during negotiations to 
persuade other members, particularly the UK, to participate in the peacekeeping operation. 
France used normative discussion referring to Franco-British normative commitments.  
In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, France and Germany had committed themselves to a 
multilateral involvement in DRC crisis management. Franco-German normative 
commitments seemed to have constrained both France and Germany to become more 
important than anyone during negotiations, which led to a Franco-German central tandem 
role in operating EUFOR DR Congo. However, the evidence of the case study suggested that 
Franco-German commitments were only limited to normative entrapment, which resulted in 
a convergence of different preferences between the two European powers on the issue of 
military engagement in the DRC. Germany was significantly reluctant and suspicious of the 
military operation, and thereby its commitments slightly constrained its decision. Yet, France 
seemed more likely to dedicate its efforts to get other member states to change their critical 




medium level of normative pressures, France showed relatively high level of normative 
pressures during the negotiations on the launch of EUFOR RD Congo.  
In the last case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the analysis showed a medium level of normative 
pressures. Having gone through the establishment of various bilateral relationships with 
Chad and CAR, France had committed itself to the maintenance of peace and security in the 
region. In compliance with bilateral defence agreements with those countries, France 
reiterated a number of normative commitments during the negotiations. However, despite 
such clear evidence of normative commitments and to a lesser extent normative entrapment, 
the evidence hardly demonstrated France using a normative argument to persuade other EU 
member states to get involved in the operation. The findings of this case study suggested that 
the launch of the EUFOR operation coincided less with the normative discourse. France and 
many other EU member states seemed rather likely to focus on non-normative arguments 
according to the national foreign policy priorities of each.  
 
8.3 Conditions and the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership 
Drawing from the comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases, this thesis comes 
to two main conclusions. The first conclusion is about the chief negotiator in contributing to 
UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. The second conclusion is about the important factors 
that are theoretically assumed to increase the likelihood of chief negotiator’s leadership. This 
thesis argues that the insights from the two conclusions ultimately provide the best answers 
to the research question: ‘Under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-related 
peacekeeping operations?’  
The comparative analysis revealed that, in every case, France steered the debate and shaped 
the EU decision on a possible EU-led peacekeeping operation on the UN’s request. The 
German leadership was once identified as a chief negotiator in the case of EUFOR RD 
Congo. However, it must not be overlooked that although the overall German role was 
important on the ground at operational level, it hardly contributed to negotiations at a 
political level. The UK remained at a lower level of commitments in every case. The role of 
Italy was presented as limited and less likely decisive during the negotiations across the three 
cases. The comparative analysis verified that robust and effective UN-EU cooperation in 
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peacekeeping is eventually determined by France and whether it plays a proactive leadership 
role in negotiations at both the UN and the EU levels. Hence, the study indicates that the 
general expectations for the role of the European Big-4 are to some extent overestimated. 
The case analysis also reveals that the HR does not have any direct or decisive influence on 
decision-making, and thereby the role of the HR remains as a facilitator. In sum, this thesis 
confirms that UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping seems likely to be fundamentally 
determined by the choice of France rather than any other EU actors.     
Table 8.2 summarises the most crucial findings from theory testing across all three cases. 
According to the results of the comparative analysis, economic interests of the chief 
negotiator are present across all the three cases, while normative conditions are either high or 
medium. On the other hand, the political interests of the chief negotiator vary across the 
cases – high, medium and low. The colonial legacy as part of normative pressures is either 
present or absent.  
 
The first case analysis showed evidence of all two hypotheses. France displayed a high level 
of political interests in pursuing both the projection of national power and the European 
balance of power; economic benefits for France were present from the peacekeeping 
operation; normative responsibility of France for European colonial legacies were present; 




















France high present present high 
Case II 
EUFOR DR Congo 
France medium present absent high 
Germany low present absent medium 
Case III 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA 




and a high level of normative conditions constrained France to provide an active leadership 
role to lead the EU to cooperate with the UN. Every hypothesis was accepted in the first case 
of Operation Artemis. The results of the case analysis suggest that the likelihood of UN-EU 
cooperation in a peacekeeping operation will increase when France meets all these four 
variables and so provides its robust leadership.  
The second case study displayed a medium level of political interests in the projection of 
national power; economic benefits were present from the peacekeeping operation; and a high 
level of normative pressures, all of which were important driving forces behind the French 
decision to play a decisive role to determine the EU military peacekeeping operation. On the 
other hand, the analysis showed that economic interests and a medium level of normative 
pressures were important conditions under which Germany was likely to lead the operation. 
The realist hypothesis on the political interests was rejected in the case of Germany. The 
constructivist hypothetical variable on the colonial legacy within the context of normative 
responsibility was rejected in both French and German conditions.   
The last case study accepted all four theoretical propositions as important conditions of the 
chief negotiator that may increase the likelihood of leadership to promote UN-EU 
cooperation. More specifically, hypotheses on the political interests, economic interests, and 
colonial legacy were fully accepted, while the hypothetical variable on the normative 
pressures was partially accepted. According to the outcomes from this case analysis, UN-EU 
peacekeeping cooperation in Chad/CAR occurred as France held a high profile in political 
and economic interests, as well as normative responsibility for its colonial legacies and 
normative commitments.  
In sum, the primary conclusion drawn from this comparative explanatory analysis is that 
economic interests and normative pressures are most consistently supported across all cases, 
which tells us that these two conditions are the best answers for the research question. 
Political interests are either accepted or partially accepted, while colonial legacy is either 
accepted or rejected across the three cases. When comparing the two realist variables, the 
evidence suggests that economic interests are more important than political interests. For the 
realists, therefore, EU cooperation with the UN is most likely to occur because of the active 
leadership of the chief negotiators being decisively motivated by economic interests rather 
than political interests. Of the constructivist propositions, the evidence illustrates that the 
normative institutionalist pressures are more important than a colonial legacy which links to 
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the historical memory and the normative responsibility. From a constructivist perspective, 
accordingly, the EU cooperates with the UN because of normative pressures of the chief 
negotiators rather than European historical responsibility. 
When bringing all these outcomes back to the research question by combining the two 
separate conclusions - one about the leadership of the chief negotiator and the other about the 
important factors - the insights drawn from the comparative explanatory analysis find the 
best answer to the research question; ‘under what conditions do EU Member States lead UN-
related peacekeeping operations?’ The best answer to the research question is that the EU 
cooperates with the UN in international peacekeeping because France, as a major driving 
force behind the negotiations, has strong economic interests and normative pressures in 
specific peacekeeping operations.  
The comparative explanatory analysis across the three cases implies an important lesson for 
this research. Given all the specific three cases in which cooperation occurred, operation 
Artemis seems particularly important, in which the evidence showed high (Hypothesis 1-1) – 
present (Hypothesis 1-2) – present (Hypothesis 2-1) – high (Hypothesis 2-2) results. 
Operation Artemis is deemed unique and more significant than the other two cases with 
regards to the question of the effective role of the EU as a promising peacekeeping actor 
alongside the UN. Despite being the very first, new and large EU operation in terms of 
autonomous military engagement beyond Europe in close cooperation with the UN, the 
agreement took less than a month from the UN’s request until the official decisions of UNSC 
Resolution followed by Council Joint Action. This case raises an important question about 
how cooperation occurred and was agreed upon so quickly. The comparative explanatory 
analysis highlights that France, who undertook the leadership as well as chief negotiating 
role for the operation, embodied both realist interests and normative responsibilities. France 
fulfilled all four conditions at all high levels, which led to the most rapid, robust and 
effective negotiation outcomes on the peacekeeping cooperation. In this respect, the study 
suggests that those four hypothetical propositions are certainly important for UN-EU 
cooperation to achieve an utmost effective and rapid action in maintaining international 








The findings of this thesis have several implications for the study of the EU as a global 
security actor alongside the UN. Contrary to most EU policy areas, the decision-making 
process on the issue of UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping has revealed the serious internal 
and external problems of the EU. This thesis argued that the two-level game metaphor, 
which Putnam used to depict international negotiations and show the entanglements between 
international and domestic politics, was a useful analytical framework to investigate the 
cooperation between the UN and the EU. This thesis suggests that the analysis of a revised 
two-level game approach not only explains the complexity of the EU as an international 
actor at the UN, but it also diagnoses the critical internal incoherence within the EU. By 
using a revised two-level game approach, this chapter seeks to discuss the domestic 
discordance and international challenges facing the EU in the realm of international peace 
and security. The aim of this chapter is to put forward some thoughts on how the diversity of 
views between the UN and the EU can overcome discord and scepticism in peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
9.1 Internal Resonance  
The comparative analysis across the three cases has demonstrated that the effective role of 
the EU as a global security actor alongside the UN crucially depends on the political will of 
the member states. Decision-making involves all EU member states “at all times with a right 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Internal and External Challenges Facing the EU 
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to veto at any time”,
 827
 insofar as the issues of CFSP and ESDP are concerned. Therefore, 
every EU-engaged peacekeeping operation, whether it is military or civilian, has to be 
approved by all member states through the ESDP decision-making process in order to 
provide the Union with a real capacity to carry out EU-led peacekeeping operations. The 
formal negotiations on ESDP operations are taken in bodies where all members are 
represented, such as the PSC, and decisions are to be taken unanimously. Accordingly, the 
supranational institutions are far less involved in negotiations and the decision-making 
process. Due to this complex decision-making process and these unusual working methods 
of the ESDP, serious cleavages and discordance among the member states often occur.  
The nature of decision-making on a military operation makes it more difficult for the EU to 
reach a consensus on the possible troop contribution and deployment of civil and military 
personnel. Whereas civilian operations are normally funded by the CFSP budget, military 
operations are funded outside the CFSP budget as well as the regular EU budget.
828
 The 
EU’s contribution to UN military peacekeeping operations entirely depends on the voluntary 
will of and the financial as well as military capability of the member states to fund and 
support resources for such operations. As the analysis of the three case studies has addressed, 
participation in ESDP military operations is always on a voluntary-basis and subject to the 
member states’ own deliberations. Consequently, during the negotiations and decision-
making process, the lack of political will to commit to troop contributions and the shortage 
of resources in many member states are significantly displayed. 
Given these fundamental difficulties in the area of EU foreign and security policy, this thesis 
suggests three sets of interlocking driving forces to grasp internal coherence. First, this study 
argues that the European major powers, inter alia the Big-3 (Britain, France and Germany), 
should recognise their important leadership position in security and defence issues. The 
comparative explanatory analysis of this thesis has revealed that those Big-3 countries are 
the most important actors to drive the ESDP forward, shape the capacity of the EU, and 
influence the political will of other member states. Considering the fact that the idea for new 
peacekeeping operations or initiatives normally originates outside the EU, particularly from 
discussions and negotiations in the UNSC, Franco-British bilateral cooperation and their 
tandem leadership needs to be further enhanced. According to the evidence from the case 
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studies, France and the UK demonstrated their important bilateral collaboration to convince 
Germany of the necessity of a EUFOR operation, which eventually led to German approval. 
The recognition of the important French and British leadership position on issues of 
European security and defence would constantly stimulate the German position, and 
subsequently other member states, which will increase internal coherence. In regard to the 
role of Italy in peacekeeping, the three selected cases found little evidence of Italy’s notable 
leadership both at the political and operational levels. However, this does not mean that Italy 
is a less important actor in peacekeeping operations. Instead, Italy has been expected to play 
a bigger role in international peace and security, particularly for multi-faceted and multi-
dimensional operations equipped with military-civilian personnel and humanitarian 
assistance.
829
 If the Big-3 strives harder for the maintenance of international peace and 
security by collaborating with Italy, forming a Big-4, the EU would achieve further enhanced 
capacities, capabilities, legitimacy, and credibility in the field of international peacekeeping.    
Second, the findings from the three case studies suggest that the degree to which national 
and European interests overlap is crucial for successful and effective decision-making within 
the EU on issues of foreign security and defence. As the comparative analysis across all the 
three cases has demonstrated, the more member states view European security and defence 
policy and European common interests as a part of their own national foreign policy and 
national interests, the better and easier the EU can achieve a common position and consensus 
on the given issues at domestic level. It is important for the EU, again, to focus its internal 
efforts on the Big-3 countries to enable them to converge on their different national policy 
and preferences first, so that they can inject the EU agenda into their national preferences, 
which will then be followed by other member states.  
Third, in order to constrain various and different foreign policy and interests of individual 
Big-3 nations, this study suggests that normative commitments need to be further developed. 
The findings of the case studies show that normative commitments that are particularly 
driven by the genuine wish to strengthen European normative power, and the wish to see the 
EU developing its independent capabilities as a promising global security actor, will have a 
stronger impact on the identity, position and behaviour of the Big-3 within the EU structure. 
Normative commitments of the EU would at least entrap the member states to fulfil their 
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commitment and to contribute to European multilateralism, which will also provide an 
important interlocking driving force for the internal discordance of the EU. 
 
9.2 External challenges 
 
There is a very well-known question, “who do I call, if I want to talk to Europe?” The 
inability to speak with a unified voice has hobbled the EU, most notably during the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The question of a stronger representative of the EU on the 
international stage has thus occupied a central position on the issue of the EU as a global 
actor at the UN. The Lisbon Treaty most recently proposed overall changes to the 
relationship between the Council and the Commission in the whole CFSP area by creating a 
new post of High Representative, Catherine Ashton, who is mainly responsible for so-called 
implementation missions (peacekeeping) and also simultaneously serves as the president of 
the External Relations Council and Vice President of the EU Commission. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental question of ‘who speaks for the EU’ remains unclear.
830
 Especially in the area 
of foreign, security and defence policy, decisions are made on the basis of inter-
governmentalism in which individual member states remain central players at both the 
UNSC and the EU. Consequently, such a distinctive nature of inter-governmental decision-
making has also impeded the diplomatic clout of the EU at the UN, which constrains the EU 
from being an effective global security actor alongside the UN in international peace and 
security.  
The analysis of a revised two-level game reveals some external challenges facing the EU at 
the UN. First, despite a legal status and vital role of the HR who has been mandated to work 
closely with the UNSC on behalf of Europe,
831
 evidence from the case studies shows that 
there is a great deal of ambiguity about the EU as an actor at the Security Council. The EU 
itself has no legal standing at the Security Council. Moreover, the European Community 
represented by the HR only has observer status.
832
 It is not exceptional for the EU Presidency. 
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Although the Presidency is allowed to express the EU’s common position concerning CFSP 
matters and to speak on behalf of all the member states in the UN, if the country holding the 
Presidency is not a member of the Security Council, it has no opportunity to act as a front-
runner in UNSC negotiations. In terms of the representative figure of the EU at the UNSC, 
delegates from the HR and the Presidency would remain in a listening mode. This may 
constrain them from having discussions and coordinating outside the Council in New York, 
and eventually in Brussels with other member states for making a better view of issues.
833
 
The EU is often invited to public meetings of the UNSC when the decisions have already 
been taken and the states are just formalising their positions. However, the Presidency and 
the HR are generally not allowed in during the most important moments of negotiations and 
deliberation, which takes place behind the closed doors of the small room of informal 
consultations, the “sancta sanctorum”
 
of Security Council’s exclusiveness.
834
 Consequently, 
again, the institutionalised political will of the EU member states sitting in the UNSC and 
effective leadership of the European permanent members at the Security Council, i.e. France 
and the UK, are essential to present the EU as an actor at the UNSC.  
Secondly, however, the analysis of this study indicates that it would be much more difficult 
to expect that those two permanent members of the Union will employ their exclusive 
positions at the Security Council to pursue the EU’s common interest rather than their own 
states’ preference. From a realist perspective, the case analysis has manifested that states 
would not easily abandon their interests and position. Rather, they become more resistant if 
their interests are affected. In this context, Hill notes that a permanent position on the UNSC 
forces the UK and France to work collectively together, but ‘not necessarily to pursue a 
substantive EU agenda in the UNSC’.
835
 French and British approaches to the UNSC, 
according to Hill’s argument, are merely to preserve their privileged national positions and 
the source of their power and influence on it.
836
  
In sum, recognising the identity, leadership and vital role of France and the UK as a diplomat 
and representative of the EU in the UNSC is essential to boost the role of the EU as an 
effective actor in the Security Council. This thesis argues that in order to cope with external 
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challenges facing the EU, France and the UK together have to provide greater efforts to 
achieve coherence and show their solidarity in the Security Council. Solana emphasised that 
“if France and the UK do not reach a common position, there will be no common EU 
position.”
 837
 The HR also stressed that “Europe is losing influence when it does not speak 
with one voice”.
838
 The UK and France are thus deemed the foremost leading actors of the 
Union that can represent the ‘spirit of the EU’ at the international level.
839
 
Cooperation between the UN and the EU in the field of international peace and security is an 
interesting but elusive and difficult subject to investigate. In recent years, the role of the EU 
as a global actor has attracted considerable attention from EU scholars. There is currently 
much discussion about the EU as a promising partner of the UN in international peace and 
security. Furthermore, the question of effective multilateralism of the EU, in contrast with 
US unilateralism, has engaged current interdisciplinary scholarship across a range of fields. 
However, most of the literature and studies on the EU’s external security policy have rather 
come to focus on the evaluation or examination of the practical phenomenon of the EU and 
its performance in international relations. To a lesser extent studies have contributed to 
illuminating the fundamental reasons why and the major driving forces behind the EU 
cooperating with other international or regional actors in maintaining international peace and 
security. Comprehending a natural phenomenon and predicting future aspects and events 
must be preceded by an investigation of fundamental motivations and factors which may 
influence actors’ behaviours and overall outcomes.  
In this regard, this thesis would probably be useful in accounting for the motivational factors 
which may increase the likelihood of UN-EU cooperation in international peace and security. 
The analytical strength of this thesis is that the revised two-level game analysis has 
successfully identified the most important actors involved in the complex web of decision-
making and entanglement of international and domestic negotiations. This thesis also has 
theoretical merits, as it has aimed to examine leading IR theories by testing each of the 
theoretical hypotheses. In addition, ideas on how the EU will skilfully cope with its internal 
and external challenges contributed general understanding and expectation of the role of the 
EU for upcoming international peacekeeping operations. 
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Nevertheless, it is essential to address some limitations of this research and comment about 
the future work based on what has been discussed. The comparative analysis confirmed that 
a high level of political and strategic interests is a vital condition under which the EU 
member states are most likely to drive the EU to actively engage in peacekeeping operations 
with the UN. Normative conditions are partially accepted, which means that the EU member 
states are not always constrained by normative and ideational reasons. However, much work 
remains to ensure and strengthen the validity of the arguments. This study limits the scope of 
possible variables which may influence the likelihood UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping. 
By positing that active leadership of the European major powers holds the decisions of 
effective and robust peacekeeping cooperation of the EU with the UN, the study examined 
two hypothetically distinct variables drawn from the two IR theories. The research work 
suggests that other independent variables could influence the EU’s active role as a security 
actor along with the UN in maintaining international peace and security.  
Besides, although this study was carefully prepared, there still remain significant concerns 
regarding the utility of the data with limited supporting evidence. Due to the limited access 
to each nation’s substantial document, the study presented the fundamental problem of large 
percentage increases in very low absolute trade numbers. In order to scrutinise the realist 
claims about the correlations between the economic interests and motivations of the chief 
negotiator, overall further and different data is required to consider the hypothesis. Hence, 
further research work needs to identify possible alternatives and provide supplementary 
source in order to ensure the credibility of the research argument and outcome. As briefly 
mentioned earlier, for example, a detailed breakdown of the mineral resources may provide a 
vital clue to the realist argument when it comes to dealing with trade levels. Existing 
corporate investment or foreign direct investment in particular peacekeeping areas may be 
another possible source, as the data seems to be helpful in elaborating on the chief 
negotiator’s trade or investment access which would necessarily have been intervened or 
impeded after the fact of an intervention. 
 In addition, further cases as well as a broad range of actors involved in decision-making, 
including individual actors, countries and organisations, should be investigated to confirm or 
reject theses hypotheses. To conclude, it is hoped that the contribution of this thesis will 
include an implication of the work for future research and an impetus for strengthening 









When the research first got under way, it rapidly recognised potential shortcomings in data 
collection. As the aim of this research project was to investigate the important conditions 
under which the decision on UN-EU cooperation in international peacekeeping is most likely, 
it was essential to examine the simultaneous negotiation process in which important actors 
collaborated to achieve a decision-making outcome. However, academic literature on this 
specific issue was limited. Furthermore, substantial documents and archives are not fully 
disclosed to the public due to the sensitivity of security and defence policy. Official 
documents released to the public often entail the final results without the full details of 
negotiations; documentation was therefore difficult or only partially accessible. It became 
clear that interviews would be the most effective way to access primary sources and data that 
could not be found through public documents.  
The research carried out 35 interviews between February 2009 and June 2012 in New York 
(February-April 2009), Paris (March 2010), Brussels (April 2010), Edinburgh (November 
2010), and Seoul (May-June 2012). Interviews were conducted with officials, academics and 
experts from various institutions; the interviewees included officials from EU Member States’ 
Missions to the UN in New York, officials from the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, officials from non-EU States’ Missions to the UN specialised in peacekeeping 
operations, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence of France, 
officials from the European Commission, officials from the Council of the EU and officials 
from NATO, national officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. In addition, 
academics and experts working in the area of UN-EU relations were also included. Almost 
all interviews were conducted in person, while one interview was conducted via email. All 
interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis and interviewees were guaranteed 
anonymity and confidentiality in order to encourage free expression and honesty on the part 
of interviewees. The interviews were normally recorded and transcribed; except one 
interview that was conducted off the record and notes were taken instead. The research 
adopted in-depth semi structured interviews which lasted generally between 40 minutes and 




In addition to interviews, empirical and primary data was also gathered using non-participant 
observation. The first observation took place during the substantive session of the ‘UN 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping and its Working Group (C-34)’ in New York from 23 
February to 20 March 2009. The author was given a formal authorisation by the Permanent 
Mission of the ROK to the UN as a delegate and special advisor on UN peacekeeping 
operations. The author was allowed to attend and monitor almost all High-level plenary 
meetings, daily working group meetings, and exclusive meetings at the Security Council 
concerning peacekeeping. The second non-participant observation was carried out during the 
‘NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Meeting’ which was held in Edinburgh from 13 to 
17 November 2010. The committee offered the author an accreditation to the meetings as an 
interpreter, and thereby the author witnessed first-hand the procedures of coordination and 
decision-making concerning a closer partnership among nations for maintaining 
regional/international peace and security. The observation allowed the author to acquire 
valuable knowledge of the role of international organisations in promoting cooperation in 
peace and security and to conduct simultaneous interviews with prominent officials.    
This empirical research was well aware that interviewees would undoubtedly be tempted to 
highlight their own institutional role or to not give the exact account of specific events. In 
order to avoid the potential biases generated by the interview data, interviewees were asked 
almost the same questions in general; and on the specific issues and events which demanded 
special knowledge and experience, secondary questions were given. In this way, the research 





















List of Interviews 
 
 
New York (February-April 2009) 
- Interview with an official from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(24/02/2009)  
- Interview with an official from German Mission to the UN 
(24/02/2009)  
- Interview with an official from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN 
(25/02/2009) 
- Interview with an official from German Mission to the UN  
(16/03/2009) 
- Interview with an official from the Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN  
(16/03/2009) 
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN 
(18/03/2009) 
- Interview with an official from the UN Political Affairs 
(26/03/2009)  
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(26/03/2009) 
- Interview with an official from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(02/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN 
(07/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from French Mission to the UN 
(07/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from UK Mission to the UN 
(14/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from the UN Office of Police Capacity 
(15/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from the UN Office of Military Affairs 
(16/04/2009) 
- Interview with an official from an EU Member State Mission to the UN 
(28/04/2009) 
- Interview with an expert from the CIC (24/02/2009) 
- Interview with an expert from the CIC (06/04/2009) 
Paris (March 2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(04/03/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(05/03/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(05/03/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Defence 
(08/03/2010) 





- Interview with an expert form the EUISS 
(03/03/2010) 
- Interview with an expert form the EUISS 
(04/03/2010) 
Brussels (April 2010) 
- Interview with an official from the NATO  
(26/04/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union 
(27/04/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission 
(28/04/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission 
(29/04/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union 
(29/04/2010) 
- Interview with an official from the Council of the European Union 
(30/04/2010) 
- Interview with an expert from the EGMONT 
(30/04/2010) 
Edinburgh (November 2010) 
- Interview with a (former) Minister of National Defence of the ROK to the NATO 
Assembly Annual Meeting (17/11/2010) 
 
Seoul (May-June 2012) 
- Interview with an official from the OSCE  
(31/05/2012) 
- Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy 
(31/05/2012) 
























 ILO International Labour Organization  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization  
WHO World Health Organization  
World Bank Group  
IBRD International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development  
IDA International Development 
Association  
IFC International Finance Corporation 
IMF International Monetary Fund  
ICAO International Civil Aviation 
Organization  
UPU Universal Postal Union  
WMO World Meteorological Organization  
WIPO World Intellectual Property 
Organization  
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural 
Development  
UNIDO United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization  
UNWTO World Tourism Organization  
 
 
Source: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/ (accessed on 05 June 2008). This figure does not include all agencies, programmes, organs 
or bodies associated with these organs of the UN, nor Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice represented in this chart. 
Subsidiary Bodies 
Main Committees 
Human Rights Council 
Other Sessional Committees 
Standing Committees & ad hoc 
Bodies 
Other Subsidiary Organs 




WTO-World Trade Organization 
IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICC-International Criminal Court 
Subsidiary Bodies 
Military Staff Committee 




Functional Commissions  
Commissions on: Narcotic Drugs Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Science and 
Technology for Development Sustainable 
Development Status of Women Population 
and Development Commission for Social 
Development Statistical Commission  
Regional Commissions  
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC)  
Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (ESCAP)  
Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA)  
Other Bodies  
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
United Nations Forum on Forests Sessional 
and standing committees Expert, ad hoc and 
related bodies  
Departments and Offices  
OSG- Office of the Secretary-General  
OLA - Office of Legal Affairs  
DPA- Department of Political Affairs  
UNODA- Office for Disarmament Affairs  
DPKO- Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations  
DFS- Department of Field Support  
OCHA- Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs  
DESA- Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs  
DGACM Department for General Assembly 
and Conference Management  
DPI- Department of Public Information  
DM- Department of Management  
OHRLLS Office of the High Representative 
for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small 
Island Developing States  
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights  
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime  
DSS Department of Safety and Security  
UNOG UN Office at Geneva  
UNOV UN Office at Vienna  
UNON UN Office at Nairobi 
Secretariat General Assembly Security Council Trusteeship Council Economic and Social Council International Court of Justice 
Programmes and Funds 
UNCTAD, ITC, UNDCP, UNEP, UNICEF, 
UNIFEM, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, UNWRA, 
UN-HABITAT, UNAIDS 






Appendix  IV - 1. Direction of Trade of Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2005 840 
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 Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar ($) 
(V)     Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US$) 
(Y)     Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US$) 





Flow 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
DR 
Congo 
Austria Exports (V) 1,754,350 (V) 631,000 (V) 1,177,000 (V) 39,909 (V) 1,636 (V) 40,455 (V) 241,545 (V) 263,091 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 389,561 (V) 140,800 (V) 106,370 (V) 749,430 (V) 1,327,590 (V) 1,146,640 (V) 896,390 (V) 1,268,630 
Belgium Exports (V) 622,764,000 (V) 724,290,000 (V) 689,869,000 (V) 705,945,000 (V) 911,209,000 (V) 595,587,000 (V) 525,451,000 (V) 522,894,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 142,906,000 (V) 104,103,000 (V) 145,068,000 (V) 121,891,000 (V) 132,380,000 (V) 156,722,000 (V) 190,883,000 (V) 252,650,000 
Denmark Exports (V) 70,005 (V) 26,364 (V) 12,355 (V) 10,923 (V) 161,213 (V) 1,021,190 (V) 136,567 (V) 152,545 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 1,798,360 (V) 821,700 (V) 351,166 (V) 1,374,530 (V) 1,699,870 (V) 6,094,720 (V) 6,334,440 (V) 5,277,250 
Finland Exports (V) 44,991,000 (V) 45,567,100 (V) 75,749,600 (V) 82,318,500 (V) 68,738,300 (V) 52,605,400 (V) 230,154,000 (V) 106,206,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 44,991,000 (V) 31,350 (V) 409,090 (V) 518,760 (V) 518,760 (V) 909,590 (V) 1,406,240 (V) 1,529,000 
France Exports (V) 12,971,600 (V) 6,469,000 (V) 17,877,500 (V) 6,037,270 (V) 33,793,700 (V) 26,968,500 (V) 13,150,600 (V) 109,528,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 40,627,300 (V) 29,712,000 (V) 43,907,400 (V) 44,043,700 (V) 85,671,400 (V) 133,138,000 (V) 133,206,000 (V) 142,520,000 
Germany Exports (V) 21,053,800 (V) 5,126,360 (V) 3,431,820 (V) 10,549,100 (V) 7,448,180 (V) 11,300,000 (V) 7,545,450 (V) 17,710,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 37,183,900 (V) 18,100,500 (V) 24,194,500 (V) 33,173,800 (V) 68,808,300 (V) 71,773,900 (V) 71,894,900 (V) 72,637,400 
Greece Exports (V) 1,662,400 (V) 95,727 (V) 565,391 (V) 92,364 (V) 82,455 (V) 124,182 (V) 96,909 (V) 83,727 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 758,321 (V) 768,350 (V) 113,234 (V) 38,830 (V) 443,960 (V) 305,800 (V) 563,420 (V) 640,860 
Ireland Exports (V) 340,666 (V) 93,546 (V) 18,091 (V) 0 (V) 727 (V) 0 (V) 98,546 (V) 34,636 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 5,473,820 (V) 5,541,030 (V) 3,250,610 (V) 3,434,860 (V) 5,327,080 (V) 10,403,900 (V) 18,056,500 (V) 18,280,700 
Italy Exports (V) 42,252,400 (V) 34,206,400 (V) 25,750,400 (V) 20,729,300 (V) 11,137,400 (V) 10,873,000 (V) 13,854,300 (V) 17,851,100 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 14,959,900 (V) 9,812,440 (V) 9,721,910 (V) 12,121,600 (V) 21,627,500 (V) 28,750,300 (V) 26,685,900 (V) 36,088,800 
Luxembourg Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 37,455 (V) 5,909 (V) 36,455 (V) 44,636 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 1,177,780 (V) 901,120 (V) 444,620 (V) 526,460 (V) 838,970 (V) 916,410 (V) 1,206,260 (V) 1,582,350 
Netherlands 
Exports (V) 5,206,050 (V) 5,904,910 (V) 32,691,600 (V) 6,383,910 (V) 2,229,730 (V) 3,881,360 (V) 1,966,640 (V) 7,686,450 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 39,126,300 (V) 23,653,800 (V) 30,112,400 (V) 33,273,500 (V) 48,123,400 (V) 42,393,200 (V) 38,492,300 (V) 64,992,000 
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Portugal Exports (V) 21,813,600 (V) 9,118,090 (V) 9,628,270 (V) 14,992,500 (V) 9,606,450 (V) 11,132,200 (V) 20,672,600 (V) 23,792,700 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 471,089 (V) 332,860 (V) 825,110 (V) 887,150 (V) 4,109,820 (V) 1,725,460 (V) 4,530,350 (V) 5,216,530 
Spain Exports (V) 4,378,380 (V) 3,179,640 (V) 2,315,090 (V) 514,364 (V) 21,422,100 (V) 2,996,910 (V) 2,686,550 (V) 3,947,090 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 6,152,460 (V) 4,965,950 (V) 10,106,300 (V) 3,550,140 (V) 5,286,380 (V) 8,198,300 (V) 11,666,700 (V) 11,216,600 
Sweden Exports (V) 2,156,810 (V) 191,423 (V) 107,938 (V) 43,879 (V) 60,807 (V) 74,029 (V) 3,328 (V) 321,273 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 1,993,180 (V) 184,994 (V) 777,367 (V) 2,939,720 (V) 1,626,030 (V) 1,944,390 (V) 14,161,800 (V) 17,338,500 
United 
Kingdom 
Exports (V) 6,234,020 (V) 4,972,340 (V) 1,267,720 (V) 736,126 (V) 1,326,140 (V) 2,154,340 (V) 7,832,460 (V) 10,123,500 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 10,713,900 (V) 4,734,810 (V) 6,836,600 (V) 15,274,400 (V) 9,148,520 (V) 14,514,900 (V) 13,224,400 (V) 22,934,900 
EU Exports (Y) 790,484,000 (Y) 841,273,000 (Y) 861,257,000 (Y) 848,976,000 (Y) 1,068,210,000 (Y) 719,406,000 (Y) 826,421,000 (Y) 822,454,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (Y) 304,535,000 (Y) 204,274,000 (Y) 277,708,000 (Y) 274,897,000 (Y) 387,329,000 (Y) 481,751,000 (Y) 537,313,000 (Y) 658,169,000 
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Flow 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gabon 
Austria 
Exports (v) 1,363 (v) 3,545 (v) 7,272 (v) 66,545.5 27,090 12,000 203,727 346,636 6,090 
Imports (c.i.f.) (v) 7,378,800 15,138,300 18,064,500 19,680,800 22,774,100 17,352,400 43,775,300  23,496,800  23,559,400  
Belgium 
Exports (v) 12,936,400 11,436,400 12,193,400 13,151,400  14,460,400  18,443,500  21,639,000  21,648,700  15,184,100  
Imports (c.i.f.) 37,862,000 34,572,300 45343300 51034000 67206800 85,060,200 149,070,000 132,654,000 118,385,000 
Cyprus 
Exports 379,669  358,559  90,946  468,621  584,216  202,091  897,545  1,653,640  444,273  
Imports (c.i.f.) 45976.3 0 0 13592 0 4400 0 0 47190 
Czech 
Republic 
Exports 26,291.30  61,090.10  327,871.00  144,598.00  722,102.00  -    37,727  727  -    
Imports (c.i.f.) 751,933  403,195  465,640  2,221,570  1,423,770  174,350  1,081,850  1,716,550  126,830  
Denmark 
Exports 316,763  218,789  386,397  910,448  730,455  562,273  1,114,180  510,818  482,000  
Imports (c.i.f.) 4,150,040  1,407,270  2,988,920  2,203,280  1,886,500  10,733,400  2,736,140  7,225,570  3,021,040  
Estonia 
Exports 0 9,090.91  9,090.91  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14300 
Finland 
Exports 114091 27909.1 1000 0 0 0 320455 1272.73 38636.4 
Imports (c.i.f.) 489,830.00  664,950.00  719,290.00  1032680 227260 7180250 2164910 7412570 1924340 
France 
Exports 770,783,000 378,007,000 319,465,000 330,445,000 321,735,000 365,529,000 587,848,000 471,510,000 301,946,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) 907,469,000 583,370,000 691,371,000 706,833,000 686,298,000 688,617,000 765,463,000 904,554,000 764,311,000 
Germany 
Exports 9,143,640 7,546,360 20,031,800 15,211,800 18,589,100 20,321,100 71,127,300 137,450,000 251,287,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) 28,923,400 28,960,800  35,875,400  44,468,600  43,049,600  73,031,400  68,209,000  86,150,100  70,654,600  
Greece 
Exports 12478400 9696450 11532100 15542400 17657500 17018700 11285300 39792500 16542900 
Imports (c.i.f.) 547800 3264800 1563980 5388240 11526000 241120 17852200 260810 146960 
Hungary 
Exports 107,273.00  1,818.18  50,909.10  72,727.30  60,090.90  30,272.70  146,636.00  23,454.50  2,545.45  
Imports (c.i.f.) 83600 0 110,000 562,100.00  611,050.00  813,010.00  617,870.00  510,290.00  356,620.00  
Ireland 
Exports 2,950,450.00  90.91  41,181.80  13,818.20  30,000.00  15,000.00  36,727.30  354,909.00  4,818.18  
Imports (c.i.f.) 2,311,100  2,849,220  2,534,180  2,195,930  4,473,150  3,269,750  5,661,260  5,804,810  3,321,230  
Italy 
Exports 33,605,800  36,471,600  51,423,700  80,576,800  82,361,000  80,241,900  88,315,000  304,811,000 50,268,800 
Imports (c.i.f.) 30,488,900  38,749,200  36,256,400  46,499,000  48,497,800  60,596,000  65,672,200  87,375,100  76,375,100  
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 Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar ($) 
(V)     Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US$) 
(Y)     Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US$) 
c.i.f.    Cost, Insurance, and freight 
n.a.      Data not available 
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Latvia 
Exports 0 0 0 0 0 189,727  89,636  0 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 0 0 0 0 0 19,030  522,500  80,850  129,470  
Lithuania 
Exports 1,363.64  19,818.20  182  20,363.60  0 0 29,273  0 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 16,403.60  16,966.00  18,857.90  24,525.40  42,680.00  112,530  119,240  21,560  135,080  
Luxembourg 
Exports 181.82  90.91  181.82  0 0 35,636  0 1,182  273  
Imports (c.i.f.) 489,280  637,340  596,860  1,089,110  586,960  1,023,990  1,536,260  1,907,290  1,941,170  
Malta 
Exports 0 0 0 1,569.95  0 0 0 0 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 22,052.50  0 0 168,952  334,290  325,600  236,940  223,850  103,620  
Netherlands 
Exports 13,548,800  12,829,800  10,904,300  9,559,180  42,043,500  17,501,500  29,620,700  283,307,000  40,545,000  
Imports (c.i.f.) 35,624,900  41,669,300  49,295,500  64,267,200  64,576,300  107,804,000  129,277,000  119,005,000  103,081,000  
Poland 
Exports 1,298,990  1,037,090  1,865,550  1,738,270  294,364  1,669,910  518,091  758,091  860,909  
Imports (c.i.f.) 257773 557370 2039950 848823 1711600 2691480 3288890 3414400 2844380 
Portugal 
Exports 52,330,500  20,602,500  61,892,800  83,689,000  17,703,100  10,758,200  14,264,500  9,703,730  6,105,640  
Imports (c.i.f.) 2,734,600  4,748,150  22,256,700  50,894,000  2,299,550  2,899,820  2,562,230  6,945,950  3,334,540  
Slovakia 
Exports 53611 34,119.70  38,191.80  49,983.90  17,000  181.818 1,454.55  272.727 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 28,631.70  97,279.80  106,216.00  119,975.00  574,200.00  1,448,260.00  639,430.00  1,160,500.00  725,340.00  
Slovenia 
Exports 0 1,925.45  6,443.27  8,432.72  92,727.30  0 5,090.91  27,545.50  0 
Imports (c.i.f.) 0 16016 0 0 541,530  874,610  5,170  142,780  24,860  
Spain 
Exports 47,251,500  26,804,600  26,630,800  67,594,400  116,399,000 150,447,000 107,243,000 342,209,000 276,305,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) 21,756,400  31,785,700  22,046,000  27,978,600  63,451,700  44,443,100  63,440,300  60,612,100  40,460,200  
Sweden 
Exports 57,330  33,734  0 120,040  226,091  29,546  19,273  24,182  5,364  
Imports (c.i.f.) 3,814,170  3,229,990  4,993,270  11,829,900  9,220,530  19,793,300  27,236,600  16,395,600  13,526,500  
United 
Kingdom 
Exports 5,662,940  7,900,830  35,043,000  11,174,000  16,711,800  10,720,700  10,834,400  6,024,180  23,144,600  
Imports (c.i.f.) 55,317,400  40,898,500  60,054,100  95,340,500  58,620,300  57,641,400  69,061,500  94,752,700  74,963,700  
Switzerland 
Exports 488,878  139,779  230,879  7,185,440  625,636  293,630  1,029,650  751,427  234,905  
Imports (c.i.f.) 5,473,810  5,057,300  6,424,730  10,787,900  9,937,790  6,440,540  3,836,470  6,679,350  23,384,700  
Turkey 
Exports 6,564,080  6,785,220  7,542,920  16,780,900  20,671,300  13,576,900  21,647,400  24,582,600  10,531,300  









Appendix IV - 3. Direction of Trade of Chad, 2001-2009842  
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 Source: Based on information from The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database (1980-2009), Currency: US dollar ($) 
(V)     Identifies data consolidated from estimated monthly/quarterly partner country records (US$) 
(Y)     Estimated by other methods, sometimes including the use of partner country records (US$) 
c.i.f.    Cost, Insurance, and freight 





Flow 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Chad 
Austria Exports (v) 356,545  (V) 0  (V) 0 (V) 9,091 (V) 3,364 (V) 10,000 (V) 57,091 (V) 0 (V) 2,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 330,770 (V) 163,130 (V) 3,060,860 (V) 1,627,560 (V) 7,490,780 (V) 6,427,190 (V) 2,674,100 (V) 6,287,160 (V) 23,896,500 
Belgium Exports (V) 1,700,000 (V) 836,364 (V) 1,291,320 (V) 19,652 (V) 28,636 (V) 48,364 (V) 238,273 (V) 203,545 (V) 16,091 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 10,384,000 (V) 12,943,000 (V) 10,678,600 (V) 18,868,300 (V) 32,916,600 (V) 25,964,800 (V) 20,589,200 (V) 26,693,300 (V) 35,745,800 
Bulgaria Exports (V) 1,818 (V) 0 (V) 15 (V) 2,347 (V) 20,952 (V) 0 (V) 364 (V) 364 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 9,900 (V) 11,000 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 1,030,560 (V) 953,590 (V) 100,980 (V) 71,390 (V) 36,080 
Cyprus Exports (V) 9,542 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 24,533 (Y) 28,668 (V) 182 (V) 182 (V) 0 (V) 91 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 40,810 (V) 8,800 (V) 0 (V) 0 
Czech 
Republic 
Exports (V) 4,206,620 (V) 2,443,600 (V) 2,943,990  (V) 2,097,640 (V) 1,847,540 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 57,841 (V) 167,998 (V) 415,293 (V) 42,230 (V) 96,320 (V) 610,280 (V) 142,450 (V) 108,130 (V) 1,180,630 
Denmark Exports (V) 21,846 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 455 (V) 91 (V) 364 (V) 4,273 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 3,198,440 (V) 3,539,080 (V) 1,953,650 (V) 1,432,130 (V) 1,229,910 (V) 1,856,360 (V) 2,789,050 (V) 6,019,420 (V) 4,869,370 
Estonia Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 455 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 55,000 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 
Finland Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 1,091 (V) 3,727 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 97,350 (V) 107,470 (V) 675,290 (V) 187,660 (V) 10,241,100 (V) 501,600 (V) 899,690 (V) 1,322,310 (V) 2,169,310 
France Exports (V) 5,253,640 (V) 4,077,360 (V) 5,739,090 (V) 7,898,270 (V) 14,246,200 (V) 12,964,300 (V) 7,495,550 (V) 50,317,200 (V) 99,959,600 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 104,124,000 (V) 140,568,000 (V) 98,640,000 (V) 89,499,800 (V) 103,361,000 (V) 98,580,200 (V) 146,142,000 (V) 156,527,000 (V) 161,164,000 
Germany 
Exports (V) 12,074,500 (V) 10,031,800 (V) 14,658,200 (V) 11,341,800 (V) 11,150,900 (V) 9,874,820 (V) 11,151,400 (V) 9,125,180 (V) 4,692,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 9,881,300 (V) 24,534,400 (V) 13,390,300 (V) 26,206,400 (V) 15,254,800 (V) 38,791,100 (V) 54,122,600 (V) 49,603,600 (V) 30,250,000 
Greece 
Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 23,091 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 6,454,180 (V) 2,601,730 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 117,480 (V) 144,980 (V) 100,980 (V) 48,730 (V) 7,590 (V) 90,970 (V) 440 (V) 38,060 (V) 0 
Hungary 
Exports (V) 310,000 (V) 9,091 (V) 26,364 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 108,545 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 31,900 (V) 1,907,400 (V) 278,300 (V) 0 (V) 205,260 (V) 7,040 (V) 8,030 (V) 2,860 (V) 29,040 
Ireland 
Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 91 (V) 14,818 (V) 0 (V) 1,455 (V) 1,364 (V) 1,107,730 (V) 2,656,090 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 188,100 (V) 154,440 (V) 946,660 (V) 219,230 (V) 215,820 (V) 77,330 (V) 554,290 (V) 796,400 (V) 9,813,870 
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Italy Exports (V) 864,455 (V) 424,000 (V) 902,909 (V) 476,364 (V) 360,091 (V) 177,909 (V) 84,636 (V) 25,364 (V) 18,455 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 7,650,720 (V) 8,873,260 (V) 8,517,520 (V) 7,187,620 (V) 7,202,250 (V) 6,718,800 (V) 12,323,400 (V) 26,616,500 (V) 59,374,700 
Latvia 
Exports n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Imports (c.i.f.) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania 
Exports n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Imports (c.i.f.) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 3,182 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 15,909 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 55,550 (V) 220,770 (V) 149,380 (V) 0 (V) 12,100 (V) 11,770 (V) 252,670 (V) 72,930 (V) 38,280 
Malta Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 182 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 273,240 (V) 660,880 (V) 1,106,710 (V) 2,033,240 
Netherlands Exports (V) 3,636 (V) 1,727 (V) 82,364 (V) 50,364 (V) 31,455 (V) 160,273 (V) 42,636 (V) 16,107,000 (V) 31,591,400 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 15,910,700 (V) 9,467,810 (V) 15,560,700 (V) 14,273,400 (V) 19,821,300 (V) 14,730,100 (V) 21,647,100 (V) 35,896,600 (V) 39,703,600 
Poland Exports (V) 3,619,620 (V) 2,719,270 (V) 2,727,820 (V) 2,289,400 (V) 111,545 (V) 111,545 (V) 111,545 (V) 111,545 (V) 3,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 805,383 (V) 273,350 (V) 665,280 (V) 605,550 (V) 406,120 (V) 636,130 (V) 688,380 (V) 287,980 (V) 918,830 
Portugal Exports (V) 22,346,000 (V) 19,980,700 (V) 13,768,500 (V) 48,084,600 (V) 48,991,000 (V) 13,519,600 (V) 14,913,500 (V) 6,531,640 (V) 3,810,450 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 1,201,200 (V) 12,054,800 (V) 4,790,170 (V) 42,717,800 (V) 22,258,800 (V) 466,950 (V) 1,212,640 (V) 118,580 (V) 279,510 
Romania Exports (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 36,364 (V) 0  (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 0 (V) 11,000 (V) 0 (V) 638,000 (V) 125,620 (V) 6,380 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 117,700 
Slovakia Exports (V) 124 (V) 221,325 (Y) 280,126 (Y) 367,899 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 91 (V) 0 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 324,695 (V) 533 (Y) 675 (Y) 886 (V) 0 (V) 25,300 (V) 58,080 (V) 117,920 (V) 108,460 
Slovenia Exports (V) 1,819,220 (V) 470,985 (V) 945,937 (Y) 1,242,330 (V) 301,364 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 182 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 242,639 (V) 199,517 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 0 (V) 117,480 (V) 0 
Spain Exports (V) 4,093,450 (V) 3,732,180 (V) 3,345,090 (V) 1,470,450 (V) 317,636 (V) 0 (V) 686,000 (V) 33,818 (V) 737,182 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 858,880 (V) 1,301,520 (V) 1,286,780 (V) 1,772,430 (V) 1,404,260 (V) 5,112,580 (V) 5,601,420 (V) 5,198,050 (V) 5,564,020 
Sweden Exports (V) 0 (V) 250 (V) 539 (V) 2,651,950 (V) 4,751,450 (V) 2,855,450 (V) 1,248,090 (V) 182 (V) 6,182 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 935,110 (V) 378,441 (V) 1,508,160 (V) 4,481,180 (V) 12,091,100 (V) 8,729,820 (V) 12,010,400 (V) 5,381,860 (V) 11,126,600 
United 
Kingdom 
Exports (V) 51,728 (V) 163,767 (V) 1,690,330 (V) 266,987 (V) 587,554 (V) 408,870 (V) 1,402,000 (V) 1,174,450 (V) 830,000 
Imports (c.i.f.) (V) 5,815,890 (V) 7,411,080 (V) 6,112,810 (V) 9,465,000 (V) 9,792,170 (V) 6,253,840 (V) 13,092,600 (V) 24,052,100 (V) 24,920,200 
EU 
Exports (Y) 56,732,800 (Y) 45,112,500 (Y) 48,442,300 (Y) 78,308,600 (Y) 82,801,400 (Y) 40,021,700 (Y) 37,368,000 (Y) 91,212,200 (Y) 146,929,000 
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